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ABSTRACT 
This thesis represents an attempt to show how recent research in
pragmatic theory can contribute to our understanding of humour.
Two inferential theories have been selected: speech act theory
and relevance theory. In addition, I have looked at the
modification of the speech act model proposed by Leech.
An exposition of each theory is followed by an account of how
these theories can be applied to humour. Some research into
humour has already been carried out using the speech act model.
This is described and evaluated. For Leech's extension of that
model, and for the relevance-theoretic model, there is virtually
no existing research on which to draw. Consequently, both the
application of these theories to humour, and their evaluation
thereof, are my own.
Speech act accounts of humour are based on the notion that
humorous utterances are unconventional and unpredictable. One
way of exploiting our expectations, and thereby creating a condo
effect, it is argued, is to violate the norms of conversation
(that is to say, Grice's maxims and Searle's conditions). This
analysis is found to be insufficient, on its own, to distinguish
between the humorous and the non-humorous utterance. I will show
how the unpredictable, unconventional remark can be used to
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create a number of different effects, some humorous, some non-
humorous. Maxim violation is thus seen to be inadequate, both as
a descriptive and as an explanatory tool.
Relevance theory constitutes a radical departure from the whole
maxim-based framework. Adopting this approach to the analysis of
verbal humour, I will try to find out exactly what is going on in
our minds when we interpret humorously intended utterances. I
will identify the various processes which I believe are employed
in the appreciation of verbal jokes, and will conclude that these
processes are not unique to humour. In spite of this, I will
claim that there is a sense in which verbal humour can be said to
be unique.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Brief historical overview 
The study of humour has traditionally been seen as a sub-part of
the study of aesthetics, and as such has been of interest
primarily to philosophers (see, for example, Edwards, 1967). The
first of the Greek philosophers known to have considered the
nature of humour and laughter was Plato. He believed that the
absurd was based on an unfortunate lack of self-knowledge,
claiming in Philebus that when we laugh at what is ridiculous in
our friends, we are experiencing a combination of both delight
and envy, that is, we mix together both pain and pleasure (Plato,
1861). Ve know also that Aristotle considered the nature of the
ludicrous in (the lost second book of) Poetics. Scant references
to comedy in the first, and only extant, volume tell us that, in
common with Plato, he saw the ridiculous as something rather ugly
and distorted (Aristotle, 1934).
For Kant humour stemmed from some kind of frustrated expectation,
that is, a bringing together of two things that are normally kept
in separate compartments in our minds:
"Humour, in a good sense, means the talent for being able to
put oneself at will into a certain frame of mind in which
everything is estimated on lines that go quite off the
beaten track (a topsy turvy view of things), and yet on
lines that follow certain principles, rational in
the case of such a mental temperament." (Kant, 1952: 203)
Schopenhauer saw the essence of humour as the creation of an
incongruity between a concept and the real object:
"The intentionally ludicrous is the joke. It is the effort to
bring about a discrepancy between the conceptions of another
and the reality by disarranging one of the two."
(Schopenhauer, 1909: 281)
Kant and Sdhopenhauer were among the first to espouse an approach
which came to be known as incongruity theory. Other incongruity
theorists include Beattie (1776), a Scottish philosopher and
contemporary of Kant; Maier (1932); Eastman (1937); Monro (1951);
and Koestler (1964).
In contrast, Hobbes subscribed to the superiority theory of
humour, regarding laughter as the result of a sudden feeling of
superiority over others:
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"..• the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory
arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in
ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with
our own formerly." (Hobbes, 1962: 46)
Bergson, whose book Laughter is probably the best known work on
humour by a philosopher, also held a version of the superiority
theory (Bergson, 1911). For him, laughter is always at
"something mechanical encrusted upon the living" (Bergson, ibid:
37). Thus, for Bergson, the archetypal comic character is a man
with a fixed idea. Bergson's thinking is quite strongly
influenced by the comic characters created by Xoliere, but he
does occasionally illustrate his ideas with other examples.
Take, for instance, the following, which features a group of men
obsessed with protocol:
"Twenty years ago, a large steamer was wrecked off the coast at
Dieppe. Vith considerable difficulty some of the passengers
were rescued in a boat. A few custom-house officers, who
had courageously rushed to their assistance, began by asking
then 'if they had anything to declare'." (Bergson, ibid: 46)
Other theorists who adhered to some version of the superiority
model include Carpenter (1922); Ludovici (1932); Leacock (1935);
and Rapp (1951).
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The rise of psychology, and in particular of psychoanalysis, led
to the development of the third, and last, major type of humour
theory. It is known as relief theory and its most influential
exponent was Freud (Freud, 1976). Relief theory is based on the
view that we laugh when we are released from the constraints
imposed on us by society. Other exponents of relief theory
include Freud's teacher, Lipps (1898); Kline (1907); Spencer
(1911); Gregory (1924).
These approaches to humour are by no means mutually exclusive,
but to help us understand something of the essential differences
between them, consider the following exchange.
(1) Diner: What's this fly doing in my soup?
Waiter: Looks like the breast stroke, sir.
For proponents of the incongruity theory, the waiter's reply is
humorous because it is unexpected and inappropriate. A more
recent version of this theory, known as incongruity-resolution
theory, holds that, to be conic, the incongruity has to be
rendered congruous, or meaningful in some way (Schultz, 1972;
Suls, 1972). In (1) the waiter's reply is incongruous because it
is an unexpected response to the diner's question. However, if
we spot the ambiguity, we can reanalyse the diner's utterance and
this will render meaningful and in some sense more appropriate
the waiter's reply.
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For proponents of the superiority, or disparagement theory, we
laugh because we feel superior to the waiter, who is stupid
enough to think that the diner really wanted to know how the fly
in his soup was managing to stay afloat, or to the diner, who has
failed to make himself understood. 	 Some superiority theorists
believe that laughter is a healthy, relatively harmless, outlet
for human aggression, since it replaces physical attacks on one's
opponents, while others believe that, on the contrary, any form
of victimisation or ridicule is wrong.
Lastly, relief theorists argue that we laugh at (1) when we are
no longer bound by the linguistic constraint of univocality, that
is, by the requirement that one utterance has one, and only one,
meaning. In addition to this, we laugh because we are liberated
from our inhibitions, which derive from the socially instilled
requirement that we suppress our feelings of mirth at the
waiter's misunderstanding (note 1).
These theories are still around today in some form or another,
although it is the incongruity theorists who have arguably
attracted the most disciples (see, for example, Rothbart, 1976;
Schultz, 1976; Xerhardt, 1976, 1977; Suls, 1972, 1983; Bayou,
1988; Xorreall, 1983, 1987, 1989). 	 Moreover, with the
burgeoning of the social sciences, the study of humour has
extended beyond the confines of philosophy and psychology to
become a multidisciplinary field of enquiry, of interest to
sociologists (e.g. Fine, 1983; Xulkay, 1988; Davies, 1990);
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anthropologists (e.g. Douglas, 1968; Johnson, 1975, 1976, 1978;
Apte, 1985); semioticians (e.g. Xilner, 1972; Boussiac, 1977);
literary theorists (e.g. Hurst, 1987; Chard-Hutchinson, 1991);
ethnographers (e.g. S herzer, 1978); health professionals (e.g.
Robinson, 1991); linguists (e.g. Hackett, 1977; Pepicello and
Weisberg, 1983; Raskin, 1985); and pragnatists (e.g. Wilson and
Sperber, 1988). I have decided to place this study within the
framework of pragmatic, as opposed to linguistic, theory. The
reason for this will become clear when we consider the nature of
these two disciplines, and the nature of humour itself.
1.2. Linguistics and humour 
Raskin is arguably the first, and most influential, linguist to
have developed a comprehensive theory of humour, based on his own
semantic theory (Raskin, 1985). Although ostensibly working
within a Chomskyan framework, Raskin's approach is in fact at
odds with one of the basic tenets of Chomskyan linguistics. I'll
explain.
For Chomsky (1986), the central goal of linguistics is the study
of 1-language, where language is seen as a system, an
internalised set of rules or principles This system is an
abstract construct, which can be studied independently of the use
to which it is put. Although knowledge of the system is vitally
important in verbal communication, it is woefully inadequate when
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it comes to explaining how language is used and understood in
concrete situations. Thus an important distinction has developed
between semantics, which forms part of our gramnmar or I-language
(and is thus a branch of linguistics), and pragmatics, which
deals with our ability to convey and interpret verbal messages.
Put briefly, semantics has to do with sentence meaning, i.e. the
semantic representation of sentences, while pragmatics has to do
with speaker meaning, i.e. the interpretation of utterances in
context. (For discussion of the semantics/pragmatics
distinction, see, for example, Smith and Wilson, 1979, Chapters 7
and 8; Leech, 1981, Chapter 16; Lyons, 1981, Chapter 5;
Blakemore, 1987, Chapter 1.)
Ve don't have to think long about the nature of humour before we
come to the conclusion that it must be approached within the
framework of pragmatic, rather than semantic, theory. The main
reason for this is quite simple. I will quote Ziv and Gadish on
the subject. "Intentional humor, they claim, "is created by
people to be enjoyed by people. This humor can be conceptualized
as a form of communication .... As with any communication, humor
implies three elements: a communicator, a listener, and a
message" (Ziv and Gadish, 1989: 760). In other words, humour is
not a property of sentences but of utterances, and as such it
depends for its existence on a context. Semantics, which only 
deals with sentences, cannot begin to give an account of a
phenomenon which falls so completely outside its domain.
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Raskin's stand on this issue is both confused and confusing. Be
acknowledges the importance of context in the creation of humour,
and incorporates into his theory the notions of implicature,
presupposition and entailment. Anyone familiar with these
categories will know that they cone from pragmatics, and in fact,
on reading Raskin's analysis, one soon reaches the conclusion
that his approach is not semantic, but pragmatic, in nature.
Raskin's mistake, then, lies more in his blurring of the
semantics-pragmatics distinction than in any fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of humour in relation to language
and communication. Ve will return to Raskin's analysis later on,
when we have considered the nature of the discipline which does
look as though it night be of some use to us, namely pragmatics.
1.3. GoialnunicatiML.thearj_lind_humauz
If we accept the basic premise that intentional humour involves
communication, then we night reasonably expect a theory of
communication to shed some light on our understanding of humorous
effects. Semioticians, who study both verbal and non-verbal
communication, have indeed applied their approach to the analysis
of humorous data. Xilner, for example, sees the essence of
humour as the juxtaposition of two distinct universes of
discourse (Milner, 1972). Following Saussure (1974) and Lyons
(1977), who see meaning in terns of differential relations,
Xilner suggests that the most effective means of achieving
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differential meaning - and thereby creating the necessary clash
of universes - is through the process of reversal. For Xilner,
then, a joke is simply a form of reversal (Xilner, ibid). He
identifies three types of reversal: paradigmatic (i.e. puns),
syntagmatic (i.e. spoonerisms) and paragrannatic (i.e. chiastic
structures). In spite of his use of the terms Ram and
spoonerism, Milner regards all these types of reversal as
situational as well as verbal.
To look at humour within the framework of pragmatic theory is
necessarily more restrictive, since pragmatics deals only with
verbal communication, while humour is neither exclusively, nor
even primarily, verbal. In spite of this, it seems to me that
there is a lot to be gained from approaching humour from this
perspective. In order to understand why, we need to consider, in
some detail, the aims of pragmatic theory.
1. 4 . Ille831125_oat_pragnatias.
I have already made the point that while semantics tells us what
a sentence means, pragmatics tells us what an utterance conveys.
A simple example will illustrate the inadequacy of semantic
theory when it comes to accounting for the full interpretation of
an utterance in context. Consider (2).
(2) The queen is dead.
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In interpreting an utterance of (2) the hearer would have to
know, first, which particular queen is being referred to at which
particular time, and second, whether dead is being used literally
or metaphorically. The speaker might not be describing the
physical state of the queen but rather her lack of power or
prestige. Or she night be expressing her opinion that the
monarchy is an anachronism. Lastly, the hearer would have to
disambiguate the word queen. Is the speaker referring to a
female sovereign, as I have so far assumed, a fertile female bee,
or a gay man? (The complete utterance is also, incidentally, the
title of a song by the (disbanded) pop group 'The Smiths', a fact
which opens up yet more possibilities.)
Reference assignment, disambiguation, and decisions about whether
an utterance is literally or figuratively intended are Just a few
of the wide range of processes that pragmatic theory must be able
to account for. (On the goals of pragmatics, see Levinson, 1983,
Chapter 1, Sperber and Vilson, 1986, Chapter 1; Leech, 1983,
Chapter 1.) The central problem is quite simply this: how is
it, that the hearer is able to pick, not Just any interpretation
of (2), but the interpretation intended by the speaker?
Broadly speaking, there are two different answers to this
question, depending on which model of pragmatics is adopted.
Code theorists see pragmatics as an extension of the grammar:
they believe that the semantic representation of the sentence
(sentence meaning), together with pragmatic rules and a
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description of the context, will yield the correct interpretation
of the utterance (utterer's meaning). Raskin's semantic (sic)
theory, which uses a script-based lexicon and combinatorial
rules, is, in fact, a pragmatic theory based on this model.
At the centre of Raskin's semantic theory is the notion of
script.	 The script", according to Raskin, is a large chunk of
semantic information surrounding the word or evoked by it. (It)
... is a cognitive structure internalized by the native speaker
and it represents the native speaker's knowledge of a small part
of the world." (Raskin, ibid: 81) A script-based lexicon, then,
does not just contain information about the inherent meaning of'
individual words, it also contains information about how those
words are actually used and the objects they denote. The
combinatorial rules tell us the ways in which individual words
can be combined to form meaningful strings.
If we take doctor, for instance, the lexicon will tell us that
this word, used as a noun, can have any of four meanings: the
'physician' meaning; the 'Ph.D.' meaning, the 'mechanical
troubleshooting device' meaning and the 'artificial fly' meaning.
A script-based lexicon will supply further information about each
of these four meanings so that when the word doctor occurs in a
sentence (Raskin talks about sentences as opposed to utterances),
the hearer will be able to decide which of these four meanings,
or scripts, was intended. According to Raskin, this is not
usually difficult, as there will be other words in the sentence
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which will evoke a similar script. In (3), for example, doctor 
combines with ilito evoke the 'physician' meaning.
(3) She looked so ill I decided to call the doctor.
If there is no other word in the sentence to assist the hearer in
the selection of the correct interpretation, contextual clues,
Including information conveyed in previous sentences, will be
brought into play. In (4), for example, it is obvious, from the
preceding remark, that queen refers to our female sovereign.
(4) A: Why are there so many people outside Buckingham Palace?
B: Didn't you know? The queen is dead.
The assumption behind Raskin's approach is that although choices
have to be made when we cone to interpret an utterance, these
choices are well defined in advance and strictly limited. It is
on this point that Raskin, and other exponents of the code model,
differ from the inferentialists, who believe that when it cones
to interpreting utterances in context the possibilities are
literally limitless. An example will illustrate just how far
removed utterance meaning can be from sentence meaning, and how
crucial, therefore, is our ability to draw the correct
inferences. Consider (5).
(5) Andy goes shopping.
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(5) is a newspaper headline. It appeared in The Observer on 1
March, 1987, shortly after the death of Andy Warhol. To
interpret this headline one would have to know that Warhol once
compared death - or life after death - to a shopping trip:
(8) I never think that people die - they must go to department
stores. (Andy Warhol)
The point about (5) is that it illustrates how an utterance can
be used to convey virtually anything at all, given an appropriate
context. The problem for Raskin lies in explaining exactly how,
we construct the context that enables us to interpret the
utterance in (5) as being roughly synonymous with (7):
(7) Andy Warhol is dead.
Although Raskin takes account of our inference-drawing abilities
in utterance interpretation, he limits his discussion to familiar
examples which can be easily accounted for. At the dinner table,
for instance, a question such as:
(8) Can you pass the salt?
would be appropriately perceived, not as a question, but as a
polite request. More complex examples such as (5), where the
contextual clues cannot be so easily codified, are just not
discussed (note 2).
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Before we look at an alternative to this approach to utterance
interpretation, we will consider how the code model might be
applied to a study of verbal humour.
1.5. Lacada_mcifieL_Qi_luamour_
In applying his semantic theory to the analysis of humorous data,
Raskin makes a distinction between bona-fide and non-bona-fide
discourse. Bona-fide discourse is governed by Grice's co-
operative principle and maxims, while non-bona-fide discourse is
governed by quite different principles. When speakers are in
joke-telling mode, for example, "the hearer does not expect the
speaker to tell the truth or to convey to him any relevant
information" (Raskin, ibid, p 103). In other words, jokes do not
conform to the expectations we have of normal (i.e. bona-fide)
discourse.
Another important point about Raskin's approach is that he
believes that it is possible to identify the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a text to qualify as a joke. A text can
be characterised as a joke, he says, if the following conditions
are satisfied.
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"1) The text is compatible, fully, or in part, with two
different scripts
2) The two scripts with which the text is compatible are
opposite"
(Raskin, ibid: 99)
Raskin then goes on to identify three basic types of script
oppositeness:
1) actual vs. non-actual situation;
2) normal, expected state of affairs vs. abnormal, unexpected
state of affairs;
3) possible, plausible situation vs. fully or partially
impossible or much less plausible situation.
The following example, one of Raskin's own, will illustrate.
Consider (9).
(9) "Is the doctor in?" the patient asked in his bronchial
whisper.
"Jo," the doctor's young and pretty wife whispered in
reply. "Come right in."
In (9) the words patient and bronchial help to evoke the
'physician' meaning of the potentially ambiguous word doctor.
The script evoked is one in which Ei patient is visiting his
doctor because he has bronchitis. However, the doctor's wife
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replies in such a way as to evoke a very different script indeed.
The fact that she is young and pretty and whispers her reply is
at first incongruous, until we realise that there is another
script operating here - one in which two lovers are meeting in
secret (and the spouse of one of these happens to be a doctor).
The type of script oppositeness that occurs in this example is
one in which a normal, expected state of affairs (patient visits
doctor) constrasts with an abnormal, unexpected state of affairs
(patient visits doctor's wife when her husband is out).
According to Raskin, this is a case of the doctor script
overlapping with the lover (or adultery) script. (It may be a
small point, but I would want to argue that, if anything, it is
the patient script which overlaps with the lover script, since it
is the patient, not the doctor, who is coundtting adultery.)
One problem with this analysis is that it does not take account
of the speaker's intentions, committing us to the classification
of the exchange in (9) as a joke, simply by virtue of the words
used and the way these are combined. And yet it is not so very
difficult to imagine a context in which the exchange in (9) takes
place, with no humorous overtones whatever.
Indeed, the view that it is possible to account for verbal humour
solely in terms of the linguistic properties of the text is
difficult to sustain, since virtually any utterance can be
construed as either humorous or non-humorous, depending on the
context. Take, as another example, the following.
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(10) Customer: I wondered if you have these in a fourteen?
Assistant: You what? This is a boutique, not the Elephant
House. (Vood, 1985)
If we are amused by (10), this is at least partly because we
recover Vood's intention to amuse. If we fail to recognise her
humorous intention, the assistant's reply would be considered
offensive and highly insulting.
Raskin fails to acknowledge the tenuousness of the humorous
remark, a flaw which, perhaps, is inevitable, given his emphasis
on the lexicon and combinatorial (semantic/pragmatic) rules, and
his concomitant disregard for speaker intentions. In the course
of this thesis we will look at what I consider to be more
promising alternatives to this approach to utterance
interpetation: the Searle-Grice and the relevance-theoretic
models.
1.6. Inferential models of hunour.
The Searle-Grice and the relevance-theoretic models are termed
inferential theories because they are based on the view that
successful communication is possible because the hearer is able
to work out what the speaker intended to convey (Grice, 1971;
Grice, 1975; Searle, 1969; Searle, 1971; Searle, 1979). This is
not to say that either theory denies that knowledge of a code
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forms a necessary part of our ability to communicate verbally
with one another: they are called inferential theories because
of the emphasis they place on the inference-drawing aspect of the
interpretation process. Moreover, these two theories differ from
each other quite considerably in the degree of importance that
they attach to our inference-drawing abilities. Indeed, if we
were to place Raskin, Searle and Grice, and Wilson and Sperber
on a continuum, Raskin would be at one end, Wilson and Sperber
would be at the other, and Searle and Grice would be somewhere in
the middle. In other words, to talk of code models and inference
models as though the two were completely separate entities, masks
the fact that some, perhaps most, theories have a foot in both
camps. The Searle-Grice and relevance-theoretic models will be
described in full in subsequent chapters. It is sufficient at
this stage to point only to those differences which will affect
our expectations when it comes to enhancing our understanding of
verbal humour.
1.7. Speech act theory and humour 
Ye have established that the aim of pragmatics is to explain how
it is that the hearer recognises the speaker's intentions in
communication. If humour is intended, this is a central part of
what is communicated, and an adequate pragmatic theory must be
able to explain how we arrive at the speaker's humorous
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intention. This involves being able to account for the first two
of the following four categories;
1) speaker intends humour - hearer amused;
2) speaker intends humour - hearer not amused;
3) speaker doesn't intend humour - hearer amused;
4) speaker doesn't intend humour - hearer not amused.
This is another way of saying that speech act theory, along with
any other pragmatic theory, should be able to describe and
explain all intentional verbal humour (note 3).
It should be mentioned that this is not the stated aim of most
speech act theorists working on humour. They are generally
careful to delineate those categories of Jokes which fall within
their frame of reference. Rancher (1980), for example, notes
that a humorous effect can be obtained when the maxims are
violated, but he does not say that maxim violation is the sole
factor in the creation of the comic, nor does he rule out the
existence of other mechanisns as being capable of producing a
humorous effect. Yamaguchi (1988) is even more restrictive. He
looks exclusively at a category of Joke known as the garden-path
Joke, and makes it clear that his analysis can only be called on
to explain this Joke-type.
In spite of the caution displayed by the speech act theorists, I
have attempted to extend the analysis (using Leech's modification
of the theory) to cover a wider range of data. It is thus on my
terns, as they are stated above, that the theory is evaluated.
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1.8. FalgyAnce_thaory_and_hunauz
We will see that relevance theory is altogether more ambitious
than its rivals. Wilson and Sperber have gone beyond the problem
of explaining how utterances are interpreted to consider the much
broader question of what principles govern our processing of
information in general, whether that information is conveyed
verbally or non-verbally. Their theory, then, is a theory, not
only of communication, but of cognition. The wider scope of
relevance theory means that we will expect it to be able to
account for a more comprehensive range of data. Two sources of
humour immediately spring to mind as falling within the scope of
relevance theory, while eluding most speech act theorists. They
are:
1) non-verbal humour; and
2) unintentional humour.
In contrast to standard speech act theory, relevance theory sets
out to account for all communicative behaviour, both verbal and
non-verbal. In addition to verbal humour, then, relevance theory
should be able to give us an account of humour deriving from non-
verbal stimuli - pictures and mime, for example.
Unintentional humour refers to those instances where an
individual is amused by an event, act or utterance, quite
independently of the intentions of the creator (if one exists) of
the humour stimulus. Unintentional humour may be inadvertently
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communicated, but because the effect is created accidentally, we
cannot expect speech act theorists to give us an account of it
(note 4).
Because of the inherent differences between the two approaches,
it should be made clear at the outset exactly what is to be
expected of each theory. As I have already stated, we should
expect speech act theory to be able to account for all
intentional verbal humour while relevance theory should be
capable of accounting for all humour, be it verbal or non-verbal,
intentional or unintentional. In spite of this, I have chosen to
exclude non-verbal humour from my analysis. To consider
instances of non-verbal humour would take the discussion too far
away from the concerns of the speech act theorists, and since
this is essentially a comparative study, it seems inappropriate
to pursue an aspect of humour which is so clearly outside their
domain. Unintentional humour is briefly discussed, however,
since I believe that it can shed light on humour that is
intentional. Moreover, it will become clear that the distinction
between intentional and unintentional humour is not always easily
drawn.
1 . 9 . Concluding remark
Finally a few words about the absurd. It should be emphasised
that it is outside the scope of this study to offer a definition
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of the absurd, a notion which I take more or less for granted.
In other words, I take it as given that there are certain
situations which are perceived as humorous, just as there are
other situations which are perceived as sad, or tragic. This is
not to say that everyone finds the same things funny, or even
that the sane person can be guaranteed to be consistent in his
appreciation of humour. Indeed, the huge variations which occur
in our responses to humour are well-documented (see, for example,
Volff et al., 1934; McGhee, 1973; La Fave et al., 1976; Bourhis
et al., 1977; Sheppard, 1977; Brodzinsky and Rightnyer, 1980;
Dolitsky, 1986; Cetola, 1988; Ruch et al., 1991). Raskin
acknowledges that these individual differences exist, and makes
it clear that his theory represents an idealised state of
affairs:
... the theory is formulated for an ideal speaker-hearer
community, i.e. for people whose senses of humour are
exactly identical." (Raskin, ibid: 58)
Ye have already seen that Raskin is concerned with identifying
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a text to qualify as
a joke, which means that, for the purposes of his theory, these
individual variations must be excluded from his analysis.
Xy aims are somewhat different. I am not trying to produce an
algorithm for the production of a verbal joke; rather I want to
understand what it is about an utterance which facilitates the
- 32 -
evocation of the absurd. After all, a joke is not funny simply
because it describes a ludicrous or amusing state of affairs, as
a comparison between (10) and (11) will demonstrate.
(10) Two taxis collided and 30 Scotsmen were taken to hospital.
(Woody Allen)
(11) Scotsmen are very mean. They travel in enormously
overcrowded taxis to avoid paying the full fare. Once
two taxis containing 30 Scotsmen collided. The
passengers were taken to hospital.
(Wilson and Sperber, 1984: 23)
(10) and (11) describe an identical situation. In normal
circumstances, (10) would be seen as conic, while (11) would not
(note 5). It is for pragmatics to explain the differing effects
created by examples such as (10) and (11). Xy goal, then, is to
identify and describe the structural and contextual properties of
humorous utterances and thereby increase our understanding of how
the absurd is exploited and brought to mind. This will help us
to understand how humorous effects are obtained, and how jokes
are manufactured.
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CHAPTER TWO 
A WA/IM-BASED APPROACH TO PRAGMATICS 
2.1. 1. Ihe_22,2112_-_-_Grar.e_zondel_a_sazgamicatlim
The Searle-Grice model is more or less what its name suggests: a
synthesis of Searle's speech-act theory and Grice's maxim-based
approach to communication. This model is widely accepted among
pragmatists - Searle included - who are aware that, on its own,
speech-act theory fails to give an adequate account of the
interpretation of nonliteral utterances (see, for example,
Searle, 1979: 32). Although it is not clear to what extent
Once would have accepted this model,there is a general consensus
that at least a subset of Grice's output is compatible with
Searle's analysis (Bach and Harnish, 1979; Leech, 1983).
In this section I will look first at the theory of speech-acts.
This will be followed by an introduction to the work of Grice,
after which it will be possible to consider how the two
approaches can be combined. My aim in this outline is merely to
remind the reader of the most salient features of the speech-act
approach, especially those which have been used in the
application of this model to the analysis of humour.
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2.1.2. The theory of speech acts 
Speech-act theory was largely inspired by the work of J. L.
Austin, who argued that language should be viewed as a social,
rather than a scientific, tool (Austin, 1962). This led Austin
to emphasise the functional aspect of language use. For example,
the utterance in (1):
(1) Can you open the door?
can function either as an enquiry ("Are you capable of opening
the door?") or as a request to do something ("Open the door,
please"). Noreover, the effect that the utterance has on the
hearer depends on which of these two interpretations is chosen.
If the hearer interprets the utterance as an enquiry, he will, in
normal circumstances, give a yes-no verbal response; if he
interprets it as a request to open the door, he will, if he is
feeling co-operative, carry out the action required of him.
These, and other, observations led Austin to claim that saying 
involves doing. The speech act, he argued, consists of three
distinct, but interdependent, activities:
1) The locutionary act 
This is the act of uttering a particular sentence with a
specific sense and reference.
2) The_Ulgoliimary_act
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This is the act the speaker intends to perform in uttering
a sentence.
3) Ihe perlocutionary act 
This is the act performed as a result of the speaker
uttering a sentence.
The example in (2) will illustrate these different activities.
(2) Would you like a cup of coffee?
The locutionary act is the actual utterance of the sentence,
"Would you like a cup of coffee?" This utterance has the
illocutionary force (i.e. function) of an offer and the
perlocutionary force (i.e. effect) of making the addressee feel
welcomed (Austin, 1962, lecture VIII; Kempson, 1977: 4.2).
Of the three, it is the illocutionary act which has aroused the
most interest, and many attempts have been made to identify and
describe the various types of illocution. Searle's taxonomy is
probably the most widely accepted, so it is this which is given
below (Searle, 1979).
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2.1.3. Types of illocutionary act 
Assertives 
The speaker is committing herself to the truth of the expressed
proposition, e.g.
- The sky is clear tonight.
- Astbn Villa beat Liverpool.
Directives 
The speaker is trying to get the hearer to do something, e.g.
- Take a seat.
Questions are seen as a sub-class of directive, since in asking a
question the speaker is trying to get the speaker to answer, and
this clearly counts as an activity. So another example of a
directive night be
- Did Aston Villa beat Liverpool?
Commissives 
The speaker is committing herself to some future course of
action, e.g.
- I'll nark those papers.
- I'll cook the dinner.
Expressives 
The speaker is expressing her emotions, e.g.
- I'm so sorry.
- Congratulations!
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Dgalaratima
These correspond to Austin's performatives. The speaker is
'saying something in order to make it so', e.g.
- I pronounce you man and wife.
- I sentence you to ten years.
Sometimes two direct illocutionary points can be made in the sane
utterance. Searle (1979: 28) gives as an example a protest,
which, he says, involves both an expression of disapproval
(expressive) and a petition for change (directive). The claim
is, however, that everything we say - whether it contains one or
more illocutionary points - is classifiable under these five main
categories (Searle, ibid: 29).
2.1.4. Direct and indirect speech acts 
These illocutionary acts can be further subdivided according to
whether the act is performed directly or indirectly.
In some cases the speaker means literally and exactly what she
says. If, for example, a speaker were to utter (3):
(3) The sky is clear tonight
purely and simply in order to inform her addressee that the sky
is clear on the night that the utterance takes place, then the
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speaker of that utterance would be said to have performed a
direct speech act of asserting that the sky was clear on the
night in question.
Searle (1979, chapter 2) is particularly interested in what he
terns Indirect speech acts, where the speaker 'means what he
says, but also means something more' (Searle, ibid: 30).	 We
have already seen that the utterance in (1) above can be used,
not only as a question, but as a request. For Searle, such
utterances have (potentially) two illocutionary forces. The
utterance in (1) has the direct illocutionary force of a
question:
(4) Are you physically capable of opening the door?
and the indirect illocutionary force of a request:
(5) Open the door, please.
Searle believes that utterances such as (1) are 'conventionally'
used to issue directives (Searle, 1979: 36), and further, that
the indirect illocution has primacy over the direct illocution
(Searle, 1979: 30). He illustrates this last point with the
following example:
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... a speaker may utter the sentence 'I want you to do it', by
way of requesting the hearer to do something. The sentence
is incidgAtAlley_32emajw_L_Etateneat, but it is also meant
primarily as a request." (Searle, 1979: 30, my emphasis.)
It should be mentioned here that the role played by convention in
the issuing of indirect requests is disputed by Sadock (1974),
who believes that these utterances are simply ambiguous. This
question will be dealt with in more detail in a later section.
2.1.5. Felicity conditions 
Austin talked about utterances that were infelicitous or
'unhappy' (Austin, 1962, lecture II). He produced a set of
conditions that must be met if the utterance is to be carried out
properly, or felicitously. Searle (1969, chapter 3; 1971: 46-53)
extended this, and it is his classification of four kinds of
condition that we will look at now.
1) Preparatory conditions 
The utterance must be appropriate to the context. If the
utterance has the illocutionary force of an order, for example,
the speaker must have some authority over the hearer.
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2) ampositdomml_samtemisaniationm
These specify restrictions on the content of any given utterance.
A promise, for example, has to refer to some future action on the
part of the speaker.
3) Sincerity condition 
The speaker must be sincere. Thus an apology must be accompanied
by the belief on the part of the speaker that she has acted
wrongly or improperly.
4) Essential condition 
If the speaker intends her utterance as, say, an assertive, then
the utterance must have certain properties. The contradiction in
(4), for example, could not count as an assertive because it is
impossible to commit oneself rationally to its literal truth.
(4) It's raining and it's not raining.
These conditions have to be met before the illocutionary act can
be said to be successfully performed. If they are violated in
some way, they lead to misfires or abuses (Austin, 1962: 16).
According to Austin, an utterance misfires if the illocutionary
act is rendered void for some reason. He gives as an example a
person taking a marriage vow when he is already married. An
utterance can also misfire if there is no satisfactory uptake.
Challenging someone to a duel, for example, requires an
acceptance on the part of the addressee. Abuses occur when the
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speaker violates the sincerity condition - by promising to do
something, for example, when she has absolutely no intention of
carrying out her promise. Austin was aware of the difficulty of
accurately distinguishing between misfires and abuses (Austin,
1962: 16), and indeed Searle prefers to talk in more general
terns about the violation of the conditions leading to utterances
which are defective (Searle, 1969: 54).
2.1.6. Cizio.e/ra_approech_to_oculumintosition.
Grice made a number of important observations about the nature of
communication, and these have been incorporated by Searle into
the speech act framework.
2.1.7. latnralaniaumzaatuzaL_Reaniag.
First, Grice distinguished between naturel. and non-natural
meaning, or meaning IN (Grice, 1957: 54). Natural meaning has
nothing to do with intentional communication, and therefore it
need not concern us here. The notion of non-natural meaning, on
the other hand, is central: it refers to meaning which is
intentionally communicated, but more than that, it represents an
attempt to state, in formal terns, what is actually happening
when we communicate with one another. Once defines meaning NH
(that is, non-natural meaning) thus:
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"'A meant NI something by x' is (roughly) equivalent to 'A
intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an
audience by means of the recognition of this intention'"
(Grice, ibid: 58).
Searle declares this to be a "very useful beginning of an
account of meaning" (Searle, 1969: 43), and offers this
paraphrasing of Grice's view of what it is to mean something by
what one says:
"In speaking I attempt to communicate certain things to my
hearer by getting him to recognise my intention to
communicate just those things 	 He understands what I am
saying as soon as he recognises my intention in uttering
what I utter as an intention to say that thing."
(Searle, 1969: 43)
In short, Grice sees utterance interpretation as being largely a
matter of recognising the speaker's intention, a view which
Searle adopts, but with the important proviso that, for him,
meaning is not just a natter of intention; it is also a matter of
convention (Searle, 1969: 43; Searle, 1971: 46).
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2.1.8. Thesa2=appzAtime_principle_ancLagaina
Another crucial contribution of Grice's to the Searle-Grice model
centres on his view that conversation is essentially a co-
operative activity. Communication is only possible, Grice
argued, because speakers conform to some global standards of
communication:
"Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of
disconne-ted remarks, and would not be rational if they did.
They are, characteristically, to some degree, at least, co-
operative efforts. Each participant recognises in them, to
some extent, a common purpose, or set of purposes, or at
least a mutually accepted direction." (Grice, 1975: 66)
On the basis of this observation, Grice postulated the existence
of a Co-operative Principle (CP):
"Aake your conversational contribution such as is required, at
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."
(Grice, ibid: 67)
He then goes on to identify nine rules or maxims classified into
four categories which, together with the CP, govern all human
communication:
• I2.1.9. • •	 I	 1;.	 or n--	 11 •
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laxlma_of quantity 
1) Jake your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange).
2) Do not make your contribution mare informative than is
required.
Eaxims of quality 
Super-maxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
1) Do not say what you believe to be false.
2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Xaxim of relation
1) Be relevant.
Xaxims
Super-maxim: Be perspicuous.
1) Avoid obscurity of expression.
2) Avoid ambiguity.
3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4) Be orderly. (Grice, ibid: 66-67)
Grice did not, of course, believe that speakers adhere blindly to
these maxims all the tine. In fact he was interested in the
effects that can be obtained when they are violated in some way.
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Grice saw violation of the maxims as a means by which speakers
are able to 'mean more than they say'. As for the CP, its
importance lies in its explanatory role. It is because we see
conversation as a co-operative activity that we are able to
interpret these violations of the maxims in the first place. The
following example will illustrate.
(7) A: Do you want to see 'Hedda Gabler' tonight?
B: I went yesterday.
In normal circumstances, B's reply would be taken as declining
A's invitation. How is it that B is able to refuse the
invitation without actually spelling it out?
According to Grice, it is B's superficial violation of the maxim
of relation (be relevant) which makes this possible. When a
maxim appears to have been violated, the hearer will nonetheless
assume that the speaker is co-operating in the exchange and
observing the maxims at some deeper level. Drawing on her
background knowledge (people do not normally see the sane play
two nights running) and her ability to draw inferences, she will
be able to recover the implied material:
(8) B does not want to see 'Hedda Gabler'.
It is the belief that B is observing the maxims that makes it
possible for A to interpret B's reply as a refusal. In
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recognising the importance of this to successful communication,
Grice introduced the term conversational inplicature. Put
simply, a conversational implicature is the assumption (or
assumptions) a hearer has to make in order to preserve the belief
that the CP and the maxims have been observed.
Let's look at another example. Consider the exchange in (9).
(9) A: Do you like Beckett?
B: Well, I like his novels.
By ignoring part of A's question, B appears to be violating the
first maxim of quantity here (make your contribution as
informative as is required). In interpreting B's response, A
will nonetheless assume that B is observing the CP. By drawing
on her knowledge that Beckett is famous primarily as a writer of
plays, she will then be able to recover the intended
conversational implicature:
(10) B does not like Beckett's plays.
Again, A is able to draw the correct inferences - and arrive at
B's intended meaning - because he assumes that B is conforming to
the CP and the maxims. Thus, in these cases, it is only in a
very superficial sense that the maxims can be said to have been
violated.
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2.1.10. itialatimaaf—lke_.-1111111115.
Sometimes speakers really da violate the maxims, however. There
are a number of reasons why they might do this:
1) A speaker may covertly violate a maxim in order to mislead 
her addressee. To tell a lie is to violate covertly the first
maxim of quality (do not say what you believe to be false).
2) A speaker may wiEh to gpt out of a maxim by indicating in
some way that he is unwilling to co-operate. The defendants in
the XcCarthyite trials in the US opted out by refusing to answer
their interrogators directly, since by doing so they might have
incriminated themselves. The exchange in (11), in which the
defendant pleads his constitutional right to silence, was
typical.
(11) - Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the
Communist Party?
- I plead, sir, the Fifth Amendment ....
3) A speaker may be faced with a glmSk: that is to say, she may
be unable to fulfil one maxim without violating another. Grice
quotes the example of a speaker being unable to fulfil the first
maxim of quantity (be as informative as required) without
violating the second maxim of quality (have adequate evidence for
what you say).
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4) Most interesting of all is the deliberate flouting of a
maxim. Vhen this gives rise to a conversational inplicature, it
is said that the maxim is being exploited. It is this notion of
exploitation of the maxim that enables Grice to explain how we
recover nonliteral interpretations. Suppose that A has just
managed to spill an entire cup of coffee over B, who is dressed
for an important meeting in a new suit. B utters:
(12) That was clever of you.
It is not plausible that B really thinks that A is clever. In
interpreting (12), A will realise that B is flouting the first
maxim of quality (do not say what you believe to be false). She
will assume, nonetheless, that B is co-operating in the exchange,
and attempting to communicate some true information. She will
then recover the ironical interpretation, the opposite of its
literal counterpart:
(13) That was not clever of you.
Litotes (understatement), hyperbole (overstatement) and metaphor
are all, according to Grice, understood in the sane way.
Hearers, on noticing that the maxim of quality has been flouted,
will look around for a plausibly true interpretation that is in
some way related to the literal one. In the case of irony, as we
have seen, the ironical interpretation is the contradictory of
the literal interpretation, while for litotes it is a
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strengthening, and for hyperbole a weakening, of the proposition
expressed. For an example of hyperbole, consider (14).
(14) I'm starving.
If the speaker of (14) looks healthy and well fed, her hearer
will realise that the maxim of quality is being exploited and
recover the conversational implicature, a somewhat weaker version
of (14):
(15) I'm very hungry.
Once (1975: 73) has argued that the deliberate exploitation of
the other maxims can also give rise to conversational
inplicatures. Compare (16) with (17).
(16) Hiss X sang 'Hone sweet home'.
(17) Miss X produced a series of sounds which corresponded
closely with the score of 'Hone sweet hone'.
This is one of Grice's examples. Clearly (17) is a deliberate
violation of the maxim of manner (be brief). By expressing
herself in such convoluted terms, the speaker of (17) is able to
convey, by means of inplicature, some additional Information
about the (poor) quality of Miss X's singing.
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Violation of the maxim of relation occurs when a speaker refuses
to make his utterance relevant to the preceding one. Consider
the exchange in (18). The setting is a genteel tea party.
(18) A: Hrs. X is an old bag.
(appalled silence)
B: The weather has been quite delightful this summer,
hasn't it?
Again, this is one of Grice's examples (Grice, 1975: 72). B's
(irrelevant) reply implicates that he disapproves of A's remark
and is not prepared to discuss it. He changes the subject.
For an example of how the maxim of quantity can be exploited,
imagine this scenario. A married couple has Just had a row. The
husband puts on his hat and coat and stomps to the door. The
following exchange takes place.
(19) Wife: Where are you going?
Husband: Out!
The husband is violating the maxim of quantity here (make your
contribution as informative as is required), since it is obvious
from his actions that be is going out. His reply therefore
carries some additional information, either (20), perhaps, or
(21):
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(20) It's none of your business.
(21) I don't know (but I wouldn't tell you if I did).
Xaxim exploitation is crucial to Grice's account of utterance
Interpretation: we will see that it is equally crucial when it
cones to applying the Searle-Grice model to verbal humour. (For
discussion of this aspect of Grice's work, see Levinson, 1983:
104-105; 109-113; 147-162. For criticism, see Sperber and
Wilson, 1986: 35-38).
2.1.11. Eearle and Once - a synthesis 
Grice's inplicatures correspond to Searle's indirect speech acts:
both are concerned with what is implicit in an utterance.
Grice's maxims complement (and sometimes overlap with) Searle's
felicity conditions: both impose constraints on what is
conversationally acceptable or appropriate. It must be pointed
out, however, that for Searle there is a fundamental difference
between his conditions and Grice's maxims. The felicity
conditions are necessary conditions, without which the
Illocutionary act cannot be successfully performed. For example,
if I promise to do something when I have no intention of carrying
out the action described, I have violated the sincerity
condition, and have failed, quite simply, to make a promise. A
connissive, in other words, cannot count as a commissive if
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certain conditions are not met. In contrast, Grice's maxims are
pragmatic rules which govern, or regulate, our conversation. To
take an example, if I make an assertion, but by doing so
inadvertently violate the maxim of relation by telling you
something you already know in the mistaken belief that you do not
already have that information, this does not affect the fact that
I have nonetheless made an assertion. To emphasise this
difference, Searle uses the term constitutive rules for the
conditions, while the maxims correspond to his notion of
regulative rules (Searle, 1969, chapter 2, section 5).
This is not to say that the maxims are any less important than
the conditions. Both fulfil an essential role in the
interpretation process, as we shall see below.
2.1.12. The interpretation of literal utterances 
As far as Searle is concerned, a literal utterance is one in
which the meaning of the sentence corresponds exactly to the
meaning intended by the speaker (Searle, 1979: 118). Moreover,
when it cones to interpreting literal utterances, neither Searle
nor Grice believes that there is much to explain. If both
speaker and hearer share a code (i.e. speak the sane language)
utterance interpretation is largely a matter of decoding the
meaning of the sentence uttered. Of course some background
knowledge is often assumed, for reference assignment and the
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disambiguation of ambiguous utterances. In (22), for example, the
hearer would have to know which individual is being referred to.
(22) He won't be coming tonight,
2.1.13. ffonliteral utterances 
Ionliteral meaning is another natter. Searle sees a nonliteral
utterance as one in which the literal sentence meaning and the
speaker meaning "cone apart" in some way (Searle, 1979: 30). He
identifies three main types of nonliteral utterance (Searle,
ibid: 118):
1) metaphorical utterances, where the speaker means something
different from what the sentence means;
2) Ironical utterances, where the speaker means the opposite of
what the sentence means;
3) indirect speech 	 where the speaker means what the
sentence means and something more as well.
In interpreting such utterances, the hearer will first interpret
the utterance literally. On finding it inconsistent with Grice's
co-operative principle and Searle's theory of speech acts, he
will then reinterpret the utterance and recover the intended
metaphor, irony or indirect illocutionary force.
-54-
Essentially, the interpretation process is seen as a kind of
'mental Journey'. A metaphorical interpretation is arrived at by
"going through literal sentence meaning"; an ironical
interpretation involves the hearer in "going through sentence
meaning and then doubling back to the opposite of sentence
meaning"; while the interpretation of an indirect speech act
"includes sentence meaning but extends beyond it" (Searle, ibid:
115).
Searle pays special attention to metaphorical utterances,
subdividing them into three types: simple, agen_ezied. and dead,.
In a simple metaphorical utterance, the speaker says that S is P
but means that S is R (where S is the sentence, P is the sentence
meaning and R is the utterance meaning); in an open ended
metaphorical utterance, the speaker says that S is P but means
metaphorically an indefinite range of meanings: S is R1; S is
R2; S is R3, and so on. A dead metaphor for Searle is
indistinguishable from an idiom: the sentence takes on a new
literal meaning that is identical with its former metaphorical
meaning. That Searle acknowledges the existence of open ended
utterances will be particularly important later.
Perhaps an example will illustrate more clearly how speech act
theory and Gricean pragmatics night interact in the
interpretation of a nonliteral utterance. Consider the following
step-by-step analysis of how A night recover the indirect part of
B's reply in (7) above.
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A thinks:
I have made a proposal to B.
On a literal interpretation, B's reply is not relevant, i.e. it
is not an acceptance, rejection, etc.
If he is co-operating in the exchange, observing the maxims,
etc., B must mean more than he says.
I know,
 that people do not usually see the same play two nights
running.
I also know that it is polite to give a reason for rejecting a
proposal.
I can therefore infer that B's reply has the illocutionary force
of a rejection. (For detailed workings-out along these lines,
see Bach and Harnish, 1979.)
In interpreting (7), A has drawn on the following:
1) knowledge of language (grammar);
2) background knowledge (memory);
3) ability to draw inferences;
4) knowledge of conditions on speech acts;
5) Grice's principles of communication (the co-operative
principle and the maxims).
Of course our ability to interpret utterances does not depend on
our knowing about Searle's theory of speech acts or Grice's
formulation of the CF and maxims. What speakers are supposed to
do is apply unconsciously the pragmatic rules - i.e. (4) and (5)
above - that this approach to communication incorporates. To
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claim that speakers acquire pragmatic rules is, nonetheless,
contentious. The existence of such rules is disputed by Wilson
and Sperber, whose own theory of communication is based on the
view that there is no special mental apparatus that is
specifically pragmatic in nature. I will consider the Wilson-
Sperber view in chapter four. The next section of this chapter
looks at the Searle-Grice model in relation to verbal humour.
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2.2. 1. The._Egar.12=Calsa_musiel_cuuLhumuur_
The Searle-Grice model has been applied to humour by Rancher
(1980) and more recently by Yamaguchi (1988) and Attardo (1990).
Nash (1985) has also given nominal consideration to both Searle
and Grice in his book The_iguiguag2_a_Hulanun. While Nash
endorses Rancher's analysis, Yamaguchi and Attardo introduce some
interesting modifications. Ve will consider in turn these
applications of speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics to the
analysis of verbal humour.
2.2.2. Bow to play games with words: Rancher's analysis 
Rancher begins with the observation that humour often stems from
the unexpected and the unconventional. According to speech act
theory, linguistic behaviour is governed by convention;
unpredictable linguistic behaviour is thus an important source of
verbal humour.
A humorous effect can be obtained, according to Rancher, when our
expectations are frustrated. Such 'joking duplicity', as he
calls it, can operate on two levels: the locutionary level (e.g.
puns, double entendres, etc.); and the illocutionary level. He
devotes his paper to a discussion of the latter.
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Violation of Ox-ice's naxins and Searle's conditions feature
prominently in Hancher's analysis, along with the exploitation of
illocutionary ambiguity. We will look at each of these three
sources of humour in turn.
2.2.3. Illocutionary ambiguity
First, there may be something ambiguous about the illocutionary
point of the utterance. Hancher quotes an example from an old
Punch cartoon, where an army officer, 'running in his pyjamas,
from a smoking barracks, shouting "Fire!" is met by a barrage of
artillery, his warning .... having been mistaken for a command'
(Hancher, ibid: 21). Hancher makes a distinction between this
type of example, which, he claims, is ambiguous on both the
locutionary and the illocutionary level ("the illocutionary
ambiguity turns on a locutionary ambiguity or pun"), and the type
exemplified by the exchange in (1), from another Punch cartoon.
(1) Mistress: Susan, just look here! I can write my name in
the dust on the top of this table!
Housemaid: Lor, Mum, so you can! How I never had no
edercation myself.
(Eaack cartoon, quoted in Hancher, ibid: 21)
In (1) the housemaid interprets her employer's utterance as a
boast when a complaint was intended: an expressive-directive, in
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other words, is interpreted as an assertive. Because indirect
speech acts are seen as being inherently ambiguous on the
illocutionary level, they provide a rich source of speech act
humour. Rancher gives us another example, from a 'Peanuts'
cartoon. This time it is the speaker who is exploiting the
illocutionary ambiguity: Violet's request for information is
cruelly misleading.
(2) Violet: Charlie Brown, would you like to cone to a party
next week?
Charlie Brown: Why yes, I'd like that very much.
Violet: I thought you would	 but I doubt if I'll invite
you anyway.
('Peanuts' cartoon, quoted in Hancher, ibid: 21)
Lastly, there can be illocutionary ambiguity when propositional
content is attributed to an illocutionary act that in fact has
none. (3) illustrates.
(3) "Good morning. And almost everything you hear from now on
will be equally speculative."
(Opening remarks by the moderator of a symposium about
America's next twenty-five years. Harvard Magazine,
July-August, 1977: 82, quoted by Rancher, ibid: 21)
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Greetings, and other expressions of phatic communion, are
generally seen by speech act theorists as being devoid of
propositional content; and yet in (3) a form of words which is
normally interpreted as a greeting is in fact intended as an
expressive-directive. The same technique is employed in the
following exchange, attributed to Groucho Marx.
(4) Taxi driver: Have a nice day!
Grouch° Marx: I'll have what kind of day I like!
2.2.4. Violation of Searle's conditions 
Rancher argues that a conic effect can also be obtained when the
felicity conditions on the intended illocutionary act are
violated in some way. We will look at a variety of such
violations.
A commonly exploited condition is the propositional content rule
on directives, which specifies that the propositional content
should predicate some future act A of H. The exchange in (5)
illustrates.
(5) A: When do you want this order?
B: Yesterday! (Hancher, ibid: 24)
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The condition is violated here because B's response, "I want you
to have supplied this order yesterday", refers, not to a future
act, but to a past act A of R.
Another condition that can be exploited is the preparatory
condition on request-directives, which stipulates that the person
issuing the request have some authority over the addressee.
Rancher quotes an example from a Steig cartoon, where an ageing,
very slightly built father confronts his strapping six-footer son
with the words:
(6) I forbid it - and that's final! (Rancher, ibid: 24)
Nobody doubts that in theory the father has authority over his
son, but in this cartoon that authority is called starkly into
question.
Ironical utterances, according to Rancher, involve violation of
the sincerity condition. Consider the 'Peanuts' cartoon which
shows Linus shaking Lucy's hand. He is saying, with mock
sincerity:
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(7) My heartiest congratulations! You did it! You have been
grabby for one thousand days in a row! You have just
set an all-tine record! I knew you could do it! ....
Let me shake your hand again. I'd also like to present
you with this specially inscribed scroll commemorating
this Historical event. Again may I say, 'congratulations!'
You are an inspiration to all the crabby people in the
world! (quoted in Rancher, ibid: 26)
Finally, we have seen that some utterances carry an additional
condition: they require a satisfactory uptake. This can be
humorously absent in declarations ('saying something in order to
make it so'), which do not count as declarations if the speaker
does not use the agreed form of words. Take the court-room
example, in which the foreman of the jury is asked by the judge
to give a legal verdict. The judge asks the question:
(8) Do you find the defendant guilty or not guilty as charged?
and, as everyone knows, one of only two responses is acceptable:
(9) We find the defendant guilty as charged;
(10) We find the defendant not guilty as charged.
Any variation on the response, however slight, represents a
violation of the constitutive rule on declarations. Rancher
tells us that, over the years, the /few Yorker has exploited, at
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least three tines, this potential for creating a humorous effect.
Be quotes the following violations (taken from cartoons):
(11) We find the defendant very, very guilty.
(12) We find the defendant guilt-ridden, as charged.
(13) I find you guilty to the nth degree. (Hancher, ibid: 25)
Nash, whose work is considered later in this section, gives us
yet another (slightly improved) variation on the theme:
(14) Clerk of the court: How do you find the defendant? Guilty
or not guilty?
Foreman of the jury: Guilty isn't the word.
(Nash, ibid: 114)
What these violations of felicity conditions have in common with
those cases involving illocutionary ambiguity is that both
contain an element of unpredictability and a concomitant
frustration of our expectations. We will see that the sane can
be said of those cases involving the violation of Grice's maxims.
2.2.5. Yinlatlian_hd_SiLisielz_mzudan.
If Searle's conditions can be exploited to conic effect, we might
expect Grice's maxims to lend themselves to a similar kind of
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exploitation. According to Rancher, this is indeed the case. In
(15) Lucy is violating the second maxim of quality; in (16) the
maxim of relation.
(15) Lucy: Schroeder, why don't you give up this classical
music thing? Don't you know that there are over
eighty million piano students in this country? And
less than one per cent of them ever make a real 
living at it.
Schroeder: Where did you get those figures?
Lucy: I just made them up.
(Schulz, 1964, quoted in Rancher, ibid: 23)
(16) Charlie Brown: I wish I could be happy. I think I could
be happy if my life had more purpose to it
.... I also think that if I were happy, I
could help others to be happy. Does that
make sense to you?
Lucy: We've had spaghetti at our house three tines this
month!
(Schulz, 1959, quoted in Rancher, ibid: 27)
The second maxim of quality requires us to have adequate evidence
for what we say. In (15) Lucy is flouting this maxim by quoting
statistics in a convincing enough manner, yet when she is
challenged to reveal her source of information, she admits, quite
readily, that the figures were simply made up.
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In (16) Charlie Brown is earnestly trying to discover the key to
a happy and fulfilling life when he is abruptly brought down to
earth by Lucy's irrelevant remark about the number of tines in
the past month that she has eaten spaghetti.
The violation of the maxim of relation in (16) is contained in a
single utterance. Hancher holds the view that any sustained
violation of this maxim destroys any potential for humour,
quoting the Aon-sequiturs in Samuel Beckett's plays as a case in
point. The violation of this maxim is funny, he says, when the
break is only occasional and the norm is not really called into
question" (Hancher, ibid: 27). Ye will return to this
observation in a later chapter.
2.2.6. A proposed modification of the speech act model 
Rancher's paper is, by and large, a straightforward application
of speech act theory to a fairly wide range of humorous data. It
is only in his concluding remarks that he introduces two examples
which cannot be easily classified in this framework. The first
is a Punch cartoon picturing a married couple, sitting at a table
over a pot of coffee:
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(17) 'The man has his hands clasped and head bowed in a
prayerful attitude, and the woman responds: "Will
you stop annoying Him? If your coffee is cold,
I'll heat it up.' (Rancher, ibid: 2?)
If violation is involved here, it is not immediately clear which
maxim or condition is being violated. Hancher appeals to Pratt
(1977) in this instance, for, according to her, there is an
additional regulative rule on requesting: "don't request
anything of a superior unless no one else can grant it"; and it
is this rule, argues Hancher, which is being violated here.
On the basis of this additional regulative rule, Hancher suggests
that there might be a similar rule governing requests among
equals: "don't request anything of an equal if you could Just as
easily do it yourself". He is prompted to make this suggestion
on the strength of another cartoon. This depicts two men sitting
next to each other on the extreme left of a diner counter, with
the salt, pepper and catsup far away to the right. The man on
the left says to the other:
(18) Would you please pass the catsup? (Hancher, ibid: 27)
It is because this regulative rule is breached, Hancher claims,
that the utterance in (18) is comic.
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What Hancher is saying, then, is that in addition to the
constitutive rules on illocutionary acts (the necessary
conditions for the successful performance of such acts) and the
general Gricean regulative rules, there are some illocutionary
acts which have their own regulative rules as well. It is
Rancher's view that the violation of these rules can be
responsible, also, for the creation of a comic effect.
2.2.7. Summary of Hancher's viewpoint 
Hancher's approach to humour could be summarised as follows.
A humorous effect can be obtained when our expectations are
thwarted in some way. This can be achieved by:
1) The exploitation of an illocutionary ambiguity. (Either the
speaker or the hearer may be responsible. The speaker may
deliberately mislead her addressee; the hearer may deliberately
pick the wrong interpretation.) See examples (1) - (4).
2) The violation of Searle's conditions. See examples (5) - (7)
and (11) - (14).
3) The violation of Grice's maxims. See examples (15) and (16).
4) The violation of the regulative rules on illocutionary acts.
See examples (17) and (18).
;2.2.8. •	 I	 -	 •
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lash, also, sees the violation of these maxims and conditions as
a source of humour, but whereas for Hancher the violations are
seen as producing an unexpected response, Nash emphasises their
role in the creation of a defective exchange. He identifies
Jokes which play on a "peculiarity of English usage" or on
speakers' refusal to "play the social game" (Nash, ibid: 115-
116). He quotes the following examples, the first of which is
already familiar.
(19) Diner: What's this fly doing in my soup?
Waiter: Looks like the breast stroke, sir.
(20) Diner: Isn't this cloth a bit off colour?
Waiter: Wait till you see your lobster.
What Nash is talking about, in Hancher's terns, is the
exploitation of illocutionary ambiguity, since, in both cases, a
complaint is wrongly interpreted as a genuine enquiry. Nash
identifies the idiomatic use of language as being instrumental in
creating the ambiguity, a point which was also made,
incidentally, by Bergson (1911: 115).
Nash further identifies a type of Joke which hinges on what he
calls a "conversational hang-up". In (21), for example, A
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mischievously misleads B by exploiting the maxim of quantity and
the maxim of manner.
(21) A: How would you like to spend seven days in a Portuguese
villa?
B: I'd love it!
A: Good, then you can envy me all next week.
(Hash, ibid: 118)
In (2) above a similar exchange was analysed as being another
case of illocutionary ambiguity. The respective merits of each
analysis will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.
Nash does not spell out his ideas in much detail, his remarks on
Searle and Grice forming only a small part of what is a very
general discussion of humour. (Consequently it seems
inappropriate to quibble over lash's rather idiosyncratic
terminology.) I have mentioned him here because:
1) he endorses, on the whole, Rancher's viewpoint; and
2) he isolates some features of the humorous utterance which
Hancher has overlooked.
It is unfortunate, however, - and this ill important - that lash's
analysis is marred by a quite serious misunderstanding of the
nature of Grice's maxims. Again, this will be discussed later.
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2.2.9. How to pull strings with wards: Yamaguchi's analysis 
Yamaguchi devotes his paper to a discussion of garden-path Jokes,
his comments being applicable only to this Joke-type. The term
garden-path ioke was coined by Hackett (1977), and was used by
him to refer to punning Jokes of the type exemplified by (22).
(22) Motorist: Can you tell me the way to Bath?
Policeman: I usually use soap and water.
The exchange in (22) can be classified as a garden-path Joke
because it contains an ambiguity which is at first concealed.
Vhen the punch line is delivered, the ambiguity is revealed and
the hearer realises that she has been 'led up the garden path'.
(22) hinges on what Rancher would call locutionary ambiguity.
Like Hancher, Yamaguchi notes that many Jokes involving ambiguity
operate on the illocutionary, rather than the locutionary, level.
He thus extends the definition to include these Jokes as well.
For Yamaguchi, then, a garden-path Joke is:
"A Joke in which the context is potentially ambiguous in that
it has potentially a first and a second reading, the former
being replaced by the latter at the end of the Joke.
(Yamaguchi, ibid: 325)
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Yamaguchi is primarily interested in those Jokes which do not
contain puns. His concerns, in other words, are similar to
Rancher's: the description of Jokes which stem from maxim
violation.
Yamaguchi differs from Hancher, however, in that he does not
treat the violation that occurs in such Jokes as genuine. He
believes that there is always a co-operative element which is
almost obliterated by the more conspicuous, non-co-operative
aspect. Mnreover, he argues that the maxim violation is there
for the sole purpose of creating the ambiguity on which the Joke
depends. The narrator of the Joke has as little as possible to
do with this unco-operative behaviour, passing the responsibility
for the deception on to the character in the Joke. Yamaguchi
calls this the 'Character-Did-It' Hypothesis (note 1).
Essentially, what Yamaguchi is saying is that the maxims are
violated in the fictional world only: in the real world the co-
operative principle is adhered to. Because as hearers we do not
expect Jokes to convey information that is either true or
relevant, the narrator cannot really be trying to deceive us. To
quote Yamaguchi, the Joke-teller is a "string-puller" rather than
a "leg-puller". We recognise the two levels of discourse, and
enter into the fictional world where the maxims are violated,
while retaining, at some deeper level, the co-operative
relationship with our interlocutor (note 2).
••Ii •
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2.2.10.
ittardo's view 
Attardo's work is placed loosely within Raskin's framework, in
which, as we have seen, a distinction is made between bona-fide
and non-bona-fide communication (Raskin, 1985; Attardo, 1990).
In common with Yamaguchi, Attardo stresses the co-operative side
of Joking behaviour (that is, non-bona-fide communication),
citing Zhao (1988), who has shown how Jokes can convey
information that is both true and relevant. Attardo also notes
that everyday conversations (that is, bona-fide communication)
can be interspersed with humorous, off-the-cuff remarks. These
two observations lead Attardo to the view that the distinction
between bona-fide and non-bona-fide communication is less than
straightforward.
As for the maxims, Attardo believes that the analysis of humorous
data in terms of maxim violation can contribute to our
understanding of the hierarchical structure of the maxims
themselves. He notes the importance of implicitly conveyed
information in humorous utterances, arguing that it is an
obligatory feature of Jokes that they violate the first maxim of
quantity (by not giving enough information). He cites further
the work of Van Raemdonck (1986, 1989), who found that all of the
243 jokes he analysed violated the maxim of relation, while only
some violated another maxim as well. (lie will see in the next
section that there is a problem with these findings.) The
-73 -
importance of these two maxims to the creation of humour lends
weight, according to Attardo, to Horn's Q-based and R-based
inplicatures (Horn, 1984), and to Sperber and Wilson's (1986)
'so-called 'relevance' theory" (Attardo, ibid: 360). What
Attardo is saying is that both Horn and Sperber and Wilson have
afforded to the maxims of quantity and relation a higher status
than was originally assigned to them by Grice himself, and that
the evidence provided by the analysis of humorous data suggests
that this restructuring of the maxims is entirely justified.
2.2.11. Conclusion
Wilson and Sperber would be justly dismayed by Attardo's lack of
understanding of their theory when he says that they (i.e. Wilson
and Sperber) "propose an underlying super maxim of relevance"
(Attardo, ibid: 360). That particular misunderstanding will be
cleared up in chapter four, when we will see that relevance
theory cannot simply be viewed as a revised version of Gricean
pragmatics.
In the final section of this chapter I will continue my
investigation of the speech act account of hunour by considering
how well it stands up to critical analysis.
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2.3.1.
On the face of it, the Searle-Grice model looks like a promising
starting point for a theory of humour, lending itself readily to
a description of the kind of humour that stems from utterances
which are in some way incongruous, defective, unpredictable, or
mischievously deceptive. Indeed the violation approach to humour
is now well established in the literature. In addition to the
theorists whose work was outlined in the previous section, there
are others, most notably Martinich (1981), Morreall (1983: 79-
81), Mayon (1988), and Fennell (1990), all of whom have
incorporated the notion of Gricean maxim violation into their
analyses of humour.
Theorists who have embraced the more general notion of rule
violation as a source of humour in clude Schultz and Robillard
(1980), Dolitsky (1983) Eco (1986) and Goldstein (1990). Giora
argues along comparable lines, claiming that Jokes involving
ambiguity violate her "Marked Informativeness Requirement"
(Giora, 1991).
Yet there are some problems with this approach.
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2.3. 2 . Ikenature_AzilianaticaLmt_stricalz_zdzims.
The first problem stems from Nash's misunderstanding of the
nature of Grice's maxims, resulting in several flawed analyses.
Take, for example, the exchange in (1).
(1) A: And where do you work, Mr Jones?
B: Oh, you know, at the Town Hall.
A: And what do you do there?
B: Oh, you know, Town Hall work. (Nash, 1985: 117)
According to Nash, B is exploiting both the maxim of quantity and
the maxim of quality here. There is no doubt that the first
maxim of quantity (calling for sufficient information) is being
breached, since B is just not being forthcoming enough to satisfy
normal expectations.
To cite the maxim of quality in this context leads Nash into
difficulty, however. Remember that there is a super-maxim of
quality: "Try to make your contribution one that is true", and
two more specific maxims: "Do not say what you believe to be
false"; "Da not say that for which you lack sufficient evidence"
(Grice, 1975: 67). First, Nash can be accused of vagueness
because he talks in general terns about "the maxim of quality',
and does not specify which of these maxims is being exploited. A
second, perhaps more serious problem, concerns the fact that it
is not easy to see why Nash should think that the exploitation of
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any of these maxims is involved in this example in the first
place. My guess is that it has to do with the idea Nash has that
the maxim of quality imposes on us a constraint, not against
uttering falsehoods, but against evidently pointless
conversations (Nash, ibid: 116). This is clearly a mistake on
Nash's part. It would appear that he has been misled by the
everyday meaning of the word quality into thinking that this
maxim is about giving our utterances some direction, when in fact
it is merely calling on us to be truthful.
Nash's misunderstanding is compounded in his analysis of the
following example, in which, he claims, "all the Gricean rules
are side-swiped" (Nash, ibid: 117).
(2) A: Now you take the whale, that's Just about the oldest
fish in the ocean.
B: It isn't a fish. It's a mammal. The whale is a mammal.
A: Well, the Bible says it's a fish. The oldest book in
the world says the whale's a fish.
B: Look, they Just didn't know enough in those days. They
had a naive taxonomy. If it swan in the sea, they
classified it as a fish. We know better now, we know
the whale is a mammal.
A: You're telling me the author of the Bible didn't know
what he was doing? The Bible? The book you swear on
in court? (Nash, ibid: 117)
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Whereas lash's analysis of (1) can be salvaged by appealing
solely to the notion of the violation of the first maxim of
quantity, and avoiding any mention of the maxims of quality, (2)
is more problematic. It is problematic because it is not clear
that any of Grice's maxims are being violated in this example.
It could be claimed, I suppose, that A is violating the first
maxim of quality - if, for example, he really did know that the
whale is a mammal - but for Nash to claim that all Grice's rules
are being violated is far too wide of the mark.
What has been exposed is a fundamental misconception, on Nash's
part, of the role of the maxims. Nash seems to think of them as
general social, rather than specifically pragmatic, constraints:
that is to say, he sees them as constituting a kind of
conversational etiquette: "The work of Grice...puts into
theoretical terms what we already know intuitively about
conversation...that it is a contract involving...agreed conduct"
(Nash, 1985: 116). For Grice, of course, they are necessary
tools enabling us to explain how successful communication is
possible.
Although Hash's misunderstanding is unfortunate, it cannot be
said to undermine the validity of the speech act approach to
humour. Handier does not claim that all verbal humour stems from
maxim violation, so the fact that Nash has inadvertently thrown
up an example which may fall outside the scope of this approach
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does not invalidate the analyses of those examples which can be
accounted for in this way. As for Yamaguchi, he would argue that
both (1) and (2) are of no interest to him because he is
concerned only with deceptive violation, and in neither of these
examples is anyone being deceived (or 'deceived').
We will return to the example in (2) later, however, for although
it is not the specified aim of the speech-act theorists to be
able to give an account of such examples, it will be remembered
that it was stated in chapter one that an adequate pragmatic
theory should be able to give an account of all intentional
verbal humour. We will see that when the theory is extended,
examples such as (2), which seem to break social, rather than
pragmatic, rules, can be accounted for.
2.3.3. equivocation and humour 
There is a more serious problem with this analysis. It concerns
equivocal utterances, that is, utterances which are
simultaneously open to more than one interpretation. Hancher
acknowledges the existence of equivocation in humorous
utterances, recognising that Susan's reply in (3) has two
possible interpretations.
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(3) Mistress: Susan, Just look here! I can write my name in
the dust on top of this table!
Housemaid: Lor, Mum, so you can! Now I never had no
edercation myself.
It is clear to us that in (3) Susan's employer is complaining
about the dust on the furniture. Susan's reply indicates that
she has interpreted her employer's utterance, not as a complaint,
but as a boast. The question is whether the mistake is genuine,
or whether Susan is merely pretending not to understand.
According to Rancher, it doesn't matter which interpretation we
choose, because both are funny. "If this is an ingenuous
mistake", he remarks, "it is a funny one. If it is a
disingenuous evasion, it is also funny." (Hancher, ibid: 21)
What Rancher fails to appreciate, however, is that there might be
a problem here for speech act theorists. We have already seen
that a speech act account of utterance iligrpretation commits us
to the view that meaning is something which is clearly defined
and self-contained. While Searle allows for the fact that some
metaphorical utterances may be open to a range of
interpretations, he makes no mention of the existence of non-
metaphorical utterances which may be similarly open to more than
one interpretation. Mbreover, there is surely a difference
between what Searle refers to as the "open ended metaphorical
utterance" (Searle, 1979: 115), in which the individual meanings
complement one another, and contribute to the meaning of the
utterance as a whole, and the equivocal utterance, in which two,
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quite distinct, meanings are in conflict. In the light of
examples such as (3), there may be a case for extending Searle's
taxonomy of utterance types to include the following:
Literal utterance: (equivocal) 
Speaker means what he says, but, on one interpretation, means
something more as well. It is an open question which of the two
Interpretations is intended.
This deals with the tipartite - inane remark or veiled insult -
aspect of Susan's reply, and it is in keeping with Grice's
approach to deliberate ambiguity (Grice, 1975: 72). However,
there is a further problem with this, and other, similar
examples. It concerns their inherent indeterminacy, or
vagueness.
2.3. 4 . Inclatezzainacj...ancl_launrua.
Suppose that Susan WAEL pretending not to understand her
employer's utterance. We then have to ask ourselves what point
she is trying to make in responding in the way she does. Is she
trying to:
- undermine her employer's authority; or
- avoid having to dust the furniture properly?
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Maybe she is aiming for both of these. The point is that her
reply is not only ambiguous, it is also - on one reading - vague,
and the Joke owes something to this.
Another such example is the one in (4).
(4) Diner: What's this fly doing in my soup?
Waiter: Looks like the breast stroke, sir.
As with Susan, we will suppose that the waiter is neither stupid
nor crazy, that his reply is not a mistake, but an evasion.
Again, the question arises as to what point is being made. Is
the waiter aiming to:
- embarrass the diner?
- show the diner who's boss?
- indicate his lack of concern about the level of hygiene in
the establishment?
- avoid having to apologise?
- avoid having to throw the soup away and fetch another bowl?
Once more, there is no hard and fast answer. It is up to us, to
some extent, to make of the waiter's reply what we will.
Speech act theory has no means of describing these vaguer effects
of communication, and so it is unable to give a satisfactory
account of what is going on in these examples.
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Note that (3) and (4) are not isolated cases. It seems that
whenever a hearer ignores the indirect part of an indirect speech
act, we are left to wonder whether the misunderstanding was
deliberate, and if so, what motives lie behind the superficially
inept reply. Take one final example.
(5) Customer: There's a pair of shoes in the window.
Shop assistant: That's right, we do that because it's a
shoe shop. (Wood, ibid: 55)
As with the waiter's reply in (4) and Susan's reply in (3), we
are forced to ask ourselves whether the shop assistant in (5) is
stupid, or whether her singularly unco-operative behaviour has
'hidden meanings'. If we opt for the second of these
interpretations, at least some of these weaker implicatures
should be recovered if we are to appreciate the humour in the
joke.
It is to Nash's credit that he goes a stage further than Hancher
by appreciating that, in a humorous exchange, a response to an
indirect request is invariably open to a range of
interpretations. Take the following:
(6) Diner: Isn't this cloth a bit off colour?
Waiter: Wait till you see your lobster.
Of the waiter's reply, Nash makes this observation:
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'Is the waiter Joking? Or is he frustrating the intended
directive	 (= 'Change the tablecloth') in order to mark his
rebuttal of an implied rebuke? ('Don't try that game with
me'; I won't be patronised by sardonic remarks'). Or, a
further possibility, does his retort signify a denial of
the importance of clean tablecloths? ('What's all the fuss
about? You came here to eat, didn't you?)"
(Nash, ibid: 116)
However, in common with Rancher, Nash does not appreciate that
the theoretical model he has adopted cannot account for the
indeterminacy he has described.
As for Yamaguchi, we have seen that his analysis of this type of
Joke is somewhat different. He makes no allowances for the
characters' stupidity: according to him, they are always guilty
of deception. (The narrator, on the other hand, is
disinterested, and merely reports the deception.) To come down
firmly on one side smoothes over the problem of equivocation, and
does away with the need for any extension of Searle's inventory
of utterance types, but it does not address the rather more
intractable problem of what these smart characters are hoping to
achieve with their evading tactics. Yanaguchi's analysis thus
leads us, by an alternative route, to the same sticking point:
the absence, in the speech act model, of the means of capturing
the vagueness that is inherent within a specific interpretation.
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2.3.5. The speech act accouint of irony 
Another problem arises when we look at the speech-act account of
irony. Rancher has adopted the standard speech-act approach,
which defines irony in terms of the overt violation of the
sincerity condition (cf. Brown, 1980). Handier quotes as an
example, a 'Peanuts' cartoon, the beginning of which is cited
again here.
(7) Linus: My heartiest congratulations! You did it! You have
been crabby for one thousand days in a row! 
	
It is clear that Linus intends us to recognise his intentions in
(7) as insincere. Unfortunately this is not the whole story, for
although the notion of violation of the sincerity condition can
explain how we recognise Linus's utterance as ironical, it does
not explain how we actually interpret his utterance, and arrive
at his intended (ironical) meaning. Searle believes that we
first interpret such utterances literally, and, on finding the
literal interpretation inappropriate to the context, we then
reinterpret them and recover the ironical meaning, which is the
opposite of its literal counterpart. Searle is unequivocal about
this. In ironical utterances, he says, "the speaker means the
opposite of what the sentence means" (Searle, 1979: 115). In
straightforward cases, this definition works quite well. Searle
gives the example of a speaker saying to his addressee, who has
just broken a priceless piece of china:
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(8) That was a brilliant thing to do
when the intended meaning is, of course, the opposite:
(9) That was a stupid thing to do.
If we return to (7), however, an indisputable case of verbal
irony, we can see that the definition falls apart. The
contradictory of (7) would go something like this:
(10) Linus: Commiserations! You failed to do it! You have
been good tempered for one thousand days in a row!
And so on. Is this what Linus really means by uttering (7)? Of
course not.
Not all theorists have committed themselves to the strong view
that an ironical interpretation is invariably the contradictory
of the proposition expressed. Grice believed that speakers
convey ironical meanings by flouting his first maxim of quality
("Do not say what you believe to be false"). This much broader
definition fits Linus' utterance in (7), but it won't do for all
cases of verbal irony. Imagine that I get caught in a
thunderstorm on my way hone, and arrive completely soaked
through. If someone were then to say to me (ironically):
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(11) You look wet
this could not be analysed as a flouting of the first maxim of
quality as the proposition expressed by the utterance would be
patently true.
Another apparent counterexample is the following exchange, quoted
by Nash (1985: 154), who, incidentally, does not discuss irony in
speech-act terns:
(12) A: Are you well?
B: As well as my doctor expects me to be.
(adapted from Nash, ibid: 154)
According to Nash, the response in (12) has an ironical reading,
which he paraphrases thus:
"Xy doctor thinks I'm well, but then how would he_ know, the
incompetent quack. If you really want to know, I feel
ghastly." (Bash, ibid: 154)
The ironical remark in (12) is a play on the conventional remark,
"as well as can be expected". The point is, though, that the
ironical response is not saying anything false (that is to say,
there is no flouting of the first maxim of quality), nor is it
insincere.
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Grice did later accept that his definition of irony, as it stood,
was flawed (Grice, 1978: 123-125). He noticed that irony was
closely connected with the expression of feeling or attitude, but
failed to build in any substantial way on this insight.
Xore recently, Haverkate (1990) has noted also that traditional
speech act accounts of irony are unsatisfactory. He shows how
the narrow definition - saying the opposite of what you mean -
is inaccurate because it excludes certain ironical categories;
while the broad definition - saying something different from what
you mean - includes, in addition to irony, such figures as
metaphor, metonymy and hyperbole. Despite these apparently
insuperable difficulties, Haverkate does not abandon the
traditional account. For him, irony necessarily involves the
violation of the sincerity condition: "The basic parameter of my
argumentation is the psychological or intentional state of the
speaker, which, in current speech act terminology, is called
'sincerity'" (Haverkate, ibid: 87).
It is difficult to see why Haverkate should want to cling to this
view. The sincerity condition on an assertive requires that S
believes p (Searle, 1969: 66). Ve have already seen that the
ironical (12) is not in breach of the sincerity condition: the
utterance in (11) - and indeed all ironical understatements -
would likewise fall outside this definition. Why do speech act
theorists continue to nine the same seam when the significant
number of counterexamples suggests quite clearly that a new
- 88 -
approach to irony is needed? We will consider a completely
different anlaysis of ironical utterances in chapter four.
2.3.6. Overlapping descriptive categories 
Eancher cites many examples, such as the exchange in (13), where
the hearer misses the illocutionary point of the utterance.
(13) Violet: Charlie Brown, would you like to come to a party
next week?
Charlie Brown: Why yes, I'd like that very much.
Violet: I thought you would .... but I doubt if I'll
Invite you anyway.
(13) can be compared with (14), which is an example used by Hash.
(14) A: How would you like to spend seven days in a Portuguese
villa?
B: I'd love it!
A: Good, then you can envy me all next week.
(Kash, ibid: 118)
Intuitively there is a good deal of similarity between (13) and
(14), and yet for Hancher (13) is a case of illocutionary
ambiguity, while Kash analyses (14) as the exploitation, by A, of
both the maxims of quantity and manner. Either way of looking at
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this type of example seems valid, with Hancher's analysis being
applicable to (14), and Kash's analysis being equally applicable
to (13).
It should not surprise us that the Searle-Grice model makes
possible two different ways of describing the same phenomenon. I
mentioned above that there has been some debate as to how
utterances such as (15) should be analysed.
(15) Can you pass the salt?
According to Searle (1979, chapter 2), utterances which have the
form of a request for information are conventionally used to
issue requests for action. Hearers recover the literal
interpretation ('Are you capable of passing the salt?'), and, on
the basis of Grice's co-operative principle and maxims, they are
able to go beyond this and arrive at the speaker's intended
meaning: 'Pass the salt, please'.
In contrast to this view, Sadock (1974) believes that the
utterance in (15) is ambiguous. In other words, he believes that
its use as a request-directive has become standardised, so that
the utterance now has two literal meanings, one of which - the
request-for-salt-meaning - is an idiom. (The respective merits
and demerits of these alternative analyses are discussed in
detail by Morgan, (1978), Bach and Harnish, (1979, chapter 9) and
Levinson (1983, chapter 5.5)).
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If we return to the exchanges in (13) and (14), we can see that
by appealing to the notion of illocutionary ambiguity, Hancher's
thinking is more in keeping with Sadock's, while Nash has more in
common with Searle. It might be interesting to look in more
detail at these alternative analyses, to see whether one approach
is more useful than the other for our purposes.
2.3.7. Illocutionary ambiguity 
We will start by examining more closely Rancher's thinking on the
subject of 'illocutionary ambiguity'. Remember that Rancher
makes a distinction between locutionary and illocutionary
ambiguity. Because his paper is essentially a discussion of
humour on the illocutionary level, he chooses not to discuss the
former in any detail. He does recognise, however, that jokes
involving illocutionary ambiguity may involve locutionary
ambiguity as well: "the illocutionary ambiguity turns on a
locutionary ambiguity or pun" (Rancher, ibid: 21). In fact this
type of joke is extremely common The familiar example, cited
again below, is a case in point.
(16) Diner: What's this fly doing in my soup?
Waiter: Looks like the breast stroke, sir.
On the locutionary level, the two opposing interpretations of the
diner's utterance can be paraphrased thus:
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a) What activity is this fly, which happens to be in my soup,
engaged in ?
b) Why is there a fly in my soup?
On the illocutionary level, his utterance can have the force of:
a) a genuine request for information (directive); or
b) a complaint/order (expressive/directive).
Moreover, as Handier points out, the two levels of ambiguity are
inextricably entwined, that is, the literal interpretation on the
locutionary level corresponds to the utterance as a direct speech
act, while the nonliteral interpretation corresponds to the
utterance as also performing an indirect speech act.
Jokes involving locutionary ambiguity alone, though not discussed
by Hancher, are also fairly common:
(17) A: How do you like school?
B: Closed.
(18) Waiter: How did you find your steak, sir?
Diner: Quite by accident. I moved a few peas and there it
was.
Notice that in (17) and (18) a request for information is both
intended and interpreted as such, which rules out any ambiguity
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on the illocutionary level: the misunderstanding (deliberate or
accidental) is purely locutionary.
Now it could be argued that by excluding examples such as (17)
and (18) from his study, Rancher is concealing an interesting
underlying connection between locutionary ambiguity and some
types of illocutionary ambiguity. Notice that in all those cases
cited above, the joke plays, not so much on the ambiguity, but on
the fact that for each ambiguous utterance there is a 'preferred'
interpretation: in (13) and (14) the hearer recovers the most
obvious interpretation, only to discover that this is pot the one
intended by the speaker; in (16), (17) and (18) it is the hearer
who is at fault, for picking an interpretation which is not
easily accessible to the 'normal' speaker-hearer.
What I am saying is that there is another way of analysing these
jokes, namely in terns of whether the responsibility for the
misunderstanding lies with the speaker or the hearer. Hancher's
analysis, which distinguishes between ambiguity on different
levels of interpretation, cuts across this distinction, and
obscures what I believe to be a salient feature of these jokes.
His analysis forces us to place the joke in (16), for example, in
a separate category from the joke in (18). For theoretical
purposes this does not seen right.
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2 . 3 . 8 . Ltalatinn_JaLlhe_maxima_ara_guLaltermatize_ta
illocutionary ambiguity
The alternative to Hancher's approach is to appeal instead to the
violation of Grice's maxims. We have already seen that the
exchange in (14) was analysed by Nash as a violation of the
(first) maxim of quantity and the (second) maxim of manner, but
what about examples (16), (17) and (18)?
I would want to analyse these latter examples as violations of
the maxim of relation, since in each case the hearer utters what
is - initially, at least - a response which is irrelevant.
I am not sure that all violationists would agree with this
analysis, however. Attardo (1990) quotes the following (famous)
example, attributed to V.C. Fields:
(19) 'Do you believe in clubs for young men?
'Only when kindness fails.'
(V.C. Fields, quoted by Attardo, ibid. 355)
Attardo analyses the exchange in (19) as a violation of the
second maxim of manner, "Avoid ambiguity". As I have already
pointed out, I believe that a distinction should be drawn between
those cases where the speaker is in the wrong, for misleading his
addressee, and those cases where it is the hearer who is at
fault, for misinterpreting an utterance whose intended meaning is
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perfectly obvious to everyone else. This distinction can be
clearly demonstrated, if we analyse the former Joke type as
involving violations of the maxims of quantity and manner, and
the latter - which would include Attardo's example in (19) - as
violations of the maxim of relation.
Xy point is essentially this: whereas it can legitimately be
argued that (13) and (14) represent violations of the maxim that
requires us to avoid ambiguity, I do not feel that this can be
extended to include examples where the hearer picks an
idiosyncratic interpretation. In other words, the first speaker
in Jokes (16) to (19) should not be held responsible for the
vagaries of his audience.
2.3.9. Overlapping maxims
Perhaps there was bound to be some disagreement over which maxims
were being violated in these examples. Remember that for Attardo
all Jokes necessarily involve the violation of the maxim of
quantity (Attardo, 1990: 360). In the same paper, Attardo cites
the work of Van Raemdonck, another violation theorist, who argues
that it is the violation of the maxim of relation which seems to
be the obligatory requirement: all the Jokes in Van Raemdonck's
sample violated this maxim while only some violated another maxim
as well (Van Raemdonck, cited in Attardo, ibid: 359). Attardo
does not draw the obvious conclusion from this, namely that he
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and Van Raemdonck can't both be right. (It should be mentioned
that Grice himself noted a connection between the quantity and
relation maxims. See, for example, Grice, 1975: 67.)
If we could resolve the question as to which maxims are being
violated in these examples, there is a clear advantage in
adopting Nash's analysis over Hancher's. If illocutionary
ambiguity as a category is discarded, we are left with violation
of the maxims and/or conditions as the sole factor in creating
the humour in the examples looked at so far. This, more unified,
classification, is less arbitrary, and we can legitimately refer
to this approach to humour as a 'violation theory'.
2.3.10. Extending the maxims 
A final difficulty lies in the ad hoc nature of some of Hancher's
analyses. On the basis of the catsup example (see (18) in the
previous section) Hancher posited the existence of an additional
rule governing requests among equals: "do not request anything
of an equal if you could just as easily do it yourself".
Certainly none of the existing maxims or conditions seem to be
involved here. However, to take the view that the maxims can be
expanded every time a new type of example needs to be accounted
for is a rather unsatisfactory solution to the problem. We have
already had an example - see (2) above - which did not seen to
involve maxim violation. It could just as easily be argued that
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the catsup joke likewise falls outside the scope of the Searle-
Grice model. The problem is that in all these cases an
unconventional response thwarts our expectations, a principal
cause, according to Rancher, of a humorous effect. Moreover, one
feels intuitively that eonething is being violated, even though
there is no maxim or condition that can readily explain the
violation that occurs.
These are not isolated cases. Consider the exchange in (20).
The setting is a trendy boutique.
(20) Customer: I wondered if you have these in a fourteen?
Assistant: You what? This is a boutique, not the Elephant
House. (Wood, ibid: 87)
The assistant's reply fits our criteria: it is unconventional
and unexpected, and it seems to involve some form of rule-
breaking. However, once again, the violation of Grice's maxims
or Searle's conditions do not seem to be responsible.
What these examples suggest is that there may well be a case for
extending the maxims, but not in the arbitrary way proposed by
Rancher. Our aim, remember, is to be able to describe and
explain all intentional verbal humour. Having isolated several
examples which do not fit neatly into the Searle-Grice model, it
is time, perhaps, to look further afield for a model which can
account for a wider range of data. Leech's pragmatic approach,
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which consists of a broad expansion of the naxis, nay prove to
be just what we are looking for.
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXPAXDIBG THE MAIM 
3.1.1. Leech's approach to conmunication 
Discovering new maxims has proved a popular pastime. Grice
himself suggested that his list was not exhaustive, while Searle
proposed the additional maxim: "Speak idiomatically unless there
Is some special reason not to (Searle, 1979: 50). The person
who has done most to increase the total number of maxims,
however, is Leech (1983), whose contribution to the Searle-Grice
model of pragmatic theory will be considered below.
Because I am not primarily interested in evaluating Leech's
approach to communication, any difficulties which arise in the
course of this presentation will be dealt with only briefly. My
main aim in this chapter is to see whether his theory can
usefully be applied to humour, and in particular, whether the
modifications proposed by Leech can rescue the speech-act model
from some of the problems discussed in the previous section. For
critical review articles of Leech's theory see Dillon et al.
(1985) and Verschueren (1985).
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3.1.2. Politeness 
Leech was not the first person to identify politeness as an
important factor in determining the way speakers chose to express
themselves. Brown and Levinson (1978) showed how speakers of
quite unrelated languages are motivated by questions of
politeness to adopt broadly similar strategies in communicating
with others. Leech was clearly inspired by this work (even
though he does not give due recognition to the fact), but we will
see that his view of pragmatics as a system of interacting
principles takes the initial idea much further.
3.1.3. The Politeness Principle 
According to Leech, there are other principles governing our
conversation besides Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP). The
most important of these is the Politeness Principle (PP). The
Politeness Principle has been stated informally:
"Minimize (other things being equal) the expression of impolite
beliefs; maximize (other things being equal) the expression
of polite beliefs." (Leech, 1983: 81)
A 'polite belief' has been defined as a belief that is favourable
to the hearer or a third party, while an 'impolite belief' is a
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belief that is unfavourable to the hearer or a third party
(Leech, ibid: 81).
Leech has been criticised for extending the notions of politeness
and impoliteness to cover beliefs, rather than merely the
communication of beliefs (see, for example, Verschueren, ibid:
461), and indeed the idea that a belief (which is a mental
representation) can be polite or impolite is rather
idiosyncratic.
Another difficulty concerns Leech's use of the terms 'favourable'
and 'unfavourable'. Leech does not define these terms, but on
the basis of his examples it can be deduced that a favourable
belief is one which is likely to please the hearer or a third
party, while a belief that is unfavourable is one which will
cause the hearer displeasure, or even some discomfort. To take
two obvious examples, consider the following.
(1) I like your new hairstyle.
(2) Your new hairstyle makes you look really ugly.
I think it is uncontroversial to say that, in normal
circumstances, (1) would be considered polite (i.e. favourable to
the hearer), while (2) would be considered impolite (i.e.
unfavourable to the hearer).
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A final terminological difficulty concerns the fact that when
Leech talks about politeness he is referring to absolute 
politeness (Leech, ibid: 83). Some illocutions, he argues, are
inherently polite (e.g. offers), while others are inherently
impolite (e.g. orders). The idea that some utterance types are
inherently impolite has also been criticised (Dillon et al, ibid:
454). Dillon et al, suggest that politeness would be better
defined in terms of how speakers 'manage' or 'mitigate' the
performance of such utterances. We will see later that Leech has
given some consideration to the 'damage limitation' options open
to speakers.
3.1.4. The politeness principle and the co-operative principle 
It would be a mistake to assume that the PP is merely a
constraint compelling us to go round saying nice things to one
another. Leech sees it as a necessary complement to the CP,
justified on the grounds that whereas the CP can provide us with
an example of how we recover implied material, it does not
provide us with an explanation of Nhy. we often express ourselves
indirectly in the first place. The PP makes good this deficit,
and could therefore be seen as an attempt to increase the
explanatory adequacy of Grice's theory. Consider the following
exchange.
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(3) A: Do you like my new boyfriend?
B: Well, I think he's really good looking.
In giving an indirect response to A's question, B can be taken to
imply (on one interpretation):
(4) I do not like your new boyfriend.
The CP explains how we recover the implicature in (4), but we
have to turn to the PP to understand exactly why B responds in
the way he does. According to Leech, B refrains from explicitly
expressing an impolite belief (that he does not like A's
boyfriend), and in so doing he reaches a neat compromise,
sacrificing neither the CP (he is not being untruthful) nor the
PP (he is not being impolite).
Sometimes the CP takes precedence over the PP, and sometimes the
reverse is true. There are tines, for example, when we might
feel that to speak the truth, however unpleasant, is more
important than being polite. At other tines, we night pay lip
service to the truth and tell a 'white lie' in order to keep on
friendly terms with our addressee. The way the CP and the PP
interact, and keep each other in check, will become more evident
when we look at the seven additional maxims that the PP
generates. These are listed and described below.
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3.1.5. The Politeness Maxims 
1) The tact maxim
This maxim applies to directives and commissives: "minimize cost
to other: maximize benefit to other". (In fact this is Leech's
shorthand. Quoted in full, this maxim reads as follows:
'minimize the expression of beliefs that express or imply cost to
other: maximize the expression of beliefs that express or imply
benefit to other" (Leech, ibid: 132). All the other politeness
maxims should be similarly expanded.)
It should be noted here that Leech uses the word Imply rather
loosely. An utterance used as a request night be said to 'imply'
cost to the hearer if, in carrying out the request, the hearer
has to expend some energy. The utterance in (5) would be an
example of such an utterance.
(5) Close the window.
Other terms which require some clarification are self and ether,
cost and benefit.
/formally self refers to the speaker (s) and gther to the hearer
(h) or a third party. However, the matter is not clear cut.
There are occasions, for instance, when self can be extended to
references to people within one's 'sphere of influence' such as a
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spouse (Leech, ibid: 131). According to Leech, there are speech
communities where a man discussing his wife will treat her as
self. This will free him, perhaps even oblige him, to denigrate
her. (He does not say whether there are also speech communities
where wives feel equally obliged to denigrate their husbands.)
Ye will see that there are many other occasions when the
distinction between self and gther becomes blurred.
As for the notions cost and benefit, Leech leaves these
undefined. From his examples, however, we can draw the
conclusion that 'cost' refers mainly to physical effort, while
'benefit' includes such traditional pleasures as eating, drinking
and going on holiday (Leech, ibid: 107).
Leech believes that speakers and hearers know intuitively,
depending on the context, the point at which cost to h outweighs
benefit. Consider the following.
(6) Mend my bicycle.
In a context where h does not stand to benefit (s is not offering
to lend h her bicycle when it is repaired), the utterance in (6)
would imply cost to h and would therefore be considered impolite.
To minimize cost to h, s can express herself more indirectly. As
a result, (7) is far more polite than (6).
(7) Would you mind mending my bicycle?
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According to Leech, indirect illocutions are more polite (a)
because they increase the degree of optionality, and (b) because
they are more tentative (Leech, ibid: 108). Notice that the more
tentative, or indirect, the more polite is the request. Thus,
other things being equal, (8) is less polite than (7), but more
polite than (6).
(8) Can you mend my bicycle?
The person who wanted her bicycle mended had to express herself
indirectly because the cost to h was high. In contrast, in a
context where the benefit to h outweighs the cost, as in (9),
there is no need for indirectness.
(9) Have another chocolate.
In (9) the cost (i.e. the effort required to take a chocolate
from a box and put it into one's mouth) is nothing compared to
the benefit obtained (i.e. the pleasure derived from eating the
chocolate). In other words, if the benefit is great, it is not
necessary to minimize the cost by being indirect.
By the sane token, the tact maxim can help to explain why a
speaker might choose to utter:
(10) Kiss me
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in preference to either:
(11) Would you mind kissing me?
or:
(12) Would you like to kiss me?
Again, the speaker of (10) can afford to be direct because he is
convinced that the pleasure to be gained from the act of kissing
outweighs the effort required to carry out the request. (Other
factors are involved here, not least the relationship between
speaker and hearer. It is linked to the problem of accurately
defining the terms self and other, and will cone up again later.)
Although they have the sane form as the utterance in (6), the
utterances in (9) and (10) would be considered polite (or - more
important - they would not be considered impolite). In short, if
we are saying something pleasant, or 'favourable', to use Leech's
term, form is of little importance. If, on the other hand, we
are saying something 'unfavourable' (such as making a request or
issuing an order), then the form of words used takes on a good
deal of significance. The tact maxim is essentially a constraint
urging us to mitigate any unpleasantness, or 'implied cost', with
indirectness. We will see later that all the other politeness
maxims work in much the sane way.
I *	 I * I it
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Before going on to look at the other politeness maxims, I want to
mention two difficulties. The first is specific to the tact
maxim, while the second is a general criticism which can be
levelled at all these new maxims. (It will not, however, be
raised again.)
First, I am not convinced that Leech's explanation for the
greater appropriacy of (7) over (6) is correct. For Leech,
remember, the indirect (7) is more polite, and therefore more
appropriate, than the direct (6) because the hearer is given the
option to refuse to carry out the request (thereby minimizing
cost to h). On the contrary, I think that a speaker's preference
for the utterance in (7) may be motivated, not by the "gther-
centred maxim of tact" (Leech, ibid: 133), but by self-interest;
that is, it may be seen as expedient to utter (7) rather than
(6). An indirect illocution, in other words, may place the
hearer under a greater obligation to comply with the speaker's
wishes than a coldly communicated order.
The second, more generalised, difficulty concerns the supposed
Immutability of the analysis. Leech seems to think that the
propositional content of an utterance, together with its form,
will determine exactly where, on the cost-benefit scale, a
particular utterance will be placed. It is easy to think of many
occasions, however, when the utterance in (9) - to take just one
example - would be considered impolite (for example, if the
speaker were handing round chocolates in the middle of a church
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service).
	 Unfortunately Leech does not seem to take full
account of these contextual variations.
2) The generosity maxi,
"Minimize benefit to self: maximize cost to self." This maxim,
which also applies to directives and commissives, can be paired
with the tact maxim. Using Leech's own examples, it explains why
(13) is impolite, while (14) is polite.
(13) You can lend me your car.
(14) I can lend you my car.
The offer in (li.) is deemed to be polite, first because it
implies benefit to h, and second, because it implies cost to s.
In the impolite utterance in (13), the relationship between cost
and benefit to s and h is reversed.
According to Leech, the speaker of (14) is applying both the tact
and the generosity maxims (she is maximizing benefit to other and
cost to self), and indeed it is often the case that the
politeness or impoliteness of an utterance can be explained in
terns of either of these maxims. Sometimes the tact maxim
operates alone, however, as in (15), another of Leech's examples.
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(15) You can get them for less than half the price at the
market. (Leech, ibid: 134)
The speaker of (15) is offering some advice which will maximize
benefit to other (tact maxim), but as the cost to s is minimal,
involving no more than the physical effort required for the
actual giving of the advice itself, the generosity maxim is said
not to be operating here (Leech, ibid: 134).
The generosity maxim can similarly be applied without the tact
maxim. Leech gives as an example the following, which, he says,
is a polite request for a second helping.
(16) Is there any more I?
Leech argues that the speaker of (16) is minimizing benefit to
self (generosity maxim) by omitting reference to s as potential
beneficiary. (It could be argued that cost to other is also
being minimized here, in which case the tact maxim would be
involved as well. This is not a serious problem, however, since
- as Leech himself has noted - these two maxims are closely
linked (Leech, ibid: 133).)
3) Tha_appr_ohation_max.tm (the 'flattery maxim')
"Minimize dispraise of other: maximize praise of other." It is
this maxim, which applies to expressives and assertives, that
prevents us from being overtly critical. It may conflict with
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the maxim of quality to produce an exchange such as (3) above.
We have already seen that B's response in this example satisfies
the constraints of both the CP and the PP: he has not conveyed
any false information while, at the same tine, he has avoided
saying anything overtly critical.
It should perhaps be noted that although the full version of the
approbation maxim suggests that it applies to the implication (as
well as the explication) of impolite beliefs, I do not believe
that this is what Leech intended. In fact, in spite of their
injudicious wording, all Leech's maxims seem to impose
constraints only on what is explicitly stated. In the case of
the approbation maxim, we should "avoid saying unpleasant things
about others, and more particularly about h" (Leech, ibid: 135,
my emphasis). When it comes to conveying nasty or unpleasant
thoughts about others through implicature, it would appear that
there are few, if any, constraints on us at all.
4) The_modesty_mxix
"Minimize praise of self: maximize dispraise of self." Just as
the generosity and tact maxims can be paired, so this maxim can
be paired with the approbation maxim. both apply to expressives
and assertives. Thus (17) is typically polite, while (18) is
atypical and impolite.
(17) Your new hairstyle really suits you.
(18) My new hairstyle really suits me.
Mote that if the speaker of (18) were addressing her
hairdresser, her utterance would not be considered impolite.
This is because she would be applying, not the modesty maxim, but
the approbation maxim.)
If we do feel compelled to praise ourselves, then we generally do
so in much less effusive terns than those used for the praise of
others. For this reason, (19) would be a typical utterance
because the speaker is referring to someone else's cooking, while
(20) would, in many circumstances, be considered inappropriate.
'When referring to our own culinary efforts, an utterance such as
(21) would probably be more acceptable.
(19) You're a fine cook.
(20) I'm a fine cook.
(21) Actually, I'm not such a bad cook myself.
5) The_agLeraval_nalai
Brown and Levinson (1978: 118-121) demonstrated how speakers will
sometimes go to considerable lengths to avoid disagreeing with
their addressees. Leech's maxim, which is based on this
observation, reads as follows: "Minimize disagreement between
self and other: maximize agreement between self and other." It
is because of this maxim, which applies to assertives, that we
tend to play down any disagreement we night have with our
addressees. Compare the reply in (22) with the reply in (23).
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(22) A: David Lodge is a writer of the first order.
B: Do you think so? I don't rate him at all.
(23) A: David Lodge is a writer of the first order.
B: He's certainly competent.
In (22) B is expressing his disagreement with A quite explicitly,
while in (23) he could be said to be doing so implicitly. On
Leech's terns, then, the reply in (22) is impolite, while the
reply in (23) is polite. If this sounds contentious, it must be
pointed out that Leech acknowledges the importance of the
relationship between speaker and addressee to the application of
these maxims. Broadly speaking, the greater the emotional
closeness, the less need there is for us to be polite to one
another. Thus the exchange in (22), though 'impolite', would be
considered perfectly acceptable between two people who know each
other well.
8) The sympathy maxim
"Minimize antipathy between self and other: maximize sympathy
between self and other." It is due to this maxim, which also
applies to assertives, that we congratulate people on happy
occasions and offer our condolences on sad occasions. According
to Leech, this maxim is so well established that it is often
unnecessary to refer explicitly to the sad event in question.
Indeed, to do so may even be considered impolite, as it involves
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us in expressing an 'impolite belief'. Thus (24) is usually
considered more polite than (25).
(24) I'm sorry to hear about your husband.
(25) I'm sorry to hear about your husband's death.
The point is that (25) implies that the speaker is referring to a
sad event; it would be a churlish (and highly unusual remark) if
the addressee's husband had Just won the Nobel Prize for
Literature.
7) The phatic maxiai (7) "Avoid silence" (or "keep talking"). A
metalinguistic maxim this, argued for on the grounds that
conversation preserves sociability, while silence implies 'opting
out'. It explains why so much 'phatic communion' - Malinowski's
(1930) term for small talk - appears to violate the CP. While
standing on the platform at the railway station, for example, I
might commiserate with a fellow traveller and utter:
(26) The train is late again
knowing that my utterance is in breach of the maxim of quantity
(be informative). It should be appreciated that utterances such
as (26) oil the wheels of our relations with others, and because
they have this social function, they do in fact observe the CP.
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Leech remains undecided as to whether this maxim should be
subsumed under the agreement or sympathy maxims or given
independent status, hence the question mark. Certainly, either
the agreement maxim or the sympathy maxim can account for the
apparent violation of the CP in (26).
It should be noted here that Verschueren (ibid) attacks the
confidence with which Leech introduces this maxim, citing Basso's
study of the role of silence in Vestern apache culture (Basso,
1972). In defence of Leech, however, it should also be mentioned
that no claims have been made for the universality of the
politeness maxims, and further, that Leech is aware that
variations across language boundaries will undoubtedly occur
(Leech, ibid: 231).
3.1.6. Leech's maxims involve comparative concepts 
It must be pointed out that these rules are not absolute; they
are observed, as Leech himself puts it, 'up to a certain point'
(Leech, ibid: 133). The person who is constantly heaping praise
on others, for example, would probably be considered, not polite,
but insincere. Thus, in the case of the approbation maxim:, the
CP (the maxim of quality) seems to keep the PP in check. As we
have seen, Leech also appreciates that politeness decreases
according to the level of intimacy between speaker and hearer.
Notice that (22) is not a rare exception: many of these so-
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called impolite remarks - e.g. (5), (6), (13) and (20)- would be
appropriate if the speaker were addressing a close friend. Vhile
Leech does not spell this out, it would therefore appear that
self and other are also relative terms. Other, can be seen as
merging gradually with self, as the relationship between speaker
and hearer becomes more intimate.
3.1.7. The other principles 
Besides the PP, Leech argues for a further four principles. I
will look at these briefly now.
1) Irony Principle 
Leech's account of irony is not incompatible with the standard
speech-act approach. He adopts the broad definition; that is, he
holds that the ironical interpretation is simply different from
(and not the contradictory of) its literal counterpart. In
another sense, though, Leech's version is narrower. This is
because he splits the category into two: the second category,
that of banter, will be dealt with later.
Leech's primary concern is in understanding why speakers use
irony in the first place. He concludes that irony is a "friendly
way of being offensive" (Leech, ibid: 144), and posits the
existence of an irony principle UP), a second order principle,
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which works by exploiting the (first order) PP. The /P may be
stated informally as follows:
"If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which
doesn't overtly conflict with the PP, but allows the hearer
to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly,
by way of implicature." (Leech, ibid: 82)
The example of the spilled coffee in the previous chapter will
illustrate. Remember that when B uttered
(27) That was clever of you
he was ironically implicating the opposite. We have already seen
how ironical utterances can be said to violate the CP when in
fact they are observing it at some deeper level. The PP provides
the rationale for this indirect way of expressing ourselves. We
are constrained to be polite, and so we uphold the principle on a
superficial level, while exploiting it on some other level.
Faced with a clash, in other words, the PP is sacrificed to the
CP: prevented from being polite, we do the next best thing and
pretend to be polite.
For Leech, irony is the acceptable face of verbal aggression: it
enables us to be offensive while keeping within the limits of
socially acceptable behaviour. Xoreover, irony can be said to
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prevent head-on conflict with one's interlocutor. As Leech
himself remarks:
"Whereas an insult can easily lead to a counter-insult, and
hence to conflict, an ironic remark is less easy to answer
in kind. It combines the art of attack with an apparent
innocence which is a form of self- defence."
(Leech, ibid: 144)
2) Banter Principle 
Irony has been termed mock-politeness: its counterpart, banter,
has been termed mock-impoliteness. Leech introduces this term to
account for the kind of jokey insults traded among friends (cf.
Labov, 1972). The utterance in (28) - which may be said to
someone who arrives looking dishevelled - is one of his own
examples.
(28) Look what the cat's brought in!
If irony is a friendly way of being offensive, banter is an
offensive way of being friendly (Leech, ibid: 144). The banter
principle has been expressed as follows:
"In order to show solidarity with h, say something which is
(i) obviously untrue, and (ii) obviously impolite to h."
(Leech, ibid: 144)
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Leech felt the need to introduce the category of banter because
he wanted some means of distinguishing between those utterances
which are only one step removed from the literal utterance
(ironical utterances), and those which are two steps removed
(banter). An example of Leech's will illustrate. Consider the
utterance in (29).
(29) You're a fine friend.
The utterance in (29) can have at least three possible
interpretations, depending on whether the speaker intends her
utterance to be taken literally, ironically, or as a case of
verbal banter. It can mean:
1) You are a fine friend (literal interpretation);
2) You are not a fine friend (ironical interpretation, derived
from the literal interpretation);
3) But, of course, you are my friend, which is why I can talk
to you like this, i.e. insult you (banter, derived from
ironical interpretation).
In short, banter is an utterance whose ironical meaning is not to
be taken at face value, while irony is an utterance whose literal
meaning is not to be taken at face value.
In addition to being able to make a formal distinction between
utterances on different levels of interpretation, the category of
banter enables Leech to distinguish between unserious utterances
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which promote familiarity and intimacy and which are considered
polite (banter), and unserious utterances which signify
superiority and emotional distance and are therefore impolite
(irony).
3) Interest Principle 
Leech's account of how we interpret hyperbole (overstatement) and
litotes (understatement) does not differ from Grice's: it is
simply a matter of recognising the fact that the speaker is
superficially violating one of the maxims and then arriving at
the indirect force of the utterance by means of a conversational
inplicature. Along with his concern as to why speakers use irony
and banter, Leech is also interested in understanding exactly why
we night use hyperbole and litotes in our conversation. One
important factor, he believes, is the way both overstatement and
understatement interact with the PP. According to Leech, we tend
to overstate polite beliefs and understate impolite ones. Thus,
it is easy to imagine circumstances in which (30) would be
appropriate (i.e. polite) if the hearer had cooked the meal, but
rather inappropriate (i.e impolite) if the speaker herself had
cooked it.
(30) That was a delicious meal!
Leech has further suggested that we use hyperbole as a means of
livening up our conversation. He thus argues for an Interest
Principle, which reads as follows:
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"Say what is unpredictable, and hence interesting." (Leech,
ibid: 146)
This principle night explain how cliches such as (31) and (32)
started out.
(31) He's over the noon.
(32) Her eyes were on stalks.
The utterances in (31) and (32) are roughly equivalent to (33)
and (34) respectively.
(33) He's very happy.
(34) She's very surprised.
Originally - that is, before they became cliches - a speaker
might have been motivated by the interest principle to produce an
utterance such as (31) or (32) in preference to its more prosaic
counterpart in (33) or (34). Of course today (31) and (32) are
also fairly predictable and prosaic, which is one reason why
language is continually changing. Speakers are constantly
looking for new, and hence more interesting ways, of expressing
themselves.
4) Pollyanna Principle
Litotes, on the other hand, is motivated by the Pollyanna
Principle, a principle which holds that speakers like to look on
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the bright side of life, that is to say, they usually prefer
pleasant topics of conversation to unpleasant ones. The negative
effect of this is that we tend to temper disagreeable
propositions in a way that would be unnecessary if we were saying
something agreeable. An example of this is our use of
euphemisms. Instead of dying, people are said to 'pass away';
while during the Gulf war, instead of dropping bombs, we were
told that pilots were making 'sorties'.
3. I. 8. Leech and
While Leech is confident about the validity of the politeness
maxims, he would be one of the first to admit that his remarks on
rhetorical devices such irony, litotes and hyperbole are
speculative. In spite of his tentativeness, we will see in the
next section of this chapter how these additional principles and
maxims can usefully be applied to humorous data. We will find
that in spite of his "vexingly idiosyncratic" terminology (Dillon
et al, ibid: 456), Leech's extension of the Searle-Grice model
has some advantages over that model, and solves some of the
problems discussed in the previous chapter.
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In the previous chapter, it was claimed that the exploitation of
Grice's maxims and Searle's conditions provided one means of
creating a humorous effect. In the ensuing discussion, a number
of examples were identified which seemed to fall outside the
Searle-Grice model. In this section, I will try to show that
these examples can in principle be accounted for if we adopt the
broader-based approach proposed by Leech.
Consider again the following.
(1> A: Now take the whale, that's Just about the oldest fish in
the ocean.
B: It isn't a fish. It's a mammal. The whale is a mammal
A: Well, the Bible says it's a fish. The oldest book in
the world says the whale is a fish.
B: Look, they Just didn't know enough in those days. They
had a naive taxonomy. If it swan in the sea, they
classified it as a fish. We know better now, we know
the whale's a mammal.
A: You're telling me the author of the Bible didn't know
what he was doing? The Bible? The book you swear on
In court?
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According to Nash, the exchange in (1) constitutes a violation of
all Grice's maxims. The flaw in this analysis has already been
discussed, when it was demonstrated that violation, if it occurs,
does not involve any of the maxims, as they are defined by Grice.
On Leech's approach, the dialogue in (1) can be analysed as a
violation of one of the politeness maxims. By antagonising one
another, both A and B are clearly in breach of the agreement
maxim: "minimize disagreement between self and other: maximize
agreement between self and other".
The exchange in (2) is another familiar example which appeared to
involve violation, while eluding classification along Gricean
lines:
(2) Customer: I wondered if you have these in a fourteen?
Assistant: You what? This is a boutique, not the Elephant
House.
Again, on Leech's analysis, an explanation can be given for the
humour in this example. The shop assistant's insulting reply can
be said to represent a violation of the approbation maxim
"minimize dispraise of other: maximize praise of other".
In addition to the examples above which were identified as
falling outside the Searle-Grice model, there are those for which
Rancher proposes a somewhat ad hoc solution. Remember the Punch 
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cartoon cited by him in which a couple are sitting at a table
over a pot of coffee. The man is looking solemn and pious,
prompting his wife to remark:
(3) Will you stop annoying Him? If your coffee is cold, I'll
heat it up.
According to Hancher, the rule that is being violated here is the
extra regulative rule proposed by Pratt (op. cit.), which
requires of us that we do not request anything of a superior
unless no one else can grant it.
If we were to adopt Leech's analysis, however, this extra rule
would not be necessary. I'll explain why.
The man in the cartoon is appealing to God to reheat his coffee,
when either he or his wife could quite easily do it themselves.
Now because God is supernatural, he is an extreme case of gther,
rather like royalty. The wife, on the other hand, is at the
other end of the scale; she is almost a case of self, (Remember
that self and gther are relative terms, with self sometimes being
extended to include the speaker's spouse.) So, by appealing to
God in preference to his wife, the husband is both annoying God
and violating the tact maxim: "minimize cost to other: maximize
benefit to other".
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A second example for which Hancher proposed a rather arbitrary
solution was the cartoon depicting the two men at the diner
counter. The man's request for the catsup to be passed was
considered inappropriate (it was at the far end of the counter
and equidistant from both diners), and therefore conic, because
of the existence of yet another regulative rule requiring us not
to ask anything of an equal if we could just as easily do it
ourselves.
Again, violation of ti - tact maxim can be appealed to here, since
the speaker is clearly maximizing benefit to self, at great cost
to other, whereas if he were adhering to the maxim he would be
doing the reverse - that is to say, putting himself out by
fetching the catsup and offering it to his eating companion.
It should be appreciated that it is not the requests per se that
are in violation of the tact maxim, for if that were the case,
all requests would be ruled out by the politeness principle.
Vhat makes these two examples comic is the unreasonableness of
the requests. The tact maxim is breached in (3) because the
request is being made to an inappropriate person, while in the
catsup example, the request itself is inappropriate.
•3.2.2. • • I -
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So far the application of Leech's approach to communication to
the analysis of humorous data has been confined to a
consideration of those examples which could not be satisfactorily
accounted for on the standard maxim-based approach. We have seen
how the agreement maxim, the approbation maxim and the tact maxim
have, in turn, cone to the rescue of the violation account of
humour. It is time now to look further afield and consider the
ways in which the other politeness maxima night be similarly
exploited.
Victoria Wood's sketches prove a fertile hunting ground for
violations of the politeness maxims. Although the approbation
maxim is her favourite, she some-tines devotes a whole sketch to
the undermining of one of the others. Consider the excerpts in
(4). A reporter on a local newspaper has called on the bereaved
wife of a popular novelist.
(4) Reporter: Widow Smith? I'm from the 'Herald and Argus'. I
believe your husband's Just died and he was
quite well known or something.
Widow: Come in then, I haven't done much tidying up since
(They go in)
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Reporter: Good excuse, a death, isn't it, to bunk off the
housework? If somebody dropped dead in our
family, I'd be quite pleased.
(She picks up a photo)
This him? He looks quite sick on this actually,
doesn't he?
(Tears from the widow)
Be looks a dead nice bloke, though. So - he did
what exactly, drop dead?
Widow: He collapsed in front of the television.
Reporter: What channel? (Wood, 1985: 43)
According to Leech, the sympathy maxim is so powerful that we
refrain from referring explicitly to a sad event such as a death.
However, the reporter in (4) goes even further, breaking all the
rules about how to treat the bereaved. She does not miss an
opportunity of mentioning the death - even to the extent of
referring to the bereaved woman as Widow Smith, a highly unusual
title in any circumstances. Moreover, the event itself is
trivialised beyond belief. The reporter suggests that a death in
the family is a good excuse to put off doing household chores;
she takes a callous interest in the death scene. Of course the
sketch is making a comment about a particularly depraved form of
journalism, but it is exaggerated, even by British standards, and
is therefore comic.
- 128 -
3.2.3 . PsalitenerasnaximsiarlZILLtithaautp-Joaxims.
Remember that these maxims are observed only "up to a certain
point". Leech remarks (Leech, 1983: 133) that the person who
applies the approbation maxim too strongly by constantly
denigrating herself quickly becomes tedious, and may be regarded
as insincere as well.
It would appear that a too-stringent adherence to a politeness
maxim can have other effects besides that of boring one's
addressee. Leech has emphasised the cultural specificity of his
maxims - that is to say, he has acknowledged the fact that what
is considered appropriate behaviour varies from one linguistic
community to another - using, as an example, the greater
importance attached to the modesty maxim in Japan relative to
English speaking communities. When offering food, the Japanese
are said to be so modest that they avoid making any suggestion
that their fare is worth eating, and may even go so far as to
deny its very existence. Leech quotes this example:
(5) Rani mo (neshiagaru wa) ari-masen ga, dozo
'There is nothing (to eat), but please ....
(Leech, ibid: 138)
When offering a gift, a similar degree of extreme understatement
applies. "Whereas an English person may call his gift 'small',
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the Japanese will go further, and say, 'This is a gift which will
be of no use to you, but...'" (Leech, ibid: 138)
These examples strike me as comic, and, if you think about it,
this is precisely what Leech's theory might predict. If we can
violate the maxims by not being polite enough, we can overstep
the mark and violate the CP by acting in a manner that is so
polite it is deemed excessive. Thus, by English speaking
standards, (5) is an aberration because the CP has not come into
play to keep the PP in check.
So far, then, Leech's extension of the Searle-Grice model has two
major advantages over that model. First, with its increased
number of maxims, it can cover a wider range of data, including
an example cited by Mash which would not otherwise be accounted
for. (Moreover, the fact that many humorous utterances appear to
derive from the violation of the PP alone, provides independent
evidence for the existence of these additional maxims.) Second,
the tact maxim obviates the need for the additional, ad hoc
regulative rules proposed by Rancher. It thus appears that
Leech's approach to communication could form the basis for a
violation account of humour that is both broader in scope and
less arbitrary than Rancher's account. (Ironically, Leech's own
theory has been criticised for its arbitrariness. See, for
example, Dillon et al, op. cit: 455; Sperber and Wilson, 1986:
36)
3.2.4. ;". •
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Besides the PP, the other pragmatic principles introduced by
Leech have implications for a theory of humour. We will look at
these in turn.
The Irony Principle and the Banter Principle 
Because Leech's approach to irony is not fundamentally different
from the traditional speech act account, the problem as to how we
recover the intended ironical interpretation remains. However,
his introduction of the term banter_ looks promising, and is worth
pursuing in a study of verbal humour.
Ve have seen that Leech makes a distinction between irony, 'a
friendly way of being offensive', and banter, 'an offensive way
of being friendly'. It is important to understand the difference
in function between the two. According to Leech, we use irony to
insult and criticise, but in such a way that the risk of counter-
attack will be minimized. Because our ironical remarks are
friendly (on a superficial level, at least), our addressees will
be less inclined, the argument goes, to respond aggressively. As
a result, direct conflict is avoided and social interaction goes
On.
The function of banter is somewhat different. Banter exists, not
to prevent head-on conflict, but to promote and maintain close,
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personal relationships. It is seen as a solidarity marker:
irony with the sting removed.
Leech emphasises the poisonous aspects of ironical utterances,
stating at one point that speakers are "ironic at someone's
expense, scoring off others by politeness that is obviously
insincere" (Leech, ibid: 142). He does not, however, rule out
the possibility that irony can be comic (Leech, ibid: 143).
As for banter, although it is never deadly serious (the phrase
serious banter contains an inherent contradiction), neither is it
always particularly comic. The example quoted above, which is
cited again below, demonstrates the banality of some instances of
banter.
(6) Look what the cat's brought in! (Leech, ibid: 144)
It is worth noting further that, on Leech's definition, banter is
a fairly restrictive category. Many playfully impolite
utterances, which would seem intuitively to qualify as banter do
not, in fact, fit Leech's definition, which requires that the
utterance is (i) obviously untrue, and (ii) obviously impolite to
h (Leech, ibid: 144). The utterance in (7), for example, does
not qualify because it is impolite about a third party.
(7) "Sociologists, it is well known, are humourless, left-wing
ptryeyors of nonsense or truisms." (Barley, 1986: 9)
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The utterance in (8) cannot be categorised as an example of
banter either, first, because it is, like (7), impolite about
someone other than the hearer; and second, the impolite thought
is left implicit, while banter for Leech involves only explicitly
conveyed insults.
(8) Bernard: If you could get her to listen to reason...
Jim: She's a sociology student, Bernard!
(Jay and Lynn in Self, 1984: 157)
On the basis of these observations, we may be prompted to ask
whether banter is of any use to us in a description of humour,
since clearly it does not seem capable of distinguishing in any
pertinent way between the comic and the non-comic ironic
utterance.
I think its importance lies in its constituting an attempt to
identify utterances on different levels of interpretation. We
have seen that irony is analysed as being only one step removed
from the literal utterance, while banter is two steps removed.
In an attempt to recognise formally these different levels of
interpretation, Leech uses the terns 'second-order principle' for
irony and 'third-order principle' for banter. Leech does not
develop this line of thought, and yet we will see in chapter four
that there is some mileage in this approach. This basic idea,
U.
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when fully developed, forms an integral part of the relevance-
theoretic description of humour.
The Interest Principle and the Pollyanna Principle 
It will be remembered that the interest principle requires that
we enliven our conversation with unpredictable, and hence
interesting, comments, while the Pollyanna principle requires us
to emphasise the cheerful aspects of life and downplay the
negative side. These principles can be linked to hyperbole
(overstatement) and litotes (understatement) respectively. Both
overstatement and understatement can be conic, as the following
examples illustrate.
(9) The girl was fashionably dressed all in black, with a mask
of white make-up, and her hair was expensively contrived to 
look as if she had just been electrocuted. 
(Lodge, 1988: 217, my emphasis)
(10) Of a man said to have broken up all the furniture, one says
'He was a little intoxicated!' (Grice, ibid: 71)
al3.2.5. I	 Ia •	 •
It is important to note that the three other principles that have
been identified as being relevant to our understanding of humour,
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namely the banter, interest and Pollyanna principles, are not
like the (first-order) CP and PP, in that they are not violated
in order to obtain a comic effect. Indeed, banter could be said
to represent a case of violation of the PP: "minimize the
expression of impolite beliefs: maximize the expression of
polite beliefs"; while the interest and Pollyanna principles, if
adhered to in order to create a comic effect, represent a
violation of the CP - or, to be more specific - the first maxim
of quality: be truthful.
These other principles are not necessary, then, on the
descriptive level. Because they are essentially rhetorical
devices, they nonetheless pick out a large subset of humorous
data, a fact which suggests that their importance lies more in
their explanatory role. We will see below that the banter and
interest principles, in particular, have implications for a study
of humour.
2, 2, 6,
On the explanatory level, Leech's model has some advantages also
(although, to be fair, neither Hancher nor Yamaguchi made any
claims in this respect for their analyses). Although this
approach cannot answer the central question - why is utterance x
funny? - it may have the built-in apparatus to answer the related
question - why do speakers try to be funny? The two principles
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involved are the Banter Principle and the Interest Principle. Ye
have already seen that for Leech banter is socially cohesive.
Similarly, for Brown and Levinson (op. cit: 129), joking is a
"positive-politeness technique", serving the purpose of putting
the hearer at her ease. This function of humour (and not simply
banter) is particularly well documented by psychologists. Giles
et al, for example, give the following as one of the four reasons
why a speaker should want to attempt humour:
"Creation or maintenance of in-group solidarity.
In forming a group or interpersonal friendship, humour may serve
as an effective alleviation of initial tension which may create
an atmosphere conducive for the formulation or evolution of group
norms and structures. Even when group cohesiveness has been
established, humour may, particularly in tines of stress with
competing out-groups, serve as a device to maintain in-group
solidarity (and 'keep the spirits up')." (Giles et al., 1976:
41).
net Leech has done, then, is to incorporate into his theory what
anthropologists and psychologists already know about the social
function of humour.
The relevance of the interest principle for a theory of humour is
less obvious. Leech has described how we try to beef up our
conversation with unpredictable, and hence interesting,
utterances. It is this principle, as we have seen, which
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explains why we use hyperbole. It seems, however, that the
interest principle has implications beyond the fact that
hyperbole can often be condo. Remember Rancher's remarks about
the relationship between humour and the unconventional. He made
the point that humour could result when our expectations are
frustrated. Thus puns, when they involve locutionary ambiguity,
fail to meet our expectations about the univocality of
utterances; and on the illocutionary level, we have looked at
many examples where the illocutionary force assigned to an
utterance by a speaker takes us completely by surprise.
Exploiting the maxims - Leech's and Grice's - is another way of
being unpredictable.
There seems to be a connection, then, between unpredictability
and humour, and unpredictability and being interesting. Yet
there is another piece in this jigsaw. Ye now know)
 as
advertising copywriters have presumably known all along, that if
a television commercial is humorous, viewers take more interest
(Brown and Bryant, 1983; Allen, 1988). (Whether they are more
likely to remember the name of the product being promoted is
another matter. See, for example, Sternthal and Craig (1973) and
Brown and Bryant (ibid).) The interest principle provides us
with something of an explanation for this phenomenon. The strong
connection between being funny and being interesting could be
seen to be due to the fact that both are a by-product of
unpredictability. Unpredictability, in other words, is one way
of being funny, and/or interesting. And since we are well
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motivated to be interesting, if only as a means of getting people
to listen to us, we are subsequently motivated to try, on
occasion, to be funny.
To sum up, Leech's model has some major advantages over the
Searle-Grice model, on both a descriptive and an explanatory
level. In the final section of this chapter, we will look first
at some minor problems which emerge as a result of our adopting
Leech's analysis. We will conclude by pulling together the main
strands of this, and other, maxim-based approaches, in an attempt
to draw up a coherent, descriptively and explanatorily adequate,
violation account of humour.
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3.3.1. Rumnur and the pnliteness principle - discussion 
Ve have seen that one of the advantages of the proliferation of
the maxims is that a wider range of humorous data can be
accounted for. It night therefore be expected, perhaps, that one
disadvantage of the application of Leech's approach to humour
will be an exacerbation of the problem of overlapping descriptive
categories. Indeed examples can be found to illustrate this.
Take the exchange in (1), which, on the revised violation
analysis, would be seen as involving the violation of the maxim
of relation.
(1) Taxi driver: Have a nice day!
Groucho Marx: I'll have what kind of day I like.
If we were to adopt Leech's model, we could say, alternatively,
that in giving such a tendentious response to the poor taxi
driver's innocent attempt at leave-taking, Groucho Marx is
flouting the agreement maxim.
In spite of this difference in analysis, it is not clear that
there is a genuine theoretical problem here. We could argue that
two kinds of maxim are simultaneously being exploited in this
example: first, the maxim that requires us to be relevant; and
second, the maxim that requires us to avoid unnecessary
interpersonal conflict. The two maxims are linked, in so far as
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the exploitation of the former provides the speaker with the
means for exploiting the latter, but there does not seem to be
any mutual incompatibility or descriptive overlap.
The problem of overlap discussed in the previous chapter was
arguably of a different order in that the exchanges concerned
involved a misunderstanding on the part of the hearer, the cause
of which was in dispute. For convenience, I will cite the two
examples again below.
(2) Violet: Charlie Brown, would you like to come to a party
next week?
Charlie Brown: Why yes, I'd like that very much.
Violet: I thought you would .... but I doubt if I'll invite
you anyway.
(3) A: How would you like to spend seven days in a Portuguese
villa?
B: I'd love it
A: Good, then you can envy me all next v,tek.
According to Rancher, Violet is exploiting the illocutionary
ambiguity of an indirect speech act in (2), while for Nash, the
exchange in (3) involves the exploitation, by A, of Grice's maxim
of quantity. These different analyses of what is, strategically,
the sane joke point to a fundamental difference in opinion as to
the root cause of the misunderstanding. For Rancher, the speaker
•3.3.2. • • • • • •	 •
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is exploiting the ambiguity that is inherent in an indirect
speech act, while for Nash, the speaker is failing to come up
with enough information to enable his addressee to recover his
intended meaning.
Perhaps the reason for the difference is as follows. Searle and
Grice are treading on the same conceptual territory, concerned,
as they are, with the problem of understanding how it is speakers
are able to 'mean more than they say'. Combined, it is perhaps
inevitable that their descriptions and explanations will involve
some overlap. In contrast, Leech is primarily interested in the
broader question as to why it is that speakers express themselves
indirectly in the first place. Because Leech's maxims are
essentially social constraints, they do not directly impinge on
the constraints imposed by either Searle or Once. Indeed, if a
speaker violates a pragmatic rule, there is every reason to
expect that she might, at the same time, be violating a
sociolinguistic rule. In other words, the kind of dual violation
illustrated in (1) presents no particular problem, and might even
be predicted by the theory.
Another issue raised by our adoption of Leech's analysis concerns
the status of the principle underlying all these approaches to
humour, namely the idea that a humorous effect is obtained when
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the maxims or conditions are violated in some way. Having
demonstrated how Grice's and Leech's maxims and Searle's
conditions can be violated in order to create a comic effect, we
now have counterexamples, where an utterance is comic because one
of the politeness maxims is applied too strongly. Leech's
Japanese examples, where the modesty maxim is applied (by English
speaking standards) to excess, are a case in point.
This difficulty was passed over without comment in the previous
section, but the question has to be asked as to whether we can
accept this extension of the notion of maxim violation. After
all, to use the term 'violation' to refer to cases where a maxim
is adhered to, albeit too strongly, represents a radical
reworking of the concept on which this whole approach to humour
is based. I can see two ways of approaching this problem, one of
which is more satisfactory than the other.
1) It could be argued that while there is a maxim being applied
too strongly in the Japanese examples, there is, at the sane
tine, an orthodox violation of the maxim of quality ("be
truthful") - and that the CP takes precedence, in a theory of
humour, over the PP. There are two objections to this analysis.
a) The CF and the PP are seen by Leech as first-order
principles, that is to say, they enjoy equal status in his
hierarchical structure of principles. To say, for the purpose of
a theory of humour, that the CP has primacy over the Pg is not
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supported by the theory, and is thus an entirely ad hoc solution
to the problem.
b) The humour in the Japanese examples seems to derive from the
fact that the speaker is being excessively modest, not from the
fact that she is being untruthful. To explain the humour in
terms of the latter goes against our intuitions.
2) The alternative solution would be to say that applying a
maxim too strongly is a special case of violation. The question
then arises: is it only the modesty maxim that is involved, or
are the others capable of being exploited in a similar way? It
Is difficult to see how Grice's maxims of quality, relation and
manner could be too strongly applied, while the second maxim of
quantity (do not be more informative than is required) already
has a control written into it. It seems, therefore, that only
the politeness maxims are involved. Consider this example of a
speaker applying the approbation maxim ("maximize praise of
other: minimize dispraise of other") too strongly. Sidney has
erected a worktop over the washing machine in his kitchen and is
proudly showing it to Marion, his boss's wife. Marion addresses
her husband as follows:
(4) Marion: Darling, Sidney built this shelf on his own. He
went out and measured the machine, got all his
screws and nails and heavens knows what and built
this shelf himself. (Ayckbourn 1977: 27)
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Marion's utterance implies that she is impressed by Sidney's
achievements. But isLthis degree of praise Justified in the
circumstances? Or is Marion making fun of Sidney by praising him
in such effusive terns? After all, every weekend, up and down
the country, DIY enthusiasts are buying screws and nails and
putting up shelves. It is something people do in their spare
tine, and, one might think, is hardly worth remarking on.
As for applying the agreement maxim too irongly, there is a nice
example in Evelyn Waugh's Scoop. Lord Copper is a newspaper
magnate, Mr Salter one of his underlings.
(5) "Mr Salter's side of the conversation was lindted to
expressions of assent. When Lord Copper was right he
said, 'Definitely, Lord Copper'; when he was wrong,
'Up to a point.'
'Let me see, what's the name of the place I mean? Capital
of Japan? Yokohama, isn't it?'
'Up to a point, Lord Copper.'
'And Hong Kong belongs to us, doesn't ,.t?
'Definitely, Lord Copper." ('Waugh, 1988: 14)
To avoid putting someone right on a point of fact when the hearer
- a Fleet Street editor - ought to be fully cognizant of the
facts, is a rather too stringent application of the agreement
maxim, and is therefore conic.
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Intentionally or unintentionally, then, the politeness maxims,
when applied too strongly, can create a conic effect. 'Because
Leech himself has acknowledged that his maxims are adhered to
only 'up to a certain point', there does seem to be some
justification in saying that, where the politeness maxims are
concerned, an extension to the notion of violation is required;
that is to say, speakers can violate these maxims by being either
under- or over-polite. If this is written into the humour
theory, the problem is satisfactorily overcome (note 1).
3.3.3. A more general problem with this approach 
Leech's approach is beginning to look promising. It has enabled
us to account in a more principled way for examples which, on a
standard violation account, were assigned rather arbitrary
descriptions. Moreover, it is capable of covering a wider range
of data.
There is, however, a more general problem with this, and all
other violation approaches to humour. It concerns the very
foundation on which the theory is based, namely that a humorous
effect is obtained when an utterance is unexpected or
unconventional, with violation of the maxims forming an important
means of creating this unexpectedness. Certainly unexpectedness
does seem to be a distinctive feature of much, if not all, verbal
humour, but the question is whether the relationship is causal.
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Violation approaches to humour imply that it is, and indeed my
own exposition of how Leech's extension of the model might be
applied to humour underlines that view. Yet we do not have to
look far before we find a range of examples which suggest that
this perspective on humour might well be wrong. Let's return to
an utterance which was cited at the beginning of this chapter.
(6) I'm sorry to hear about your husband.
I said that it was due to the constraints of the sympathy maxim
that (6) would be appropriate if the addressee's husband had Just
died, and highly inappropriate if he had Just won the Nobel Prize
for Literature. We saw - remember Wood's bereaved-wife sketch
from the previous section - that when the sympathy maxim is
violated to create an unexpected response, the utterance is not
Just inappropriate, it is comic. In the light of this, consider
the following exchange.
(7) A: My husband's just won the Nobel Prize for Literature.
B: (said with compassion) Oh, I'm sorry to hear that.
The sympathy maxim is clearly being violated by B here to create
an unconventional response. Note, however, that unlike the
exchanges in the bereaved wife sketch, (7) is not conic.
Similarly, consider the exchange in (8).
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(8) A: Do you like my new boyfriend.
B: Frankly, no.
B's reply in (8) is unexpected, it represents a violation of the
approbation maxim - but again, it isn't funny.
Now we must remember that no-one is claiming that all cases of
maxim violation are comic, so, in themselves, the exchanges in
(7) and (8) do not threaten the validity of his description. The
trouble, as we shall see, is that the counterexamples are
commonplace, and there seems to be no means of distinguishing
between the humorous and the non-humorous cases of violation.
Nor is it the case that the problem is confined to the politeness
maxims. Metaphor, to give another example, represents a
violation of one of Grice's maxims, the maxim of quality; and
yet, if I say, speaking metaphorically:
(9) Sally is a block of ice
I am unlikely to raise any laughs. Or, to take another example,
consider (10).
(10) A: Can you pass the salt?
B: Yes (B does not move).
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On Rancher's analysis, B's reply exploits an illocutionary
ambiguity (or, on the revised analysis, is a violation of the
maxim of relation), - but in many circumstances it would be seen
as disconcerting rather than comic. Equally disconcerting, and
disorienting, is Lenny's violation of the maxim of relation in
this exchange from Pinter's The Homecoming.
(11) Lenny: .... You must be connected with my brother in some
way.
Ruth: I'm his wife.
Lenny: Eh, listen, I wonder if you can advise me. I've
been having a bit of a rough time with this clock.
(Pinter, 1970: 28)
Ve have seen that Rancher does acknowledge the fact that the
violation of the maxim of relation is not always conic. The norm
must not seriously be called into question: any prolonged lack
of co-operation, he argues, can have tragic rather than humorous
results.
It is interesting that at this point Rancher cones close to
adopting Yamaguchi's view, that there is something superficial
about the humour that occurs in humorous utterances. In fact, it
Is worth looking again at Yamaguchi's more restricitve approach,
to see whether it can save us from some of the wrong predictions
just outlined.
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For Yamaguchi the key word is deception. An utterance is comic
not just because the maxine are violated to create an unexpected
response: there must also be some deception. In an exchange
such as (2), for example, Violet is deceiving Charlie Brown by
leading him up the garden path. In contrast, because there is no
such deliberate deception in, say, the use of metaphor, an
example such as (9) would automatically be ruled out as a
candidate for humour. So far, so good. Unfortunately for
Yamaguchi, however, deceptive violation also occurs in non-
humorous utterances. In fact, the technique is used frequently
by advertising copy-writers. Consider the following.
(12) We're giving away half our furniture for Christmas.
(Advertisement for Habitat)
This eye-catching copy leads us to believe that Habitat is giving
away half its furniture for nothing, but on close reading of the
rest of the text in the advertisement - which I have not included
here - we realise that this is not the case. What they are doing
is selling off (selected items of) furniture at half price. The
advertisement is effective because it grabs our attention by
means of semi-deceptive violation of the maxim of quality.
This attention-grabbing technique, as I have said, is widely
used. Another example can be found in (13), an advertisement
from a Sunday supplement, inviting readers to take out a
subscription on someone's behalf. (See also Wilson, 1992)
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(13) Give 'The Observer' for a year and we'll award you the
Booker Prize.
In (13) we are momentarily deceived into thinking that by taking
out a subscription to 'The Observer' we will be awarded that
dubious accolade, the Booker Prize. But, as with the previous
example, a second reading (or a close reading of the small
print), forces the conclusion that what is being offered is not
the Booker Prize itself, but the copy of the book which wins the
Booker Prize.
Of course, we are not really being deceived in these examples,
any more than we are truly deceived in the garden-path jokes
discussed by Yamaguchi. This is an important point. It looks as
though advertisers obtain their effects by using the same
techniques as those used by the writers of comedy, an observation
which leads us by another route to the same question: what
exactly is the link between maxim violation and humour creation?
The picture that seems to be emerging is one where some cases of
maxim violation are comic, while others aren't. And although no-
one is claiming that maxim violation is a defining feature of the
comic utterance, it is important to develop some means of
distinguishing between the comic and the non-comic cases of
violation. Unless we can do this, the link between maxim
violation and humour creation is too tenuous to be useful as an
analytical tool.
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3.3.4.
Perhaps the answer to this problem lies in an observation made in
the introduction. In this and the previous chapter, the
impression might have been given that an utterance is either
humorous or non-humorous. Indeed Hancher and Yamaguchi
implicitly adopt this view and, in extending the violation
approach to include Leech's maxims, this assumption has not been
challenged. However, the point was made at the outset that an
utterance is not intrinsically comic, that for every so-called
'comic' utterance, it is possible to construct a context which
would render that utterance humourless. An adequate theory of
humour, it was argued, should be able to give an account of all
intentional verbal humour; that is to say, the aim of this study
Is to provide a means of distinguishing between the exchange in
(14) when humour is intended, and that same exchange when the
shop assistant is intending to offend and insult.
(14) Customer: I wondered if you have these in a fourteen?
Assistant: You what? This is a boutique, not the Elephant
House.
The answer, it seems, would be to say that maxim violation is
comic if humour is intended. To build this proviso into the
definition excludes examples (7) to (13) - assuming, for the sake
of argument, that humour is not intended in these examples - but
the question remains: is this a useful theoretical tool' After
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all, it does not take us much further than a statement claiming
that an utterance is comic if the speaker intends it that way.
In the second section of the next chapter we will look at humour
from a different perspective. It will be suggested that the
basic assumption underpinning all speech act accounts of humour
might well be wrong. In other words, the causal relationship
that is thought to exist between maxim violation and the creation
of verbal humour might itself be a garden path. But before we
look at this alternative view of verbal humour, we need to know
something about the approach to communication from which it
stems. The first section of the next chapter, then, is an
introduction to relevance theory.
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CRAPTER FOUR 
LBANDONING THE HAIM 
4 . 1 . 1. Ralazarait_then=_Ale_leginninga
Wilson and Sperber reacted against the readiness, shown by Leech
and others, to create new maxims on what they saw to be a
completely ad hoc basis (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 36). In their
early work, they sought to show that instead of extending the
maxims, they could be reduced - to one single maxim of relation
(Wilson and Sperber, 1981). (The Wilson-Sperber model, as it
stands today, is against the whole maxim-based framework.) We
will look at the sort of data that led them to this conclusion.
Consider the exchange in (1).
(1) Jane: (with a wail) I just want to go to bed.
Sidney: Well you cannot go to bed. Not at eighteen forty
seven.
Now take off that coat. (Ayckbourn, 1977: 35)
On a Gricean approach, Sidney's utterance might be analysed as a
violation of the maxim of quantity, since by stating the time so
precisely he is - on one level - giving more information than is
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necessary to make his point. It could be argued, however, that
Sidney's utterance constitutes a violation of the maxim of
relation, for, in the circumstances, the precise time is simply
not relevant. (Ye have seen the problems that this overlap has
caused for an adequate violation account of humour.)
lext consider again this conversation from a 'Peanuts' cartoon
strip.
(2) Lucy: Schroeder, why don't you give up this classical music
thing? Don't you know there are over eighty million
piano students in this country? And less than one
per cent of them ever make a real living at it?
Schroeder: Where did you get those figures?
Lucy: I just made then up.
Following handier, we analysed (2) as a violation, on Lucy's
part, of the maxim of quality. To supply false information, and
then to admit, quite readily, that it 1..a false when challenged,
could equally be seen as a violation of the maxim of relation.
After all, Lucy's remarks are worthless (that is to say,
irrelevant) when we know that there is no factual evidence to
support them.
Consider finally this violation of the maxim of manner.
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(3) Cumulo-nimbus stacked up outside; Treece always associated
it with the provinces. (Bradbury, 1978: 13)
This is an extract from a novel, not a geography text book. The
author has used the technical, Latinate tern ounmlo-nimbus for
stylistic reasons. We might infer that Treece is something of a
pedant, or the sort of person who prides himself on his extensive
vocabulary and wide general knowledge. Whatever the intended
implications, Bradbury has violated the maxim of manner here in
order to produce a (mildly) comic effect. But could it not be
argued, once again, that it is the maxim of relation that is
being exploited? Is the correct terminology for a certain type
of cloud formation crucial (that is to say, relevant) in this
context?
Starting from this rather nebulous position - after all,
relevance (as Grice was the first to admit) was not then a
clearly defined category - Wilson and Sperber set about
developing their own pragmatic theory. It is called,
predictably, Relevance Theory. The main tenets of relevance
theory are set out below. (For a more comprehensive presentation
of the theory, see Sperber and Wilson (1986) or Blakemore (1992);
for an outline, see Sperber and Wilson (1987) or Wilson and
Sperber (1990). For criticism, see Sperber and Wilson (1987,
second section) and reviews (Mey and Talbot, 1988; Nemo, 1988;
Levinson, 1989).
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4.1.2. Relevance theory: the basic premise 
According to Wilson and Sperber we do not go round taking in
information indiscriminately; rather we pay attention to
phenomena that strike us as relevant. This might seem a rather
obvious point to make, let alone base a theory on, but as Wilson
and Sperber have shown, this simple fact does have implications
for communication. Their argument goes something like this.
When we speak, we are claiming someone's attention, and when we
are addressed, we tune in, in most circumstances, to what is
being said. Now if it is the case that we only pay attention to
relevant stimuli, it follows, that as hearers we must
automatically assume that utterances addressed to us are
relevant. It is this assumption, claim Wilson and Sperber, that
explains how we are able to interpret utterances in context.
4.1.3. Relevance defined 
Ve all have fairly strong intuitions as to whether or not an
utterance is relevant, and the fact that we have these intuitions
is crucial to the theory. For example, (4b) would probably be
considered a relevant response to (4a), while (4c) would, in many
circumstances, be considered totally irrelevant, and therefore
inappropriate.
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(4) a. What time does the train leave?
b. 8.30.
c. Iron is the most widely used metal.
This ordinary language notion of relevance is a useful starting
point, but too vague to be of any use in an adequate pragmatic
theory. Wilson and Sperber define relevance more precisely. For
then, an utterance is relevant if it interacts with the context
in a particular way - that is to say, if it has contextual
implications or, more generally, contextual effects. To
understand what they mean by this, we will need to look at the
three ways in which new information can interact with the context
to produce a contextual effect.
First consider the scenario in (5).
(5) The doorbell rings. I think to myself:
a. If it's the milkman, I'll pay the bill.
I open the door and:
b. It lathe milkman.
Hew information, (5b), has interacted with the context, (5a), to
yield some further information, (5c):
(5) c. I'll pay the bill.
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To put it another way, the information in (5b) has implications
in the context of (5a) because some new information, (50), has
been obtained which could not be deduced from either (5a) or (5b)
alone.
Next consider this scenario.
(6) The doorbell rings. I think to myself:
a. It must be the milkman. If it is, I'll pay the bill.
I open the door and:
b. It lathe milkman.
In this example, there is an assumption in (6a), 'It's the
milkman', which is raised from hypothesis to certainty by the
information in (6b). It can combine with the information, 'If
it's the milkman, I'll pay the bill' to yield the contextual
assumption in (6c):
(6) c.	 I'll pay the bill.
Finally consider (7).
(7) The doorbell rings. I think to myself:
a. It must be the milkman. If it is, I'll pay the bill.
I open the door and:
b. It isn't the milkman.
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Here the new infornation in (7b) has a contextual implication
because it leads to the abandoning of an assumption - namely,
'it's the milkman' - in the context (7a).
These different scenarios, which are based on Wilson and
Sperber's own examples (Wilson and Sperber, 1986), represent the
three ways in which new information can interact with the context
to produce a contextual effect. They can be summarised thus.
Hew information can:
1) combine with the context to yield a further piece of
information;
2) strengthen an existing assumption;
3) eradicate an existing assumption.
And according to Wilson and Sperber, these are precisely the ways
in which an utterance can achieve relevance.
4.1.4. relevance is a comparative concept 
It is important to remember that relevance is a comparative
concept. In other words, one utterance or item of information
may be more relevant in a specified context than another.
Compare, for example, the following.
(8) A: What time does the train leave?
B:	 8.30.
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(9) A: What time does the train leave?
B: 6.30 and iron is the most widely used metal.
Prima facie B's reply in (8) is more relevant than B's reply in
(9). According to Wilson and Sperber, this is because relevance
is a function, not only of contextual effects, but also of
processing effort. In processing information, hearers look for
the greatest possible effect for the minimum necessary effort.
The response in (9) contains information which costs the hearer
some processing effort with no reward in the form of an extra
contextual effect (if all A wants to know is the departure time
of the train in question), and as a result, is less relevant than
the response in (8).
It is an the basis of the above observations that Wilson and
Sperber propose the following (simplified) definition of
relevance:
"Relevance:
(a) Other things being equal, the greater the contextual
effects, the greater the relevance.
(b) Other things being equal, the smaller the processing effort,
the greater the relevance." (Wilson and Sperber, 1986: 11)
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Now that we have a definition of relevance, we can proceed to
expand on the claim made above, namely that we are only able to
interpret what is said to us by assuming that the person
addressing us intends her utterance to be relevant.
Vhen we speak, we convey two layers of information:
1) the information conveyed by the utterance;
2) the information that the speaker intends to convey that
information.
These are the contents of the speaker's informative and
actamuniaatime. intentions respectively. As part of 1), speakers
communicate, by the very act of requesting their addressee's
attention, the information that what they have to say is worth
processing. Communication is only possible because hearers (in
general) look for an interpretation which would confirm this.
This piece of information, which is automatically communicated by
every utterance, is known as the presumption of relevance. The
following example, from a previous chapter, will illustrate.
(10) A: Do you want to see 'Hedda Gabler' tonight?
B: I went yesterday.
In processing B's reply, A takes the proposition expressed and
attempts to access a context in which it would be worth
processing (presumption of relevance). In this case, the context
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would include the information that people do not usually want to
see the sane play two nights running. Thus A is able to extract
the information that B does not want to see 'Hedda Gabler'. She
might then make the hypothesis that B does not want to see 'Hedda
Gabler' because he saw it the previous night, and thus extract an
explanation for B's not wanting to see it. And the utterance, on
this interpretation, might well be worth the effort A has spent
in processing it.
The essential difference between this and the Searle-Grice
approach is as follows. On a Gricean analysis, A recognises that
the maxim of relation is potentially being violated and looks
around for an interpretation of B's response that will restore
his belief that the maxims are being adhered to at some deeper
level. For relevance theorists, rule violation is not possible,
simply because there aren't any rules in the first place.
Utterances automatically create expectations of relevance because
of the way the mind works. This fact is stated in the single
general principle around which relevance theory is built:
"Principle of relevance 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption
of its own optimal relevance" (Wilson and Sperber, 1986: 158).
This is a more technical way of saying that every utterance
creates an expectation of its own optimal relevance. An
interpretation which satisfies that expectation, or which the
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speaker might rationally have expected to do so, is consistent
with the principle of relevance. Sperber and Wilson claim that
every utterance has at most a single interpretation which is
consistent with the principle of relevance, and this is the
interpretation that the hearer should rationally choose.
4.1.6. Optimal relevance 
Optimal relevance is a new tern which needs to be defined if we
are to get any further in our understanding of relevance theory.
Material is optimally relevant if it is relevant enough to be
worth processing. But how relevant is 'relevant enough'? The
answer to this is best tackled by addressing two further
questions:
1) How much do hearers expect in the way of contextual
effects?
2) How much effort can they be expected to make?
The answer to the first question is that the effects have to be
adequate, that is, the information conveyed has to be as much as
we were entitled to expect, and more relevant than any other
information we could have been processing at the tine. It is
easy to see that when it cones to contextual effects, our
expectations vary from one situation to another. For example, if
an acquaintance asks me, at the bus-stop, how I am feeling these
days, he is not entitled to expect more than a few words on the
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topic. On the other hand, the same question from my G.P. in her
surgery, would probably elicit a more detailed response. The
difference is, quite simply, that of a polite enquiry as opposed
to a request for a Justification of one's presence. We all have
fairly strong intuitions about how much detail is expected of us
in a given context, and most of us get it more or less right most
of the tine. (Ve will be looking later, however, at situations
where hearers' expectations are not fulfilled.)
The effort side of the definition of optimal relevance says that
the intended effects should be produced for the minimum
Justifiable processing effort. From this it follows that an
utterance whose effects could have been more economically
produced is not optimally relevant: so to find an optimally
relevant interpretation, the hearer would have to find some extra
contextual effects, which could not have been more economically
communicated by any other utterance. We will return to this
point in the discussion below on the role of implicatures.
The basic claim of relevance theory, then, is that every
utterance creates in the hearer an expectation of optimal
relevance: an expectation, that is, of adequate effects,
achieved for no unjustifiable effort, in a way the speaker could
manif estly have foreseen. Having found an interpretation which
bears out that expectation - or which the speaker night
rationally have expected to do so - he need look no further. The
first such interpretation is the only such interpretation, and is
the only one the hearer should choose.
On the relevance-theoretic approach, all this is achieved without
recourse to any maxims of communication. I shall look now at
some of the implications of relevance theory for the topics dealt
with in chapters 1 - 3.
4.1.7. Applications of relevance theory 
One advantage of Wilson and Sperber's theory is that it attempts
to explain, not only how speakers succeed in communicating, but
tax they sometimes choose to express themselves implicitly,
ironically, euphemistically, vaguely, and so on. We will look
now at the relevance-theoretic account of some of these aspects
of communication, and draw some comparisons, where appropriate,
with both Leech's and the Searle-Grice accounts.
4.1.8. The_riale_at_implicaturea
We have seen that Leech, in common with Wilson and Sperber,
wanted to understand not only how we are able to recover implied
material, but why we should express ourselves implicitly in the
first place. He cane up with the idea that in order to maintain
satisfactory interpersonal relationships, speakers often choose
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to express 'impolite' thoughts (thoughts that are unfavourable to
the addressee) indirectly, that is, through implicature. All the
politeness maxims are derived from this basic idea. As I have
already explained, Leech did not ignore the fact that the need to
be polite varies from one context to the next, the two main
factors affecting our adherence to the maxims being:
1) cultural norms;
2) the relationship between speaker and addressee (seltand
gther).
The closer that relationship, the argument goes, the less need
there is to be polite. It would follow from this, although Leech
does not spell it out, that speech between intimates is
characterised by less circumlocution, that is to say an avoidance
of the use of implicatures.
Vilson and Sperber approach the question of the role of
implicatures from a completely different perspective. For them,
their use is linked to the notions effort and effect. Because
processing utterances requires effort on the part of the hearer,
Vilson and Sperber believe that any material that can be taken
for granted between speaker and addressee should be left
implicit. If the hearer is put to some extra linguistic effort
to process material which he could have supplied for himself,
something, they argue, is wrong. Consider the exchange in (11),
and compare it with (12).
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(11) He: Would you like some coffee?
She: Coffee would keep me awake.
(12) He: Would you like some coffee?
She: No, I wouldn't. Coffee would keep me awake.
In (11) the speaker implies that she does not want any coffee,
and gives an explicit reason for this, namely that it would keep
her awake. In (12), the sane information is conveyed, but both
the refusal, and the reason for the refusal, are made explicit.
According to Wilson and Sperber, the response in (12), which
costs the hearer more linguistic processing effort, would be
optimally relevant only in circumstances where the hearer could
not be trusted to work out for himself that the speaker did not
want to stay awake, and might therefore misunderstand the
utterance without this piece of information being made explicit.
In other words, a speaker aiming at optimal relevance should
leave implicit everything that she trusts the hearer to be able
to supply with less effort than it would take him to process an
explicit prompt.
Leech night account for the use of the implicature in the
response in (11) on the grounds that it is polite to give a
reason for refusing an offer. What is not clear is which of the
politeness maxims is involved. The agreement maxim ("maximize
agreement with other; minimize disagreement with other") comes
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nearest. We could modify this maxim slightly and say that
refusing an offer is one way of disagreeing with one's
interlocutor. I don't think this is too wild a claim. Indeed,
there is sometimes little difference between disagreeing and
refusing. Consider (13).
(13) A: You want coffee, don't you?
B: I don't think I do.
In (13) A could be said to be making an offer, but at the same
time he is inviting agreement. B refuses the offer, while doing
her best to minimize disagreement, that is to say, she is
adhering to the agreement maxim. I think that it is
uncontentious to suggest that - other things being equal - the
response in (13) is more polite than the response in (14), in
which B appears to be flouting the agreement maxim.
(14) A: You want coffee, don't you?
B: No, certainly not.
Suppose, however, that the reply in (11) Was intended to imply an
acceptance of the offer of coffee. (In certain circumstances,
this would be a possible interpretation.) While Leech's
agreement maxim can be modified to accommodate the giving of
reasons for refusing offers ("if you must refuse an offer, you
are less likely to cause offence if you do so indirectly, through
inplicature"), it is not so easy to explain how the giving of
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reasons for accepting offers represents, also, an adherence to
this, or any other of his maxims. In fact, it could be argued
that to accept an offer amounts to a case of maxim violation,
since it implies benefit to salf. at the expense of other. (The
tact maxim requires of us that we maximize benefit to gther, not
the other way round.)
This well-known Sperber-Vilson exchange has proved somewhat
problematic for Leech. That has been highlighted is a rigidity
in his approach which does not allow for the wide range of
interpretations that can be assigned to a single utterance. It
seems to be the case that if speakers and hearers 'keep to the
rules' (that is to say, if they keep to his rules), meaning can
be accounted for. As soon as they trangsress, as, for example,
when the response in (11) is intended as an acceptance rather
than a refusal, problems arise. If relevance theory fares better
- and I believe that it does - this is because it operates on a
higher level of generality. The principle of relevance applies,
and provides the key to the meaning of an utterance, whatever is
intended by the speaker. It is in this respect that relevance
theory constitutes a radical break from other pragmatic theories.
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4.1.9.
relationship
Inplicatures, for Sperber and Wilson, fall into two classes:
implicated (i.e. intended) contextual assumptions, and implicated
(i.e. intended) contextual effects. Inplicatures, then, are the
contextual assumptions and contextual effects that the hearer is
expected to recover in his search for an optimally relevant
interpretation.
It follows that for Wilson and Sperber, as for Leech, there is a
connection between the use of implicatures and the relationship
between speaker and hearer. Consider the following exchanges.
(15) He: I need to get hold of Hugo. Do you know where he is?
She: Where he usually is after a hard day.
(16) He: I need to get hold of Hugo. do you know where he is?
She: He's in the 'Bricklayers' Arms'.
In (15) the speaker knows that she can leave Hugo's exact
whereabouts implicit. Her response is an economical one,
enabling her to supply, not only the Information requested, but
an additional reminder as to where Hugo can usually be contacted
in the evening. It may even be the case that in responding in
the way she does the speaker is also expressing her attitude to
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Hugo's lifestyle. In (16), on the other hand, only the
information that is asked for is supplied, and made explicit.
Ye have already seen that speakers should leave implicit material
that can be taken for granted, in order to save their addressees
undue processing effort: the fact that they can communicate
implicitly in the first place - without fear of communication
failure - is a function of the speaker-hearer relationship.
Conversely, the more that has to be explicitly spelled out, the
greater the implied distance - in knowledge, abilities or
sympathies - between speaker and hearer. Here I will give just
one example. Consider the following.
(17) He: I need to speak to Hugo. Do you know where he is?
She: He's in the 'Bricklayers' Arms'. That's a public
house. It's just down the road from here, on the
left.
In (17) we have a response that is at the opposite end of the
spectrum from (15). Nothing is taken for granted here; the
speaker even takes some trouble to rule out the possible
interpretation that Hugo is cradled in the arms of a bricklayer.
If the reply in (15) is a marker of some intimacy, the reply in
(17) is a marker of a lack of intimacy - as a result, perhaps, of
linguistic and cultural difference. (For this approach to
inplicatures based on stylistic choices, see Sperber and Wilson,
1986, chapter 4, section 6.)
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It is interesting to note that Wilson and Sperber's reasoning has
caused them to emphasise a quite different aspect of the use of
implicatures. For Leech, remember, the overriding motivation for
their use is politeness; that is, he sees them as a device
enabling speakers to convey 'impolite thoughts' to people they do
not know well enough to speak to in a more direct way. Wilson
and Sperber, on the other hand, emphasise their role in improving
efficiency. Because greater efficiency can be achieved by
leaving implicit material that can be taken for granted, and
since more can be taken for granted between people who know each
other well, it follows that for Wilson and Sperber, speech
between intimates is typically characterised by more, not less,
implicitly conveyed material.
4.1.10. Inplicatures_axLmaguemeras.
Wilson and Sperber do not claim that the only reason for the use
of implicatures is increased efficiency. They argue that often
something is lost by spelling out the implicatures of an
utterance, because implicatures are weak and indeterminate in a
way that explicit communication isn't. One reason for
implicating is to avoid hurting or upsetting one's addressee.
This point can be illustrated by looking again at an example from
chapter three. Remember that, according to Leech, the sympathy
maxim ("minimize antipathy between self and other: maximize
sympathy between self and other") prevents us from referring
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explicitly to a sad event such as a death. As a result, (18) was
considered to be more appropriate than (19) if the addressee's
husband has just died.
(18) I'm sorry to hear about your husband.
(19) I'm sorry to hear about your husband's death.
Vilson and Sperber would account for the greater appropriacy of
(18) on the grounds that the speaker is attempting to divert her
hearer from looking into the encyclopedic entry for 'death', with
all the pain that this entails. In other words, the speaker of
(18) is being deliberately vague in order to make the painful
inplicatures that would be derived from (19) less accessible. It
should, of course, be appreciated that the speaker of (18) would
have to be confident that her addressee would know what she was
referring to: it is the fact that the hearer can be trusted to
arrive at the intended interpretation which enables the speaker
to convey her condolences euphemistically in the first place.
The problem with Leech's analysis is that it lacks explanatory
adequacy. The sympathy maxim explains the greater appropriacy of
(18) over (19) on the grounds that the speaker is politely
suppressing the expression of an thought which is unfavourable to
the hearer, and while this analysis holds good for the expression
of sad, potentially distressing, thoughts, it cannot explain why
congratulations (that is, a thought which is favourable to the
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hearer) might be alluded to in similarly vague terns. Compare
(20) with (21) below. Assume that in both instances Norma's
husband has just been re-elected Prime Minister.
(20) Oh Norma, I was so pleased to hear about your husband.
(21) Oh Norma, I was so pleased to hear that your husband has
been re-elected Prime Minister.
Leech has mentioned that an utterance such as (20) would normally
be interpreted as a congratulation, and on many occasions it
would be seen as more appropriate than the spelled-out version in
(21). But why is the speaker suppressing the overt expression of
a thought that is favourable to the hearer? The sympathy maxim,
which requires that we maximize expressions of sympathy between
self and other, would surely predict that (21), because it makes
explicit the favourable thought, would be preferable to (22),i
On a relevance-theoretic model, the analysis of (20) partly
mirrors that of (18). If the event referred to can be assumed,
the speaker can leave this part of the message implicit.
Moreover, by leaving implicit the event in question, the speaker
is able to create some intimacy ("I know that you know what I am
talking about, because I know how important it is to you that
your husband succeeds...."). This part of the message is only
weakly communicated, and may be absent altogether on some
interpretations, but the point is that relevance theory can
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account for these vaguer effects while Leech fails to recognise
their existence.
4.1.11. A relevance-theoretic account of irony 
We have seen that many speech act theorists subscribe to the
standard view of irony, in which the utterance meaning is the
opposite of what the sentence means literally. This description
of irony was found to be inadequate - remember the 'Peanuts'
cartoon strip cited in chapter two. Wilson and Sperber have
identified other weaknesses in the traditional account (Wilson
and Sperber, 1988). To take an example, they have shown that to
succeed as irony an ironical quotation has to be recognised as a
quotation. Consider the famous utterance in (22).
(22) The Health Service is safe in our hands.
(Margaret Thatcher)
Uttered with derision, that is to say, ironically, by a political
commentator, (22) could convey (roughly) the contradictory of
what the utterance means literally, namely:
(23) The Health Service is not safe in the hands of the
Conservatives.
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If this were all there was to the ironical interpretation of
(22), the speech act account would be perfectly adequate.
However, the ironical interpretation conveys some additional
information that is not present when the sentence is uttered non-
ironically: that Margaret Thatcher cannot be relied on to keep
her word. Depending on the context, it may also convey the
information that no. publicly funded body is safe with the
Conservatives, or that the Conservative Party is an uncaring
party, willing to put short-term profit before the needs of sick
people.
Irony is an efficient vehicle for the expression of attitude, but
for us to recover the opinions expressed in (22), when it is
quoted ironically, we have to recognise that there is an
original, Margaret Thatcher's utterance, which is being
ridiculed. The standard view of irony cannot capture this
important feature of the ironical quotation, unlike the Wilson-
Sperber view, which, as we will see, is ideally suited.
Wilson and Sperber have identified several other types of
utterance where the standard definition of irony breaks down. I
do not want to discuss then here; instead the interested reader
should refer to the paper mentioned above. More important for
our purpose is the alternative view outlined by then.
To understand the relevance-theoretic account of irony, we must
understand the distinction, introduced by Wilson and Sperber,
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between descriptive and interpretive uses of utterances. Put
simply, a descriptively used utterance represents a state of
affairs, while an interpretively used utterance represents a
thought attributed to someone other than the speaker (or the
speaker in the past). Compare (24) with (25).
(24) A: What is her name?
B: Her name is Caroline.
(25) A: What did she say?
B: That her name is Caroline.
The reply in (24) is an example of an utterance used
descriptively, while the reply in (25) is an example of an
utterance used interpretively. It is not difficult to understand
the distinction. The former is a matter of saying what is the
case, the latter of reporting what someone else says is the case.
Interpretively used utterances have two functions. They can be
used to report, or they can be used to echo, what someone else
has said. B's response in (25) is a case of reporting, while in
(26) it is said to be echoic.
(26) A: That was a delicious meal.
B: Yes, a delicious meal.
Echoic utterances not only represent a thought attributed to
someone else, they also express the speaker's attitude to that
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thought. On one interpretation, B is endorsing in (28) the
opinion held by A, namely that the meal was a delicious one. On
another interpretation, she could be said to be distancing
herself from that opinion, and expressing, instead, the view that
the meal was far from delicious. Ironical utterances are a
subset of this second type of echoic utterance, in which speakers
convey their disagreement or disapproval of the thought or
opinion expressed.
Let's return to the utterance in (22) above. As a case of irony,
it fits Wilson and Sperber's definition quite neatly, since it is
recognisably echoic (it represents an utterance attributed to
someone else) and dissociative (it conveys the speaker's attitude
as one of disagreement and ridicule of the opinion echoed).
In some cases of irony, however, the echoic element is less
tangible. Consider Searle's example, the ironical (27), uttered
to someone who has just broken a priceless vase.
(27) That was a brilliant thing to do.
(27) is clearly dissociative in that the speaker is distancing
herself from the view that the addressee has done something
clever. But in what sense can it be said to be echoic?
According to Wilson and Sperber, echoic utterances do not have to
echo actual utterances or thoughts; they can echo the sort of
utterances or thoughts that might be expected to occur. Ironic
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interpretations are often echoic in this sense. Of course, an
ironical interpretation is appropriate (i.e relevant) in a
context very different from the context in which a non-ironical
interpretation would be appropriate. For instance, if the person
being addressed in (27) managed to piece together the priceless
vase with super-glue, leaving no visible cracks, the sane
utterance could be uttered with no ironical overtones whatsoever.
In recognising the irony, we construct a context, however vague,
in which the utterance night be non-ironically intended, and it
is this contrast, between the real and the imagined contexts,
that provides us with the echoic element that is present in all
ironical utterances. (Againcthere are implications here for a
description of humour.)
4.1.12. lieakem_ellactsQisaammunicatinn.
There are times when utterances have well-defined, highly salient
interpretations, as, for example, in the straightforward exchange
of information:
(28) A: What's the capital of France?
B: Paris.
Many exchanges are unlike (28) in that their interpretations are
much vaguer. We have seen, for example, that speakers may prefer
to talk in vague terns when referring to a taboo topic such as
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death. Sometimes, however, it will not be so transparently
obvious why a speaker chooses to communicate through implicature.
Consider the following exchange.
(29) A: Would you like to visit China?
B: I don't want to visit any foreign country.
The response in (29) certainly implies:
(30) The speaker (B) does not want to visit China.
However, if B had merely wanted to convey the information in
(30), she could have saved her hearer some processing effort and
replied as follows:
(31) No, I don't want to visit China.
So why did B respond in the way that she did? Wilson and Sperber
have pointed out that responses such as the one in (29) convey
weakly implicated material, which may be reconstructed in
different ways by different hearers. From B's response in (29),
for example, the hearer might draw any of the following (weakly
implicated) conclusions:
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(32) The speaker is a singularly unadventurous person;
(33) The speaker is xenoph obic or fiercely nationalistic;
(34) The speaker is agoraphobic or has a fear of travelling;
(35) The speaker is a workaholic who does not take holidays.
Which of (32)-(35) did the speaker intend to communicate? We
cannot say for certain, as we could in the case of (30). What we
can say is that the speaker, by answering in this way, gave some
degree of encouragement to the hearer to think along these lines.
The greater the range of possible interpretations, the weaker the
implications will be.
These weakly implicated assumptions pose something of a
theoretical problem. According to speech act theory, successful
communication has to do with the complete recovery of the
speaker's intended meaning. Because none of the inplicatures
(32)-(35) is, in any strict sense, necessary for the
understanding of B's reply in (29), speech act theory would have
difficulty dealing with this type of case.
Relevance theory takes a broader approach to communication.
Wilson and Sperber believe that hearers can achieve only an
approximation of the speaker's thoughts, not an exact replica.
They would argue that there is no definite cut-off point to
distinguish between that which the hearer can or cannot
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legitimately infer, and as a result, they are able to accommodate
within their framework this weakly implicated material.
A great many utterances seem to depend for their effect on the
fact that they convey a very wide range of weak inplicatures.
Consider again an utterance cited in chapter one.
(36) I never think that people die - they must go to department
stores.
Ay interpretation of (38) is given below.
(37) Instead of worshipping God, people (Americans?) today
worship money and possessions. If spending is their
idea of bliss, then paradise is a trip to Macy's, or
Harrod' s.
People (Americans?) find it difficult to accept the
finality of death. It is comforting to think of it
as a kind of extended shopping trip. After all, people
can be expected to return from the shops. (cf. Woody
Allen's comment: "I don't believe in an afterlife
- although I am bringing a change of underwear.")
How similar is my interpretation to yours, and how closely does
it reflect what Warhol actually intended? The answer to both
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questions is that it doesn't matter all that much. What la
important is that we get the general drift of Varhol's message,
that is to say, his jokey, but critical, comment on the value
system of western industrialised society. I think you will agree
that his utterance is more potent than my laborious explanation,
and further, that these additional effects can be analysed as a
wide range of implicatures which the hearer is licensed to
explore.
Many ironical utterances are similarly open to analysis in terns
of weak inplicatures. Consider again (22) above. As an ironical
quotation this utterance enables the speaker to ridicule the very
idea that the Health Service is safe in the hands of the
Conservatives. I have already mentioned that in addition to this
strongly implied material, various weakly implicated conclusions
might also be drawn. In other words, the ironical interpretation
is capable of conveying an indeterminate range of assumptions -
and is all the more effective for that. Indeed, the fact that
ironical utterances have this potential means that irony is a
highly efficient vehicle for the expression of attitude, and
this, in turn, provides us with a rationale for the existence of
irony in the first place.
Ve saw, in a previous chapter, that indeterminacy of expression,
as a feature of verbal humour, is a problem for speech act
theorists. The above discussion demonstrates that vagueness is a
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characteristic of many other types of utterance. Relevance
theory has a clear advantage over speech act theory in that it
can provide us with an account of these vaguer aspects of
communication.
4.1.13. lian=meriaLLS=1111111CaltiLLAUCLLiaguitinn.
I want to make two final points before we look at humour in
relation to relevance theory.
First, Wilson and Sperber have shown that communication is
possible without the use of a code, e.g. language. (I am not
talking about the use of gestures which may be a codified form of
behaviour.) Consider, for example, the following:
(38) A: Where are you going for your holidays this year?
B: (Produces a brochure advertising self-catering scuba
diving holidays in the Seychelles.)
There is no code which says that showing someone a travel
brochure means:
(39) I am going on a self-catering scuba diving holiday in the
Seychelles
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but A can nonetheless work out that this is what B intended her
actions to convey, as it is the only interpretation consistent
with the principle of relevance.
Just in case it might be argued that a brochure naming a holiday
destination can be used to signify the destination itself (in
which case we would be dealing with a codified form of
behaviour), compare (38) with (40)
(40) A: Where are you going for your holidays this year?
B: (Produces a Honebase catalogue.)
It is unlikely that B would infer from this that A is planning to
spend her holidays in the local DIY superstore. He may infer,
however, that B is intending to decorate her house over the
holiday, since this would be the optimally relevant
interpretation in the circumstances.
I think the different interpretations placed on (38) and (40)
prove that the ability to draw inferences is crucial to human
communication, while the use of a code can sometimes be dispensed
with.
Second, it is worth remembering that relevance theory is a
theory, not only of communication but of cognition (i.e. what we
know and can take in). In other words, this predilection we have
to pay attention to phenomena that strike us as relevant is a
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general purpose feature of our cognitive make-up which enables us
to make sense, not only of utterances addressed to us, but of all
stimuli or phenomena. This is important because we can laugh,
quietly, on our own, at something that just happens to strike us
as comic. Ye night also laugh at an utterance in which humour
was not intentionally communicated.
These two final points have been made because it was stated at
the outset that in principle relevance theory should be capable
of accounting for all humour, be it intentional or unintentional,
verbal or non-verbal. It is these two aspects of relevance
theory which encompass that broader aim, although, as I have
already stated, this thesis is concerned exclusively with verbal
humour. In the next and final section of this chapter we will
develop a relevance-theoretic account of verbal humour.
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4.2.1. ; • •	 •	 •	 I	 ii.
Ve have seen that for Raskin (ibid) joke telling constitutes a
non-bona-fide communication. What he means by this is that when
we tell a joke we are not bound by the same linguistic
conventions that apply in bona-fide discourse. The effect on the
addressee is that expectations are subsequently altered. On
recognising the utterance as a joke, the hearer will abandon any
assumptions she might have as to the truth or relevance - in
Gricean terms - of the information conveyed (note 1).
Searle, like Raskin, noted that there is something unorthodox
about our use of language when telling a joke. For him, it is a
'parasitic' form of communication, along with practising
pronunciation, play acting, and so on (Searle, 1969). Yamaguchi
(ibid) adopts a modified version of Raskin's approach, with his
view that joke-telling involves both non-bona-fide and bona-fide
discourse. For Yamaguchi a Joke has both a co-operative and a
non-co-operative aspect. He sees a joke as having two 'voices',
so to speak: the narrator of the joke, who passes the
responsibility for the lack of co-operation on to the fictional
character in the joke. That these diverse views have in common
is that they have all identified the need to recognise two types
of utterance: one that describes a state of affairs in the
actual world, and one that describes a state of affairs which is
somehow removed from the here and now of real life. Indeed,
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Leech's introduction of the terms 'second-order principle' and
'third-order principle' for irony and banter respectively,
provide further evidence for the need to distinguish between
utterances on different levels of interpretation. Yamaguchi
pursues the problem in the most detail, comparing his view with
that of Sperber and Wilson in their paper 'Irony and the Use-
Xention Distinction' (Sperber and Wilson, 1981).
Wilson and Sperber's thinking has altered somewhat since the
publication of that paper. As we have seen, the distinction they
now draw between descriptively and interpretively used utterances
has become a fully integrated part of their approach to
communication. Indeed it is largely because they have
incorporated these two utterance types so completely into their
overall framework that their approach to communication is so
different from any other. For Searle, Raskin and Yamaguchi,
there is an underlying assumption that sone utterances deviate
from the norm, and that Jokes are a case in point. For Wilson
and Sperber, there are no sub-groups of utterance types to which
normal standards of communication do not apply. According to
them, both descriptively and interpretively used utterances are
commonplace in everyday speech, and as a result they enjoy equal
status. This in itself has implications for a theory of humour.
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4. 2. 2. inkt,s_iumi-LliarjaeliY2-1Anguage_1152.
On a relevance-theoretic approach a person telling a joke night
be said to be using language interpretively. There are two
reasons why this should be the case:
1 Joke-telling, as Raskin observed, does not deal with literal
truth. We would not accuse a speaker of lying if, in
telling a joke, she were to describe a state of affairs
that is clearly non-existent.
2 Jokes are, typically, transmitted from one person to
another. They are rarely made up on the spur of the
moment, but are learned and then delivered as and when the
occasion demands.
Because so many utterances are likewise a step removed from
straightforward descriptive use, there is no strong reason to
suppose that any extra mechanism will be required to explain how
jokes work. Wilson and Sperber have given us an outline of how
poetic and ironical utterances convey the effects they do without
recourse to any new terminology. The implication is that jokes,
and indeed all. hunorous utterances, can be similarly treated
within the existing theoretical framework. This view is in
contrast to that of Searle or Raskin, who see jokes as falling
outside a general theory of communication. We will see whether
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this no-special-treatment approach of Sperber and Wilson can be
applied to the description and explanation of humorous data.
4.2.3. An alternative to the violation approach 
Analyses of humour based on the Searle-Grice or Leech models rest
on the notion of violation of the maxims. Indeed I have called
these theories of humour yiolation theories. We have seen that
these approaches to humour are fundamentally flawed because maxim
violation or rule infringement alone cannot distinguish between
the humorous and the non-humorous utterance. For Wilson and
Sperber the principle of relevance is an exceptionless
generalisation about communication. As a result, the question of
violation just does not cone up. It will thus be interesting to
see how relevance theory would account for some of the examples
we have looked at in which, it was claimed, some form of
violation was involved. Consider yet again the exchange in (1).
(1) Diner: What's this fly doing in my soup?
Waiter: Looks like the breast stroke, sir.
On a violation approach, the waiter's reply is said to be comic
because it goes against pragmatic convention. The waiter has
exploited an illocutionary ambiguity (or failed to apply the
maxim of relation) and produced an unpredictable, and hence
comic, response. On a relevance-theoretic approach, there are no
- 190 -
major conventions governing communication, so no broad
generalisations along these lines are possible. To understand
what is going on in this example, all we can do is look carefully
at what is involved in the processing of both the diner's
question and the waiter's reply.
First, in interpreting the diner's utterance, we create a context
in which a man eating in a restaurant is complaining angrily to
the waiter because there is a fly in his soup. Having set up
this context, we now have certain expectations as to what night
conceivably happen next. What actually happens challenges these
expectations. In processing the waiter's reply, we are forced to
create a fresh context, one which involves us in the accessing of
some rather different assumptions. They include the following:
- The waiter (mistakenly) thinks that the diner is actually
interested in finding out how the fly in his soup is
managing to stay afloat.
- The waiter thinks the fly night be doirs the breast stroke.
However, there must be more to the joke than this.
Xisunderstandings arise all the tine. When they do so as a
result of some ambiguity, we are caused, on spatting the
ambiguity, to accommodate the new information, and make the
necessary modifications to the context. Admittedly, the
modifications that are required here take us into the realm of
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the absurd, but it should be noted that a similar adjustment to
the context is necessary also for the interpretation of (2)
below. The lack of humour in (2) demonstrates that this mental
adjustment in itself is not sufficient to create a humorous
effect.
(2) A man went into a restaurant and ordered a bowl of soup.
The soup had a fly in it and the diner complained.
"What's this fly doing in my soup?" he demanded angrily.
The waiter, who mistakenly thought that the diner really
was interested in knowing how the fly in his soup was
managing to stay afloat, peered into the soup bowl and
replied, "Looks like the breast stroke, sir.".
So what is it about (1) that makes it more comic than its long-
winded near-equivalent? Many writers on humour have mentioned
brevity and suddenness as contributory factors to humour creation
(see, for example, Hobbes, 1962; Freud, 1976; Raskin, 1985;
Oring, 1989; Giora, 1991). Certainly (1) is more economically
expressed than (2), and the effect more sudden. But how exactly
do these features of the joke affect our appreciation? Relevance
theory can offer up something of an explanation.
It has to do with the two factors affecting the relevance of an
utterance in a context: effort and effect. According to Wilson
and Sperber we don't engage in mental activity for nothing; we
expect some kind of payoff. As hearers we are entitled to expect
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adequate effects for no unjustifiable processing effort. We are
entitled, in other words, to expect optimal relevance. It is
because of this expectation that (3) was considered more
appropriate than (4), if it is clear that B does not want to stay
awake, that is.
(3) A: Would you like a cup of coffee?
B: Coffee would keep me awake.
(4) A: Would you like a cup of coffee?
B: No thank you. Coffee would keep me awake.
As a general rule, speakers are expected to save their hearers
from undue processing effort by leaving implicit any material
that can be taken for granted and is accessible enough to need no
prompting. This is what B has failed to do in (4). In
processing her reply, A - if he is a normal hearer - is required
to put in more effort than would be necessary to process B's
reply in (3), but with no additional reward in the form of an
extra contextual effect.
(3) and (4) are fairly straightforward examples. In cases where
humour is intended, things become a little more complicated. It
seems that in humorous utterances speakers often leave implicit
material that cannot necessarily be taken for granted. The
waiter's reply in (1) is a good example of an utterance whose
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interpretation involves us in a lot of processing work because
the assumptions we have to supply are not easily accessible.
But still this doesn't explain the humour in (1). Although
hearers expect to benefit from any extra processing that they
have to do, there is no hard and fast guarantee that they will do
so. In fact, it seems that the relationship between effort and
effect in humorous utterances is less direct than I have so far
indicated. I want to suggest that the humour in the waiter's
reply stems, not so much from the (albeit absurd) assumptions
that we have to supply, but from the fact that we have to supply
them at all. In other words, in supplying these relatively
inaccessible assumptions, we are caused to entertain the idea
that the waiter thinks that they gtr_e_ readily accessible, a state
of affairs which gives rise to some further absurd assumptions;
- There is nothing unusual, or wrong, in serving soup that is
contaminated with verminous insects.
- The first question that would occur to someone finding a fly
in his soup is what swimming stroke it is doing.
Vhat I am saying, then, is that there are two layers of
processing here: the first layer enables us to interpret, in a
superficial way, the waiter's response; while the second layer
enables us to appreciate fully its absurdity. The point - that
is to say, the real relevance - of the waiter's utterance comes
in at the second stage. In other words, the humour has less to
- 194 -
do with the state of affairs being depicted, and much more to do
with the sudden insight we get into the waiter's mental world.
The Joke is funny because it is plainly ludicrous that the
interpretation selected by him should be the one the diner
intended.
I think we night now be in a position to understand more fully
the difference between (1) and (2). We have seen that in
interpreting (1) we have a huge amount of work to do,
reorganising our existing assumptions, while in (2) most of the
work is done for us. If the speaker merely wanted to report a
misunderstanding, the extra processing required in (1) would
is
hardly be Justified. However - and thisAthe real difference
between (1) and (2) - the point of the Joke is not to describe
the misunderstanding as such. Rather the person telling us the
joke is commenting on the waiter's stupidity - or, on another
interpretation - his guile. In short, (2) tells us how the
waiter went wrong, while (1) carries with it the additional
information, expressed through implicature:
- Isn't it funny that the waiter should go wrong in this way?
In other words, the Joke is a case of showing rather than
telling. You have to see that it's funny, rather than merely
being told. The sudden rush of laughter cones at that moment of
recognition, and it is at this point that the increased
processing effort pays off.
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Ye will look at another example.
(5) Waiter: How did you find your steak, sir?
Diner: Quite by accident. I moved a few peas and there it
was.
On a speech act analysis, both (1) and (5) were said to involve
the exploitation of an ambiguity, but whereas (1) was analysed on
Rancher's approach, as being ambiguous on the illocutionary
level, (5) was analysed as being ambiguous on the locutionary
level. Because of the surface similarity of these two examples,
it was felt that an analysis which emphasised the difference
between them went against our intuitions. Thus on the revised
version of the speech act approach, (1) and (5) were treated the
sane: both examples were said to involve failure on the part of
the hearer to apply the maxim of relation.
On a relevance-theoretic account, our intuitions are likewise
taken care of. In interpreting the diner's reply we have to
reorganise the context, Just as we did in (1), abandoning
existing assumptions and supplying fresh ones. One assumption we
abandon is the following:
- The waiter is asking whether the steak is all right.
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Ve then replace it with these three:
- The waiter actually wants to know how he (the diner) managed
to find his steak;
- The steak was so minute it could be hidden underneath a few
peas;
- Steaks so small can be obtained.
If this were the end of the matter, the diner's reply would fall
short of achieving optimal relevance, for the extra processing
effort would have failed to yield any returns. However, once
again, the fact that we are being asked to supply material which
cannot easily be taken for granted leads to further implications.
Indeed it is at this second stage of the interpretation process
that we realise we are being asked to entertain the idea:
- It is normal to serve such a tiny piece of meat in a
restaurant and call it a steak.
Thus we become aware of the diner's informative intention:
- Isn't it funny that the diner should pick that
interpretation, with all that this implies, in preference
to the one which was so clearly intended?
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4.2.5. Incleiezziatar4._aexpLeaaralcuLln_luanaliz
In addition to the inadequacy of the notion of violation as
either a descriptive or an explanatory tool, there was a further
problem when these examples were discussed within the framework
of speech act theory. It concerned their indeterminacy. In both
(1) and (5) it is an open question as to whether the
misunderstanding is a mistake or a clever evasion. With a slight
modification to Searle's inventory of utterance types, it was
possible to accommodate this duality. However, the problem of
indeterminacy within a particular interpretation remained. If
the misunderstanding is taken to be deliberate, for example,
there is the further question as to what point, if any, is being
made. Take (5). If it is decided that the diner is pretending
to misinterpret the waiter, we then have to decide whether he is
playing an impish game or whether his remark has some purpose.
If it has a purpose, the most likely interpretation would be one
where the diner is commenting on the stinginess of the management
for serving such small portions. And, in a more general sense,
the utterance could be seen as a comment on all restaurants that
try to maximize their profits by serving minute portions of the
more expensive Items on the menu.
Unravelling a joke like this can lead us into areas which are a
little less than straightforward. Two question marks seem to
hang over this joke:
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- Can we appreciate the Joke without recovering these weaker
impressions I have Just outlined?
- Does my interpretation differ, in some of its details, from
the one the inventor of the Joke intended?
My answer to the first question is yes, and to the second that it
is immaterial; and the point about both questions is that this
kind of individual variation in interpretation is inevitable.
Psychologists have shown that there are many factors affecting
individual differences in humour appreciation (see, for example,
Wolff et al., 1934; La Pave et al., 1976; Bourhis et al., 1977;
Sheppard, 1977; Ruch et al., 1991). One of these concerns our
degree of familiarity with the topic described in the Joke
(Cetola, 1988). If, for example, we have had direct experience
of restaurants where the portions served are small, our
appreciation of (5) is likely to be enhanced. What is important
here is that relevance theory predicts that this kind of
variation will occur, while speech act theorists - to the extent
that they concentrate on determinate aspects of meaning - rule it
out.
4.2.6. The notion 	 optimal relevance
Another major difference between Wilson and Sperber's approach
and that of Grice is that the former introduce a notion of
optimal relevance. Remember that every utterance creates in the
-199 -
hearer an expectation of optimal relevance, and that an
interpretation is said to be optimally relevant if the hearer
obtains adequate effects for no unjustifiable processing effort.
This attempt by Wilson and Sperber to define relevance in terms
of hearers' expectations goes well beyond anything Griceans have
in mind when they talk about relevance. When it comes to
understanding humorous utterances, the notion of relevance as a
comparative concept is a useful one.
Remember that for Wilson and Sperber all phenomena, and in
particular, all stimuli, verbal or otherwise, are processed in a
context, where the context is seen as being drawn from the set of
assumptions that are manifest (that is to say, everything that
can be assumed or inferred) to the individual concerned at the
moment the stimulus is received. In processing the responses to
(1) and (5), a massive reorganisation takes place as we abandon
our existing assumptions and supply fresh ones. Not all Jokes
depend on our making such radical alterations, however.
Sometimes it is more a case of reordering rather than replacement
that is in order. Wilson and Sperber emphasise the point that in
any given context some assumptions are more manifest than others.
They give as an example the case of a doorbell ringing (Sperber
and Wilson, 1986: 40). They say that a strongly manifest
assumption here would be that there is someone at the door. Less
strongly manifest would be the assumption that the person at the
door is tall enough to reach the bell, and less strongly manifest
still would be the assumption that the doorbell has not been
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stolen. Most strongly manifest of all, of course, is the fact,
for which there is conclusive evidence, that the doorbell is
ringing.
Generally speaking, when we respond to a stimulus, we construct
that representation of the stimulus that strikes us as most
relevant. If we then feel that the resulting representation
might be relevant enough to be worth our addressee's attention,
we night produce an utterance intended to communicate it to him.
To be appropriate, this utterance must be consistent with the
principle of relevance, that is, it must yield adequate effects
for no unjustifiable effort, or at least have been rationally
expected to do so.
Imagine this scenario. I am at hone with a friend. The doorbell
rings. My friend utters:
(6) I wonder who that is.
In uttering (6), the speaker is focussing on a strongly manifest
assumption, namely that there is someone at the door. Thus there
is nothing untoward about her utterance. Suppose, however, that
instead of uttering (6), my friend were to utter (7).
(7) Well, I see the doorbell hasn't been stolen.
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The speaker in (7) is focussing on an assumption that, in the
circumstances, is only weakly manifest; and yet, in processing
the utterance, we automatically entertain the notion that the
assumption that the doorbell has not been stolen is relevant
enough to be worth our attention and hence, that it could not be
taken for granted. As with the jokes we have just looked at,
there seem to be two stages to the interpretation process. First
we process the information conveyed, then we are struck by how
odd it is that someone should want to convey that information.
This may affect us in either of two ways:
1 We may feel disconcerted that our addressee's mind should
operate in this way; or
2 We may feel amused that it should do so.
Indeed it may be that humour was intended (add to the context the
information that the house in question had recently been
burgled); in which case we would hope that the hearer recognises
this and is suitably amused.
4.2.7. I.
This foregrounding of weakly manifest (and hence inadequately
relevant) assumptions is used widely in humour. We will see that
many riddles work in just this way. Consider (8).
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(8) A: What's the difference between an elephant and a biscuit?
B: You can't dip an elephant in your tea.
It is an indisputable fact that an elephant cannot be dipped in a
cup of tea, but this is not the kind of assumption that springs
to mind when pondering the difference between elephants and
biscuits. What da spring to mind are highly relevant assumptions
such as (9) and (10).
(9) Elephants are large, biscuits are small.
(10) Biscuits are edible, elephants are not.
This automatic selecting of relevant material is something of an
obstruction when trying to solve riddles. Our finely tuned
processing skills work against us in our search for the 'right'
answer. Unless we have heard the Joke before, it is unlikely
that we could cone up with the response in (8).
But why is (8) comic? It seems to me that it is very similar in
its working to (?) - if the speaker of (?) ii tended to amuse,
that is. First, we are caused to entertain the thought that the
information contained in the response might be optimally relevant
to some people. We are then in a position to appreciate the
absurdity of the thought that such information could possibly be
optimally relevant, i.e. that it could contain, not only new
information, but information that night be valuable to the
hearer.
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Note that in addition, (8) is constructed to ensure that it
achieves maximum effect. Because we are asked specifically to
think about the difference between elephants and biscuits, we are
encouraged to bring to mind assumptions such as (9) and (10).
This can only to serve to divert us from the kind of response our
addressee is looking for. When we are finally given the answer,
the contrast between our world and this joke world is thrown into
sharp relief. Noreover, the joke is phrased in such a way that
we are led to think that there is one - and only one - highly
significant difference between elephants and biscuits. (Notice
that we are asked for the, not a., difference.) This can only
serve to heighten the absurdity of the answer. In this sense,
(8) could be seen as a more extreme version of (7). In (7) a
weakly manifest assumption is given prominence; while in (8) a
weakly manifest assumption is singled out as being the only
assumption worth considering at all.
There is another aspect to the phrasing of (8) that deserves
mention. Compare (8) with (11).
(11) A: What's the difference between an elephant and a
biscuit?
B: You can dip a biscuit in your tea.
I think it is uncontroversial to say that the response in (8) is
more conic than the response in (11). We will try to understand
why. B's reply in (8) states explicitly that:
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- You cannot dip an elephant in your tea
and implies that:
- You can dip a biscuit in your tea.
B's reply in (11) differs in that what is explicit in (8) is
rendered implicit, while the implicit material in that example is
rendered explicit. In terns of what is strongly communicated,
then, the information conveyed in the two utterances is
identical. The difference seems to lie in the weaker effects
that each utterance conveys. To assert that something can't be
done suggests that some people think otherwise; that is, (8)
gives rise to the absurd thought that someone lacking the vital
information it contains might, on coming across an elephant,
actually attempt to dip it in his tea. This idea is given much
less prominence in (11), and is therefore unlikely to be
recovered.
All riddles which foreground a weakly manifest assumption work by
creating these absurd impressions, with the style of the response
being very closely linked to the effect obtained. Another
example is given below.
(12) A: What's the difference between a lemon and an elephant?
B: A lemon is yellow.
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Again, the answer to this riddle, though true, is not relevant
enough to fulfill our expectations. Because we automatically
think of circumstances in which it would be relevant enough, the
joke is funny. However, as with (8) above, the style of the
response is inextricably linked to the creation of the humorous
effect. Compare (12) with (13).
(13) A: What's the difference between a lemon and an elephant?
B: An elephant is grey.
(13) is less funny that (12), isn't it? I think the difference
here lies in the fact that the word lemon is commonly used as a
colour term. We can say, for instance:
(14) The Princess of Wales looked radiant in a lemon suit with
matching accessories.
As a result, the word lemon is linked more firmly in our minds
with yellowness than the word elephant is with greyness. This is
illustrated by (15), which would seem to sug,est, not that the
Prince of Wales is wearing grey, but that he is in fancy dress.
(15) The Prince of Vales looked equally dashing in a well-cut,
elephant suit.
It follows from this that the utterance:
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- A lemon is yellow
as a response to A's utterance in (12), foregrounds an assumption
that is less relevant than the assumption that is foregrounded in
the utterance
- An elephant is grey.
In other words, the assumption a lemon is yellow is so obvious to
everyone that it is not worth remarking on. The greyness
	 of
elephants is not particularly worth remarking on either, but has
slightly more news value, (i.e relevance), than the yellowness of
lemons. Because of this, the person who needs - that is, would
find relevant - the information that lemons are yellow is just
slightly more green that the person who needs to be told that
elephants are grey.
Although Hancher does not discuss this type of example, it could
be argued that both (8) and (12) involve a violation of the maxim
of relation. The problem is that Grice fails, on his own
admission, to give a precise enough definition of relevance, and,
in cases such as these, where some notion of optimal relevance,
or at least degrees of relevance, is required, straightforward
violation of the relation maxim is inadequate to describe what is
going on. It would mean, for example, that we should be unable
to distinguish between (8) and (12), which are comic, and (16),
below, which is not.
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(16) A: What's the difference between an elephant and a
biscuit?
B: We all like biscuits.
Second, the differing effects obtained by stylistic variants,
which are neatly captured by relevance theory, with its twin
notions of effect and effort, fall outside the scope of the
Searle-Grice model.
Giora's (1991) analysis - in which it is claimed that a Joke is
well-formed if it (a) obeys the Relevance Requirement and (b)
violates the Graded Informativeness Requirement (Giora, 1991) -
is, in some respects, an improvement on the Searle-Grice model.
It would successfully eliminate the non-comic exchange in (16),
for instance, on the grounds that the Relevance Requirement is
not met. However, in common with the Searle-Grice model, Giora's
analysis cannot handle stylistic variants: it would be likewise
unable to distinguish between the comic exchange in (8) above and
its non- comic near-equivalent in (11).
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4.2.8.
alalunacill—A–briel–raumadr-IL
At this point it may be worth sumnerising my position so that
some important differences between the relevance-theoretic
approach and the speech act analysis may be clearly understood.
Remember that for Hancher humorous utterances thwart our
expectations, with violation of Grice's maxims and Searle's
conditions being used as a means to this end. On the basis of
the examples we have looked at so far in this chapter it might
seem that a relevance-theoretic analysis is not significantly
different from this, by now fairly well established, view. After
all, both the waiter-diner Jokes and the elephant Jokes
considered above were analysed as necessitating a restructuring
of the context, brought about by the fact that they contained
utterances which went against our expectations.
I think that one significant difference is that relevance theory
pushes the analysis a stage further. What I have tried to show
is that the humour lies not in the context modification as such,
but in the assumptions underlying the fact that we have to modify
the context in the first place. Being taken by surprise is not
in itself funny, but sometimes, in processing these surprising
utterances for optimal relevance, we are transported into a world
that is absurdly comic. In other words, it is not the thwarted
expectations but the subsequent cognitive reorganisation that
seems to be more closely linked to the humorous effect (note 2).
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Another feature of the relevance-theoretic approach which has
emerged in the course of the above discussion, concerns the idea
that humour depends, to some extent, not (or not only) on the
type of content, but on the way the content is communicated.
Comparisons between (1) and (2), (8) and (11), and (12) and (13)
were used to illustrate how the wording of a joke can be crucial
to the effect obtained.
4.2.9. Beyond the level of the exchange 
Ye have noted the usefulness of the notions of optimal relevance
and degrees of relevance: another characteristic of the
relevance-theoretic model is that it has implications above the
level of the exchange. Vilson and Sperber argue that we all have
quite strong intuitions about how much detail is required of a
communicator in a given context, and, as I mentioned in the
previous chapter, what is optimally relevant in one context is
not necessarily optimally relevant in another. I used as an
example an enquiry about one's health, saying that an
acquaintance at the bus-stop would expect a very different
response from that of a doctor holding a surgery. Now
occasionally speakers misread a situation and overburden their
addressees with boring and unnecessary detail. I was recently
subjected to a detailed account of the inner workings of a
colleague's car, offered in response to a polite enquiry as to
whether the said car had been repaired. The situation struck me
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as mildly humorous, which is hardly surprising when you think
about it. What made the situation amusing was the idea that the
speaker should think that I was atually Interested in what he was
saying (that I should find it optimally relevant).
Of course the motor car bore did not intend to amuse - and yet a
parallel can be drawn between this and the examples discussed
above where humour is intended. Again there seem to be two
stages to the interpretation process. First I had to process all
the information about the car - what went wrong with it, what
spare parts were needed, how they were obtained, and so on. Had
I been interested in cars I might have been sufficiently rewarded
for my efforts, and the interpretation process would be
completed. However, my lack of interest in the topic being
discussed caused me to feel intense boredom, as all my
expectations of relevance went unfulfilled, and it was at this
point that I was able to distance myself from the content and
appreciate how absurd it was that such material was being
conveyed to me at all. Once the fact of being told something
takes on a greater significance than the information itself, some
sort of cognitive reorganisation takes place. And in this
instance, as in the waiter-diner jokes above, reorganisation gave
rise to a humorous effect.
People often get carried away by their enthusiasm for a
particular subject, as many comedy writers are keenly aware.
Indeed it may be as a result of exposure to this type of conic
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situation that I found the above incident amusing and not
frustrating. In the extract below we have a variation on this
idea, someone who i prepared to put in an enormous amount of
effort for (what to us would be) scant reward. Tony Hancock is
contacting by wireless a fellow radio ham.
(17) Tony: This is GLK London calling HB 24 D Tokyo. GLK
London calling HB 24 Tokyo. Cone in, Tokyo. (He
adjusts some dials, then listens intently.) Hallo,
hallo, HB 24 D Tokyo. Yoki? How are you? No, no,
no, how ... are ... you? (Tries Japanese accent.)
How are you? This London GLK, how getting are you?
Oh, never mind, how's the weather out there? No,
no, what is the weather like? No, no, is it
raining? Raining. Pitter patter. Water. Wet.
Ugh, nasty. Hallo, hallo. Yes, listening, go
ahead. Sorry, what was that? Yes, I can hear,
no understand. I ... cannot ... understand. Can
you put it another way? Put it another way? Say
it differently. No, in English. Fool! Slowly,
now. Slowly.	 It ... is ... are ... raining not.
Oh, good, good. Very good. It is are raining not
here also. Yes. Cor, this is hard work.
(Galton and Simpson, 1986: 128)
Surprisingly, Hancock does not feel short changed after this
Herculean effort to discover whether it is raining in Japan. He
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has worn himself out, but feels well rewarded for his efforts, to
the extent that he goes on to remark, with some smugness:
(18) Tony: Ah, it's marvellous to be able to converse with
people all over the world. People different to yourself,
with something new to say, it broadens your outlook,
increases your knowledge of things. I bet there's not
many people round here who know it's not raining in Tokyo.
I suppose I must lead what the Social Workers call a full
life. (Galton and Simpson, ibid: 128)
Of course this only compounds the humour for the audience, who
proceed beyond the initial stage of the interpretation process to
recover the author's informative intention - the real relevance,
that is, of Hancock's speech:
- Isn't it funny that Hancock should consider it worth all
that effort, just to exchange the kind of banalities that
are exchanged when we literally have nothing of any
interest to say?
It would be difficult to account for examples such as (17) on a
violation approach. With the exception of ironical utterances,
violation analyses are typically restricted to one or two line
utterances. Indeed, it will be remembered that in so far as the
maxim of relation was concerned, Hancher believed that sustained
violation destroyed any humorous effect that might be obtained.
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4.2.10. Ealmic_atierAnagra._cacLilunauz
I said at the beginning of this section that Joke-telling
generally involves interpretive language use. This is because
in telling a joke we are offering up - in most cases - a report
of a thought or utterance that is attributed to someone else; a
paradigm example, that is, of an interpretively used utterance.
Jokes were also said to represent a variety of interpretive use
In the sense that they deal, not with real-life situations, but
with hypothetical ones. The difference is essentially between
saying, 'The world is like this' and, 'Wouldn't it be funny if
the world were like this?'. All the jokes so far discussed fit
into this category.
In addition to these quite straightforward aspects of
interpretive use, there is what is arguably a more interesting
dimension. It concerns the use of echoic utterances. Remember
the motor car bore above. Now compare that incident with the
following extract from a play by Ayckbourn.
(19) Sidney: I've got some more shelves upstairs. For the
bedside. And also I've partitioned off part of
the spare bedroom as a walk-in cupboard for the
wife. And I'm just about to panel the landing
with those knotty pine units, have you seen them?
(Ayckbourn, 1977: 27)
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Here Ayckbourn is using language echoically to mimic, not the
motoring bore, but the archetypal DIY bore, the enthusiast who is
oblivious to the fact that not everyone shares his interest in
fitted kitchens and stripped pine. Ayckbourn has used both irony
and parody to ridicule poor Sidney. We find parody, the echoing
of linguistic form, in his use of non-standard forms - for
example, the wife instead of my wife. Ayckbourn is mimicking the
socially insecure. Lower middle class Sidney is intent on
impressing his middle class boss, but he unwittingly exposes
himself by using these stigmatised forms. Irony, the echoing of
content, lies in Ayckbourn's ridiculing of Sidney's
preoccupations with home improvements, the struggle for a 'nice
house' - particularly of the fitted kitchen and stripped pine
variety - being, stereotypically, a lower middle class one.
Piddle and upper class people have different tastes, and are more
likely, presumably, to take their pleasant surroundings for
granted.
In trying to be funny we are necessarily expressing our attitude.
At the very least, we are saying something like the following:
- I think this sort of thing is funny and I want you to find
it funny as well.
Because echoic utterances are an important vehicle for the
expression of attitude, we should not be surprised to find that
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they feature prominently in all brands of humour. We will look
at another example of irony, from an earlier chapter.
(20) Linus: My heartiest congratulations! You did it! You
have been crabby for one thousand days in a row!
You have just set an all-tine record! I knew you
could do it! ... Let me shake your hand again.
I'd also like to present you with this specially
inscribed scroll commemorating this historical
event. Again nay I say 'Congratulations!' You
are an inspiration to all the crabby people in the
world!
According to Handier, irony occurs when the speaker overtly
violates the sincerity condition. On recognising that this
condition is being violated, hearers are able to recover the
intended ironical meaning, which, it is claimed, is the opposite
of what the sentence means literally. This account was found to
be unsatisfactory on a descriptive level when it was demonstrated
that the meaning of (20) was not simply the contradictory of its
literal interpretation.
Wilson and Sperber see the effect communicated by an ironical
utterance, not as the polar opposite of, but as a distancing, or
dissociation, from the literal interpretation. So, in relevance-
theoretic terms, Linus is dissociating himself from the
propositions expressed, and thereby indicating something of his
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attitude to Lucy's crabbiness. He is ridiculing the very idea
that she should be praised for being so bad-tempered, and at the
same time he is making it clear that he does not really approve
of her behaviour. Again, it seems that we are dealing not just
with irony but with parody as well. His remarks are ironical in
so far as the kind of things that are said are those that are
typically uttered at prize-giving ceremonies. Parody lies in the
rather ebullient phraseology adopted by Linus, echoing the way
congratulations are meted out on these official occasions. His
remarks are comic because it is ludicrous that crabbiness should
be seen as a quality worthy of praise. (Consistent with this
view - and equally ridiculous - would be the assumption that
good-naturedness is to be derided.) This, then, is a rather
heavy-handed example of irony/parody. The thoughts expressed are
so patently ridiculous that we have no trouble recovering the
echoic element, and hence Linus's attitude of disapproval and
mockery.
4.2.11. Puns and the echoing of fora
The Vilson-Sperber notion of irony as a type of echoic utterance
has proved useful. Examples such as (20), which could not be
adequately accounted for on a speech act analysis, fit neatly
into the relevance-theoretic framework. More subtle cases of
irony, such as (19), are also easily accounted for. It is
important to remember, though, that to be funny echoic utterances
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do not have to be either ironic or parodic. To illustrate this,
we will look at some examples where form is echoed, but without
the use of parody. Consider the following.
(21) Divers do it more deeply.
(22) Non-smokers do it without puffing.
(21) and (22) are based on a rather tired formula, X do it adv P,
of which the original is generally understood to have been (23)
(23) Vindsurfers do it standing up.
In processing (21) and (22), we recognise the formula and recover
the ambiguity, that is to say, both the sexual and the non-sexual
interpretations. To take delight in word-play is a universal
human characteristic, maybe because the extra processing effort
required is well-rewarded (two ideas for the price of one). Puns
are not always comic, however, so the effort-effect explanation
is, at best, only half the story (note 3).
Perhaps it will help us to understand these examples better if we
consider carefully the thoughts we are caused to entertain in
recovering the ambiguity. The first point about these examples
is that they each contain both a 'safe' and a 'risque'
interpretation. The reason, of course, that the sexual
interpretation is risque is that sex is a taboo topic of
conversation. It is thus something of an anomaly to use your
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rear windscreen to announce to the world the nanner in which you
- the assumption is that the owner of the car is a member of the
group referred to - have sexual intercourse. In fact it is more
than just an anomaly: because a taboo is being broken, it is
mildly controversial. Notice, however, that these stickers are
not overtly controversial: there is always the guise of the safe
interpretation. And it seems to me that to appreciate the Joke
we have to recover not only these two interpretations but the
conflicting assumptions underlying then. On the one hand, we
have the subversive playing at being the innocent; on the other,
the innocent is being inadvertently subversive. (Again there is
a similarity here between this example and the waiter-diner Jokes
cited above.) The former interpretation causes us to entertain
the absurd idea that the sexual interpretation is not.
controversial, while the latter causes us to entertain the
equally absurd notion that someone could be so innocent as to be
oblivious to the double entendre. Both interpretations then,
depend on the other for their effect. It is essentially from
this interdependency that the humour stems (note 4).
This idea of controversiality - or, more correctly,
'controversiality . - explains, I think, why allusions to sex
often occur in humour. In French the verb Zaire can be exploited
in the same way that English speakers exploit the verb do (see
Redfern, 1984); while Aristophanes never missed an opportunity to
create a pun out of the ambiguity of the Greek word keles,
meaning either a rowing boat or to have sex. He used it whenever
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he referred to the Salaminians, who had to row across the strait
to get to Athens. (See, for example, Aristophanes, 1983: 182 and
note: 249.) It should be emphasised, though, that there is
nothing intrinsically conic about the breaking of a taboo. What
we laugh at is the idea that a speaker could, in all innocence,
allude to a topic such as sex and believe all along (or have us
believe) that she is acting with the utmost propriety (note 5).
4.2.12. Relevance theory and the 'second-degree joke' 
Some humour theorists have argued that there is a type of joke
which depends for its success on the hearer recognising the
source text (Attardo, 1988; Norrick, 1989; Zaldman, 1991).
Attardo calls these jokes 'second-degree jokes' (SDJ), an example
of which might be:
(24) A: Why did the elephant cross the road?
B: I don't know. Why did the elephant cross the road?
A: It was the chicken's day off.
To appreciate the (rather weak) humour in this joke, the hearer
would have to know that there is an original ("Why did the
chicken cross the road...?") on which it is based. A second-
degree joke, then, is a 'joke played on a joke' (Zafdman, ibid:
38).
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It should be noted that relevance theory has the framework
already in place to account for these instances of so-called
'second-degree humour': they would simply be classified as
instances of echoic use. Moreover, it could be argued that it is
unhelpful to put these Jokes in to a separate category, for the
following reasons:
1) In some cases, recognition of the formula plays only a minor
part in the creation of the humour - e.g. the do it car
sticker jokes cited above, light bulb Jokes, knock-knock
Jokes; while at other times it is crucial - e.g. the
elephant Joke in (24).
2) Recognition of a source text is necessary for the
interpretation of many, non-humorous utterances - e.g.
ironical quotations (Wilson and Sperber, 1988) and
advertising slogans (McCarthy, 1992).
In other words, Attardo's classification forces dissimilar
utterances in to a single category, while at the sane time
significant similarities between 'second-degree jokes' and other
echoic utterances escape description.
4.2.13. Can we distinguish, in pragmatic terns. between the 
ktuanzmiseuuLth
I have talked about the two layers of processing that seem to
occur in Jokes, citing as examples of this the waiter-diner jokes
and elephant Jokes. I have also mentioned how the fact that a
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speaker expresses a particular thought is sometimes more
important to the creation of the humorous effect than the
information actually conveyed. These two processes are, of
course, linked, for on occasions when radical reorganisation
takes place, it is to be expected that the hearer will be struck
- to a greater or lesser extent - by the fact that such
reorganisation was necessary.
This does not mean that the 'double-take', which seems to be such
an important part of the humorous utterance, will provide the key
to all humour. The truth is that very many utterances seem to
work on these two levels of interpretation - some are humorous,
some are not. Take the case cited above of the doorbell ringing.
I said that if a speaker were to utter:
(7) Well, I see the doorbell hasn't been stolen
the hearer may either be amused or disconcerted. (She may also
be neither of these things.) I have already constructed a
context in which an utterance of (7) might Le construed as comic:
it may be disconcerting in a context in which the speaker were
known to have a mental illness. The point is that in both
instances the hearer has gone beyond the initial stage of the
interpretation process; that is, she has focussed not on the
information conveyed but on the fact of its being conveyed.
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What this means is that some of the cognitive processes which
have been shown to result in a humorous effect may equally occur
in the processing of non-humorous utterances. This is not to say
that relevance theory is incapable of distinguishing between the
humorous and the non-humorous remark. (It will be remembered
that the Searle-Grice model was criticised on just these
grounds.) It does suggest, though, that the difference may be
rather a subtle one. Let's look more closely at the utterance in
(7). I said above that if the hearer's house had recently been
burgled, a speaker may utter (7) with the intention of creating a
humorous effect. In order to appreciate the humour, the hearer
would have to recover some of the weak implicatures conveyed by
(7) (when humour is intended). These would include the
following:
- This burglar took everything it was possible to take
- It is usual for burglars to steal doorbells
- Doorbells are of some value.
- Doorbells are easily dismantled and stolen.
In a context in which the hearer is disconcerted or disturbed by
the utterance in (7), it is unlikely that these weak implicatures
would be recovered. Instead the hearer is more likely to infer
something like the following:
- The speaker is off her trolley
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and leave it at that.
The difference is essentially this: when humour is intended, the
utterance conveys a range of weak implicatures, which are part of
the intended interpretation of the utterance; when humour is not
intended (and the bearer is not amused), these weak implicatures
are absent. (A similar point has been made by Jodlowiec (1991)).
So the answer to the question at the head of this sub-section is
yes, it does seem to be possible to distinguish between the
effects obtained when an utterance is humorously intended and the
different effects obtained when that same utterance is non-
humorously intended.
In the final section of this chapter we will consider some
further examples before we address the broader issue as to
whether there is a general pragmatic principle underpinning all
humorous utterances. In other words, we will try to find out
whether humour is, from a pragmatic point of view, unique.
- 224 -
4.3.1. A relevance-theoretic approach to humour (2) 
In order to highlight the differences between the speech act and
relevance-theoretic models, I began the previous section with a
discussion of examples cited by the former. From there I went on
to look at examples which had not been previously discussed in
the literature. This was necessary because I wanted to show how
some particular features of the relevance-theoretic model - for
example, the notion of optimal relevance - could usefully be
applied to humour. There remain to be discussed two types of
example:
1) those jokes that were introduced in chapter three, where
violation, if it occurs, has to do with social, rather
than specifically pragmatic, constraints;
2) unintentional humour.
We will consider below how relevance theory might respond to
these aspects of humour.
4.3.2. An alternative to violation of the politeness maxims 
Consider again the following excerpts from a conversation between
a shop assistant and a customer in a trendy boutique.
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(1) Customer: I wondered if you have these in a fourteen?
Assistant: You what? This is a boutique, not the Elephant
House.
And then later:
(2) Customer: I don't really suit green.
Assistant: I shouldn't think you suit much do you, body
like that ...
On Hancher's analysis there was a problem with these examples
because although it was felt that something was being violated,
none of the existing maxims was capable of capturing the exact
nature of the violation. With Leech's extension of the maxims we
were able to analyse both (1) and (2) as violations of the
approbation maxim. Later on we saw that the problem with this,
and indeed all violation approaches, concerned the fact that
there was no satisfactory way of distinguishing between
utterances such as (1) and (2) when humour is intended, and those
instances when the same utterances are intended as spiteful and
insulting. What would relevance theory have to say about them?
On a relevance-theoretic analysis these examples are similar, in
some respects, to the waiter-diner jokes already discussed. In
both we are required, in the pursuit of relevance, to restructure
our cognitive environment, and in so doing, we are caused to
entertain the absurd. In the case of (1) and (2) above, we are
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transported from the predictable world in which shop assistants
flatter their customers in order to secure a sale, to one where
they mercilessly insult them. (The TV sit corn 'Fawlty Towers',
which had a hotel proprietor treating his guests as interfering
intruders unworthy of his services, was based on a similar idea.)
Moreover, the assistant's responses convey the following, weakly
implicated (and absurd) assumptions:
Vomen who wear size fourteen clothes (the most common dress size
for British women)
- are obese
- should not be looking for clothes in a trendy boutique, but
in a shop that specialises in outsize clothing
- should give up trying to look attractive;
It is immaterial whether
- any merchandise is sold
- the business makes any profit.
However, as with the waiter-diner jokes, the reconstruction that
is required to interpret the assistant's responses in (1) and (2)
is, on its own, insufficient to explain their humour. After all,
if we were to imagine circumstances where the assistant is being
genuinely abusive, a similar reorganisation of the context would
also be necessary. The defining feature of (1) and (2) as
humorous exchanges, it seems, is their echoic nature. Vood is
ridiculing a certain type of shop assistant in these examples; we
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are expected to recognise this and recover her intention to
amuse.
There are other examples from chapter three which depend, on a
relevance-theoretic analysis, on our recognising the echoic
nature of an utterance. Take the sketch involving the bereaved
wife of a popular novelist and an unscrupulous Journalist. It
started like this:
(3) Reporter: Widow Smith? I'm from the 'Herald and Argus'. I
believe your husband's Just died and he was
quite well known or something.
Widow: Cone in then, I haven't done much tidying up since
(They go in)
Reporter: Good excuse, a death, isn't it, to bunk off the
housework?
On Leech's analysis this example was said to represent a
violation of the sympathy maxim, but we saw, in a subsequent
section of that chapter, that a flagrant violation of a
politeness maxim is not sufficient to create a humorous effect.
The utterance in (4), for instance, is not funny.
(4) Congratulations! I hear your husband's Just died.
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On a relevance-theoretic approach the difference between (3) and
(4) is straightforward. In (3) Wood is echoing the kind of
remarks that journalists make in order to get a story. Of
course, Wood's version is an exaggeration of what would happen in
real life, but nonetheless we recognise the sort of character
that is being ridiculed and recover Wood's humorous intention.
In (4) the echoic element is absent, and as a result it isn't
comic.
It seems that all the examples which were described as being
violations of the politeness maxims can be treated on a
relevance-theoretic approach as examples of caricature. Remember
the cartoon depicting the two men at the diner counter, with the
salt, pepper and catsup at the far end, a great distance away.
When one man says to the other:
(5) Would you please pass the catsup?
we said that the tact maxim ("minimize cost to other: maximize
benefit to other") was being violated. Rancher, who introduced a
new regulative rule on the basis of this example, saw the cause
of the humour in a similar light when he said that we do not ask
anything of an equal if we could just as easily do it ourselves.
This clearly seems to be what is going on in this example.
Regardless of their position in the outside world, two strangers
in a restaurant (particularly in a fast food restaurant) have
more or less equal status - in respect of each other, that is.
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The speaker of (5) is thus upsetting the relationship that would
normally pertain in this context. The relevance-theoretic
analysis differs in so far as it goes beyond the recognition that
a social norm is being violated to look at the assumptions
underlying this break with convention. The diner's utterance
suggests that, as far as he is concerned, there is nothing
uncontentious about his request, so we have a lot of work to do,
restructuring our cognitive environment in order to understand
his conception of the world.
But, once again, that is only half the story. The author of (5)
is not merely reporting an incident which actually occurred, for
if he were, the utterance would not be (intentionally) comic.
Central to the humour in this example is the attitude being
expressed. To appreciate the humour, we have to recover the
underlying message, the real relevance, that is, of (5):
- Isn't it absurd when people make outrageous demands, while
acting for all the world as though there is nothing
inappropriate about their behaviour?
The utterance in (5), then, is poking fun at a certain type of
person, and unless we recognise this echoic element, the joke
will not work.
4.3.3. ••	 a;	 I	 IS	 • 	 11 • •	 •
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Ye have looked at several examples which were analysed in chapter
three as involving violation of the PP. (It is worth remembering
that the PP was initially brought in to the discussion because
there seemed to be cases which fell outside the Searle-Grice
analysis, but which were thought, nonetheless, to involve some
form of violation.) On a relevance-theoretic analysis it has
been demonstrated that there is little real difference between
what, on a speech-act approach, would be seen as two different
types of Joke. Take, for example, the waiter-diner jokes of
chapter two (CP violation) and the shop assistant-customer jokes
of chapter three (PP violation). According to relevance theory,
both types of joke cause the hearer to discard some existing (and
easily accessible) assumptions and replace then with some fresh
(but rather unusual) ones. In addition, both joke types require
that the hearer recognise the echoic nature of the language used.
It is this second feature which is linked to the two layers of
processing which is required for the successful interpretation of
these utterances as Jokes. Remember that in the previous section
of this chapter I argued that we could only appreciate the humour
in the waiter-diner jokes when we distanced ourselves from the
content and focused on the fact of its being conveyed in the
first place. It is important to realise that this is equally
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true of the shop assistant-customer Jokes and the catsup example
cited above.
This is not to say that these two types of Joke should be treated
as identical. What does seem to have emerged, though, is that
the difference between them is one of emphasis rather than
substance. In the waiter-diner Jokes the contextual
reorganisation that is required to interpret the response is
arguably greater than in the shop assistant-customer Jokes. The
reason for this has to do with the fact that the former contain a
misunderstanding which necessitates a reprocessing of the first
speaker's question: in the shop assistant-customer Jokes, this
major upheaval of the context at this level of interpretation
does not occur.
It is important to realise that I am not claiming that the
waiter-diner Jokes involve the hearer in more processing effort,
only that they involve the hearer in more effort at the first
level of interpretation. When it cones to the second level, it
may be the case that it is the shop assistant-customer Jokes
which require more effort on the part of the hearer. The
thinking behind this would be the idea that the shop assistant-
customer Jokes are examples of caricature, which means that to
appreciate the humour, we have to recognise the type of high-
handed shop assistant who is being ridiculed and be able to
recover all the absurdist assumptions that go hand in hand with
this. These weak implicatures can only be recovered when the
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first layer of processing is complete. So, what I .a claiming is
that Jokes can vary, in a significant way, according to where the
bulk of the processing effort lies.
The idea that Jokes can be distinguished from one another
according to the nature of the effort required to process them
represents a radical departure from the revised speech-act
approach, which classifies Jokes according to the rules - social
or linguistic - which are being violated. This difference is
highlighted when considering Jokes which were said to violate the
PP because of the emphasis, in those examples, on constraints on
content (for example, the avoidance of the expression of
'impolite beliefs'). On a relevance-theoretic analysis, it is
the form of the utterance which determines how much effort we
have to expend; therefore it is the form which is seen as being
more closely linked to the humorous effect. It is my view - and
one which I hope will become clear during the discussion below -
that the humour in Jokes is largely a natter of style; that is,
it has less to do with type of content and =eh more to do with
the way that content is communicated.
4 . 3. 4. Irsay._ancl_..bantez
It will be remembered that Leech introduces the category of
banter to account for those utterances whose meaning is one step
removed from the ironical meaning. While Leech sees irony as a
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form of "mock-politeness", banter is seen as a form of "mock-
impoliteness" (Leech, ibid: 144).
As a means of distinguishing between those instances of comic and
non-comic irony, this new category was found to be ineffective.
Many cases of banter are nonhumorous cliches, as in the
following:
(8) No rest for the wicked! (Said to someone who obviously gets
little opportunity to relax.)
(7) What a mean cowardly trick! (Said to someone who has
performed a particularly clever gambit.)
(Leech, ibid: 144)
Noreover, some cases of mock-impoliteness which atg, conic do not
fit Leech's criteria. We will look at these examples again now.
Consider (8) and (9) below.
(8) "Sociologists, it is well-known, are hu.dourless left-wing
purveyors of nonsense and truisms."
(9) Bernard: If you could get her to listen to reason...
Jim: She's a sociology student, Bernard.
These two examples were said to fall outside the scope of Leech's
definition because they are impolite (or "impolite") about a
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third party, whereas banter is about saying something which is
impolite to the hearer (Leech, ibid: 144). In addition, Jim's
reply in (9) expresses the impolite thought through inplicature,
while for Leech banter involves the hearer in saying (rather than
merely implying) something which is impolite (Leech, ibid: 144)
On a relevance-theoretic approach, (8) and (9) are
straightforward examples of irony. Ve'll look at (9) first.
In this exchange Jim is ironically implying that sociology
students are incapable of rational thought; nothing particularly
funny about that. Remember, though, that it is only material
which can be taken for granted by both speaker and hearer which
is left implicit. So, because his opinion is conveyed through
implicature, Jim is able to convey the additional information
that he believes his views to be shared by Bernard, and indeed,
by many other people besides. In other words, we are caused to
think of circumstances in which this additional information -
which is actually highly contentious - would be seen as mundane
and matter-of-fact.
Of course, Jim does not really believe that sociologists are
incapable of rational thought, a point which brings me to the
second contributory factor to the humour in this example. To
appreciate the humour, we have to recognise the echoic nature of
Jim's response, that is, we have to entertain the idea that he
holds such a view, but at the sale time we are not expected to
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believe that he - or anyone else, for that matter - could
actually be quite so bigoted.
A similar analysis can be applied to the utterance in (8). Again
the author of a controversial opinion is not endorsing, but
ironically echoing, a contentious view, the only real difference
being that in (8) the contentious view is made explicit while in
(9) it is left implicit. In both cases, it is the
controversiality of the view expressed, together with the implied
uncontroversiality, which provides the key to the humour.
I want to make one further point. On a relevance-theoretic
analysis, the examples in (8) and (9) could be classed, not just
as ironic, but as cases of comic ironic hyperbole. In other
words, while Jim may not really believe that sociologists are
Irrational, he may well hold them in low esteem. As for Barley's
utterance in (8), this can easily be seen as an exaggerated
version of his actual viewpoint. (The fact that speakers can use
hyperbole to express their opinions in this way undermines
Raskin's view that jokes are incapable of conveying information
that is both true and relevant.)
Leech mentions hyperbole in connection with the Interest
Principle, and its counterpart, litotes, in connection with the
Pollyanna Principle. We will look now at the issues raised by
4.3.5. I	 •	 ;	 • Ia •
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these two other principles, and consider how relevance theory
might respond.
principles 
Ve noted in chapter three that both hyperbole and litotes can be
comic, citing (10) as an example of the former and (11) as an
example of the latter.
(10) .... her hair was expensively contrived to look as though
she had just been electrocuted.
(11) Of a man said to have broken up all the furniture one says,
"se was a little intoxicated"
Hyperbole and litotes are said to represent a violation of the
first maxim of quality, so on a violation approach to humour,
both (10) and (11) were described in terms c_ the violation of
the CP rather than the PP. Leech proposes a rationale for our
use of hyperbole and litotes. The former, he suggests, is
motivated by the interest principle, that is to say, we use it to
liven up our conversation, while the latter is motivated by the
Pollyanna principle, the principle which encourages us to
emphasise the positive aspects of life and downplay the negative
side. It was noted that these two principles picked out a large
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subsection of humorous data. In the case of the interest
principle, there seemed to be a good reason for this. The
interest principle requires us to be unpredictable, and hence
interesting. Since, on a violation account, unpredictablility is
seen as providing the key to much verbal humour, we might expect
many utterances adhering to that principle to be funny as well.
It is not so easy, though, to see why utterances adhering to the
Pollyanna principle might be comic. Indeed it is partly because
Leech's account seems capable of telling only half the story that
I want to consider how relevance theory might tackle the problem.
On a relevance-theoretic approach, the utterances in (10) and
(11) would be classed - like (7) and (8) - as ironic. Perhaps it
is the case that hyperbole and litotes are comic when they are
also ironic. If so, there is a simple reason for this. When we
speak ironically, we need to give our addressees some clue so
that they recognise the dissociative nature of our utterance. We
can do this in a number of ways. We might, for example, adopt an
ironic tone of voice, or we may, from our facial expression,
indicate that we are dissociating ourselves from the proposition
expressed. In addition, we may either exaggerate or understate
our case. The utterance in (10) is a case of exaggeration (i.e
conic ironic hyperbole), while (11) is an understatement (i.e.
comic ironic litotes). The hearer in (10) knows that the person
balag referred to did rot really look as though she had just been
electrocuted; similarly, the hearer in (11) knows that someone
who has broken up all the furniture must have been more than just
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a little intoxicated. The elements of exaggeration or
understatement in these examples act as indicators signifying a
degree of dissociation from the proposition expressed; the
hearer, in recognising this, recognises also the echoic, and
hence condo, nature of the utterances. (See Carter (1987) for
further discussion of the ways in which speakers indicate their
Ironic intentions.)
4.3.6. aiatantianal-huma=
It is possible for someone to find humour where humour is not
intended. We had an example of this in our motor car bore from
the previous section. One important source of unintentional
humour is the unconscious pun. S.herzer (1978) notes that with
regard to unconscious punning there are four possibilities:
1) the pun is noticed by both speaker and hearer;
2) the pun is noticed by the speaker but not the hearer;
3) the pun is noticed by the hearer but not the speaker;
4) the pun is not noticed by either speaker or hearer.
The first possibility is probably the most conducive to laughter,
although the second and third are also capable of producing a
humorous effect. Sherzer is not concerned exclusively with the
humorous pun. In fact, his main aim is to show how unconscious
punning plays a role in discourse cohesion. He is aware,
however, of the prevalence of humorous puns involving references
to sex, citing the following example of a pun which was
- 239 -
unintentionally produced, but then laughed at by both speaker and
listeners:
(12) In a course on human sexuality there's a lot to cover.
According to S herzer, it is the topic of (12) which causes
people to look for and to find puns:
"In American white middle class society, when discussing such
tabu subjects as sex, individuals interpret words and phrases
as allusive puns which would probably not seem at all punful
to them if the discussion were about a non-tabu subject 
	
Sacks himself notes that 
	
 it is more natural to talk
about such subjects as sex allusively than to talk about them
directly. My point is that not only do speakers tend to talk
about these topics allusively, but listeners tend to
interpret them allusively." (s herzer, ibid: 334/345)
S herzer may well be right, but this does not explain why such
puns should be seen as comic. It seems to me that when puns are
unintentional we laugh at the thought that the speaker could have
uttered the pun and been oblivious to the ambiguity. This is
similar to the humour derived from intentional punning, the only
real difference being that when humour is intended we know that
the speaker is only pretending not to be aware of the double
entendre; in unintentional punning the speaker is, initially at
least, genuinely unaware of the ambiguity.
4.3.7. • •	 I - I • •
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Sometimes unintentional humour can be reclassified as
intentional. This happens when an individual inadvertently
causes another individual to be amused, and the second individual
then isolates whatever it was that caused him amusement and
presents it for the amusement of others. The slips of the tongue
made by radio and television commentators are one such example.
A selection of them are given below.
(13) Her tine, about 4.13, which she's capable of.
(David Coleman)
(14) Even to my untrained eye, it looks as though she has a long
train... (Ronald Allison)
(15) I must apologise to the deaf for the loss of subtitles.
(Angela Rippon)
(16) Send in your competition answers with your name, age and
how old you are. (Tony Blackburn)
It is easy to make the kind of mistakes cited above, especially
on live television. Nor do such utterances present major
communication problems. In processing the remarks for optimal
relevance, we usually filter out the 'nonsense', and arrive at
the speaker's intended meaning. Some people do notice the
nonsensicality, however, and are amused by these utterances. In
presenting them to a wider audience (all the above have appeared
in Private Eye and subsequently in Colemanballs), they want us to
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be amused as well. This is the sense in which unintentional
humour can become intentional.
There is quite a market for this kind of thing. The now defunct
/Few Statesman used to run a column called 'This England'.
Readers sent in extracts from the press that had struck them as
particularly amusing. The following is an example.
(17) Please advise me how I can best protect my stamp collection
in the event of a nuclear war, from the hazards of intense
heat and high radiation levels. Also, would the resulting
radiation affect the phosphor reaction of my Chambon 'dull
orange'? (Letter in Stamp Collecting, reprinted in The.
!few Statesman)
The person who spotted this letter would have been surprised, and
subsequently amused, that anyone could possibly think along those
lines. In the event of a major global catastrophe there is a man
(I am assuming it is a man) who is more concerned about his stamp
collection than he is about his own safety, and indeed that of
the whole of mankind.
Again, the important thing about (17) is that the mechansisms at
work are identical to those already discussed. To appreciate the
humour in this example we have to abandon some existing
assumptions concerning our own priorities and value system and
take on those of this stamp collector; unless we do this, we
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cannot understand his conception of the world. And the more we
think about it, the more weird is this world of his. First the
author of (17) is assuming that he will survive a nuclear attack
(even when radiation levels are high and the heat intense);
second he is assuming that in the event of a war, life will
continue much as before. Part of the thrill of stamp collecting
has to do with possessing items which are rare and valuable.
Yet, in the aftermath of a full-scale nuclear war, it is likely,
surely, that a loaf of bread will be more highly valued than a
rare stamp. In this context, the vision of a man in his nuclear
bunker protecting his stamp collection, together with his back
numbers of Stamp Collecting, is a ludicrous one. The person who
submitted this letter to the New Statesman could see this, and
wanted us to see it as well (note 6).
The two layers of processing which I have repeatedly referred to
can be clearly differentiated in examples such as (17). When it
appeared in stamp collecting this letter would, in normal
circumstances, require only the one layer of processing: when
reproduced in the New Statesman, the reader is expected to
realise that the person who submitted it is dissociating himself
from its content. In this case, then, (and to appreciate the
humour) the two layers of processing are necessary.
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We have looked briefly at two types of unintentional humour. The
first, unconscious punning, falls outside the scope of the speech
act model. The second crosses the boundary into intentional
humour and should, therefore, lend itself to a description in
speech-act terms. This type of example has yet to be discussed
by speech act theorists.
4.3.8. .; •	 • .	 a	 •	 •	 11 • —	 11111.	 ;I •
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I believe that the examples we have looked at in this, and the
previous, section have enabled us to see more clearly exactly how
humour is communicated through utterances.
First, I have argued that speech act theorists were misguided in
thinking that the humour in Jokes had to do with thwarted
expectations, and suggested instead that the subsequent
reorganisation of existing assumptions was more closely linked to
the humorous effect. What this means is that it is not the
unconventionality of an utterance which provides the key to the
humour; rather it is the extra work that the unconventional
utterance requires of us. Relevance theory holds that we do not
engage in extra processing work for nothing: we expect some kind
of payoff. Where Jokes are concerned, that extra effort is
rewarded when we appreciate the Joke's humorous import.
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Of course it is not enough to say that the answer to humour lies
in the extra processing: we have to explain the connection
between the two. I have illustrated above how in non-humorously
intended utterances speakers leave implicit material that can be
taken for granted (in order to save hearers from unnecessary
processing) but that in humorously intended utterances it is the
less easily accessible assumptions which are left implicit (note
7).
This clearly involves hearers in extra effort, but it still does
not explain why such utterances should be humorous. What I have
tried to show is that leaving implicit assumptions that cannot
necessarily be taken for granted in itself leads to further
implications being drawn. For example, if contentious material
is expressed through implicature, we will be caused to entertain
the idea that it is not contentious, simply because it is the
uncontentious material which usually Is conveyed through
implicature. We have seen that this technique is used
extensively in humorously intended utterances.
This is not the only way that speakers can use implicatures to
convey the idea that contentious material is not contentious.
They can do so by ironically echoing the contentious view. When
this happens, the controversial view can be made explicit, but
the speaker must indicate in some way that he is dissociating
himself from the view expressed. In both types of case, the
speaker wants us to entertain the idea that controversial
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material is not controversial, but at the same time we are
expected to see that, in actual fact, it iaLcontroversial. In
other words, we are caused to entertain an absurd opinion, and
then we are expected to see Just how absurd that opinion is.
This last point brings us on to another important aspect of
humour in utterances. I have mentioned above how it is necessary
that we arrive at the humorous point by virtue of our own
(processing) efforts, and we looked at several examples where the
joke would fail if everything had to be spelled out in laborious
detail. What has not, perhaps, been explained is why exactly it
is so important that the listener finds the humour in the Joke
for herself.
Some psychologists see Joke processing as essentially a problem-
solving exercise: it is the successful solution of the problem
which gives rise to feelings of heightened self-esteem, which is
then manifested in laughter or smiling (Schultz, 1976: 16).
Moreover, empirical studies have shown that the pleasure obtained
from finding the Joke solution increases in accordance with the
difficulty of the problem solved (McGhee, 1973), while Jokes
which are too obvious fail to amuse (La Fave et al., 1976).
I think that there is another reason why the humour in Jokes has
to be 'discovered' by the listener. It has to do with the
relationship between the person telling the Joke and her
listener. We have already seen that speakers who know each other
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well will typically rely more on the use of inplicature than
speakers who are strangers to one another. Xoreoever, when the
implicit material concerns the expression of attitude, we can
assume an even greater degree of intimacy. Now, to tell someone
a joke necessarily entails the expression of attitude, since it
implies, at the very least, something like the following:
"I find this comic and I want you to find it conic as well."
Xany jokes will go further than this, conveying additional
information about the speaker's attitudes to a specific topic,
which the hearer is expected to share. Thus, the very act of
telling a joke implies some intimacy or rapport. If a speaker
were to spell everything out, leaving nothing to the hearer to
work out for herself, she would destroy that intimacy, and
thereby destroy the joke.
I have emphasised that the way the content of a joke is
communicated is crucial. This point is vaguely appreciated, but
I believe that its significance is hugely underestimated. Nash,
for instance, acknowledges the importance of language to humour
creation, but at the same time he adheres to the established view
that the topic being referred to constitutes a vital part of the
joke as well. Lodge endorses Nash's viewpoint. In a recent
newspaper article, he identifies the two primary sources of
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comedy in fiction as being situation and style (Lodge, 1991).
Bergson's thinking was rather different: he believed also in the
two sources of humour, referring to one as the comic in words
(i.e. the humour created by language) and the other as the conic
in situations (i.e. the humour expressed by language - Bergson's
emphasis). However, while Nash and Lodge see style and situation
as being inextricably linked, Bergson believed that humour
expressed verbally derived from either the one or the other.
It is my view that although verbal jokes can be discussed and
analysed from the point of view either of their form or their
content, when it cones to locating their Juinour, it is the style
of the utterance (that is, the form) which invariably takes
precedence over the content. Throughout these final two sections
I have stressed the importance of style to the humorous effect
obtained, showing how - in the elephant jokes, for example - a
minor change to the wording can effectively kill the humour. I
have also demonstrated how humour can be destroyed if the joke's
implicit material is spelled out in tedious detail. As for a
joke's content, I have shown how there is no'hing intrinsically
comic about any particular event or series of events. This
became especially clear in the exchanges between a shop assistant
and a customer, where the shop assistant's responses can be
interpreted either echoically (that is, as examples of
caricature), or non-echoically (that is, as insults). The same
echoic/non-echoic dichotomy was seen in the seriously intended
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letter in Stamp Collecting and its humorously intended
reproduction in the Yew Statesnaa.
Should we conclude, then, that verbal humour is essentially no
more and no less than a stylistic effect? No. The examples just
cited which illustrate how tangential is a joke's content can
equally be used to demonstrate that style is not the deciding
factor either. After all, the stamp collector's letter was
reproduced word for word in the Few Statesman.: thus, with no
change whatever to the style, a serious enquiry was transformed
into a joke.
I think the source of the humour lies not so much in style pez
sa, but in the cognitive activity that the precise style of the
utterance gives rise to. One final example will illustrate what
I mean. Remember that at the end of my introductory chapter I
stated that the central aim of this thesis was to explain the
difference between the humorous utterance in (18) and its non-
humorous counterpart in (19).
(18) Two taxis collided and 30 Scotsmen were taken to hospital.
(19) Scotsmen are very mean. They travel in enor mausly
overcrowded taxis to avoid paying the full fare. Once two
taxis containing 30 Scotsmen collided. The passengers
were taken to hospital.
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(18) and (19) describe an identical series of events: it is the
style which differentiates them. We will see how this difference
in form triggers different cognitive responses.
1) Xassive reorganisation of the context - first layer of 
interpretation: 
In processing (18), the hearer abandons any assumptions she
might have about the number of people who, at any one tine,
would normally travel in a taxi. She would then have to
make some fresh assumptions,
namely:
- Scotsmen are very mean;
- They travel in overcrowded taxis to save money;
- On the occasion in question, two taxis contained, between
them, as many as 30 Scotsmen;
- It is possible for two taxis to hold so many people;
- The taxi drivers in question did not object to squeezing
so many people into their vehicles.
This massive reorganisation of the context does not, of
course, occur in the processing of (19).
2) Recovery of the interpretive nature of the utterance - second 
layer of interpretation: 
The idea that Scotsmen are very mean is highly contentious.
Nonetheless, in interpreting (18), the hearer is expected to
entertain the idea that it is not controversial, and then to
recognise that the speaker is not endorsing the view that
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Scotsmen are mean, but ironically echoing a well-known
national stereotype.
In interpreting (19), the idea that Scotsmen are mean would,
in normal circumstances, be taken at face value.
3) Bearer has to arrive at humorous import by virtue of her own 
efforts: 
In (18) the hearer is trusted to be able to recover the
implied material, which is a measure of the relationship
between speaker and hearer (note 8).
There is no indication in (19) of there being any rapport
between speaker and hearer.
Lastly, it is important to appreciate that the cognitive
processes which are involved in the interpretation of (18) and
(19) are directly related to the use, in those utterances, of
implicit and explicit material. This should not surprise us, as
Sperber and Vilson have pointed out that style is largely
determined by decisions as to what should be made explicit and
what should be left implicit (Sperber and W lson, 1986: 218).
I have isolated style as being crucial to the creation of verbal
humour, and, more important, I have identified precisely the kind 
of cognitive activity that the humorous utterance gives rise to.
One final question remains to be answered: are these mechanisms
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unique to verbal humour? The answer, I think, is that they are
not (note 9). Every characteristic of the humorous utterance
seems to occur in other, non-humorously intended utterances.
Reorganisation, for instance, is required frequently in the
interpretation of advertising slogans, as we saw in a previous
chapter. The recovery of a range of weakly implicated material,
another feature of verbal humour, has been shown by Sperber and
Vilson (1986: 222) to be a defining feature, also, of the poetic
effect. As for the two layers of processing, it has already been
pointed out that the fact that a hearer has gone beyond the
initial processing stage and focussed on the significance of some
piece of information being conveyed to him, is no guarantee that
humour will result. Finally, interpretive language use, although
a defining feature of intentional verbal humour, is widespread -
again, as we have seen - in many other types of utterance.
Having said that, I do think that there is something unique about
the GmAlainalica of stylistic devices employed in intentional
verbal humour. I will compare the ambiguity in jokes with the
ambiguity in advertising slogans. Consider the following:
(20) "Spain - everything under the sun"
This slogan was used by the Spanish Tourist Office to promote
holidays in Spain. On an initial reading it is likely that the
phrase "everything under the sun" will be interpreted as an
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idiom, and only subsequently will it be interpreted as a claim
that everywhere in Spain enjoys gloriously sunny weather.
Reorganisation is clearly involved - and along similar lines to
that which is found in the waiter-diner jokes, for example - but
whereas the waiter-diner Jokes depend for their effect on the
range of weak implicatures that the reorganisation gives rise to,
the advertising slogan aims to get across one single message:
- If you go to Spain for your holidays, you will enjoy
gloriously sunny weather.
The slogan works by causing the reader initial processing
difficulties (and can thus be compared with the Habitat and book
club advertisements discussed above). Once these are resolved,
the intention is that the advertiser's message (that is, the
second reading) will be clearly imprinted on the reader's mind
(note 10).
This sharp focussing of ideas seems to be absent from verbal
jokes. Indeed the difference between the ambiguity in
advertising slogans and the ambiguity in Jokes could be sunned up
by saying that in the former it is used primarily as an
attention-grabbing device, while in the latter it is used to
convey a range of indeterminate, and sometimes quite diffuse,
meanings.
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Another stylistic effect which can be compared to humour is
poetry. Sperber and Wilson have defined a poetic effect as the
peculiar effect of an utterance which achieves most of its
relevance through a wide array of weak implicatures" (Sperber and
Wilson, 1986: 222). One of their examples will illustrate what
they mean. Compare (21) with (22).
(21) My childhood days are gone.
(22) My childhood days are gone, gone.
In both (21) and (22) the speaker is indicating that her
childhood is over. The utterance in (22), however, conveys more
than just the information that the speaker's childhood has gone;
it also conveys the speaker's attitude to the proposition
expressed. It is the hearer's task to recover something of the
speaker's mood, which is, after all, only weakly communicated.
He may infer, for example, that the speaker is saddened by the
realisation that her childhood is over, that she feels nostalgic
for the past, or remorse. Clearly the speaker is trusting the
hearer to be able to imagine what she is thinking - to expand the
context to include some of the things that night be running
through the speaker's mind.
Ve have looked at numerous examples of verbal humour which
likewise require us to be able to access a wide array of weakly
implicated material. Indeed, in this respect, humour and poetry
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could be said to have a great deal in common. A major
difference, though, lies in the absence, in poetry, of the
massive reorganisation which is invariably required in the
processing of humorous utterances. (If reorganisation IA
required in the processing of poetic effects, I would argue that
it is of a much less radical kind than that which is required in
the processing of verbal Jokes.)
What I am saying, then, is that the mechanisms which are employed
in the creation of verbal jokes are employed in the creation of a
number of other stylistic effects. So, although there does not
seem to be a pragmatic device which is unique to humour, the
devices which ere employed do seem to be combined in a unique
way. Humour has stylistic links with both poetry and the double
entendres of advertising slogans, but neither of these makes use
of the sane combination of devices which we have identified as
being characteristic of the humorous utterance. It is in this
somewhat weaker sense, then, that I would want to argue that
verbal humour ifiLunique.
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Chapter One 
1 Hot all writers on humour would agree that humour theories can
be subsumed under just three main headings. Robinson (1991)
identifies five, and Keith-Spiegel (1972) eight, different
theories. I am merely attempting to give a flavour of the
ways people have thought about humour in the past, and have
therefore used the simplest classification system.
2 The news of Varhol's death was no longer hot by the time this
headline appeared, the ensuing article being an appreciation
rather than a news story. If readers had not already known
that Varhol was dead, and if the headline had appeared on
the front page of the newspaper, and not as a review article,
it is possible, indeed quite likely, that the wrong
inferences would have been drawn, and the utterance
misinterpreted. This is also important, since it demonstrates
the extreme context-sensitivity of successful communication.
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3 It should be mentioned that Searle makes a distinction between
'serious' and 'parasitic' utterances (Searle, 1969: 57).
Parasitic forms of communication fall outside 'normal real
world talk' (Searle, ibid: 78), and include play acting, joke
telling, teaching a language, reciting poems and practising
pronunciation. Because he makes this distinction, Searle
might want to argue that it is inappropriate to apply
speech act theory to verbal humour. There are two answers to
this (hypothetical) objection.
1) Linguists working within the Searle-Grice framework have 
attempted such an analysis, and it is their work that is
evaluated. Indeed the notion that humour stems from
some form of violation of the norms of conversation is
now well established in the literature.
2) The distinction between 'serious' and 'parasitic'
utterances is difficult to sustain. It demands that we
distinguish between the spontaneous, witty remark, which
would be classified as serious, and the formal telling
of a joke, which would be considered parasitic.
Furthermore, it implies that the stand-up conic is not
communicating, in any real sense, with his audience -
unless, perhaps, when he is adlibbing.
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4 While there may be speech act theorists who aim to give an
account of unintentional meaning, Searle deals solely with
intended interpretation (see, for example, Searle, 1969,
Chapter 2.6; Searle, 1983, Chapter 6).
5 It should be enphasised that I am not committing myself to
the view that the utterances in (10) and (11) are invariably
humorous and non-humorous respectively. As I have already
pointed out, it is possible to take any 'humorous' utterance
and construct a context in which that utterance would not be
comic.
Chapter Two 
1 /rayon adopts a similar position when he says:
"The teller (i.e of a Joke) must be lying or telling about
an event in an imaginary world. Either way, the teller is
aware of the sane knowledge as the listener is, and the
protagonists seem to obey the laws of the hypothetical
world in which they reside. If they do not, that can be a
good subject for Joking..." (/rayon, 1988: 214)
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2 There is a question, though, as to how the narrator's
behaviour can be seen as conforming to the maxims. Raskin's
answer to this is that when speakers are in joke-telling mode
they abide by a set of maxims which are quite different from
the ones which apply when speakers are engaged in bona-fide
discourse. Yamaguchi rejects this view, arguing that "we
do not need another cooperative principle for Joke-telling"
(Yamaguchi, ibid: 324), and yet he fails to explain exactly
how the narrator's contribution can be construed as true,
informative, relevant, and so on.
Chapter Three 
1 This solution may be objected to on the grounds that a new
problem is created, namely that a theoretical account is
needed of how the appropriate point is determined. How do
speakers know, in other words, the extent to which they
should apply these politeness maxims? The answer, I think,
is that as members of a speech community we just da know
what the social and cultural norms are, and are able to
determine, with a fair degree of accuracy, how much
approbation, modesty or sympathy, and so on, is appropriate
in a given context. Moreover, it is because these politeness
maxims are culture-specific that non-native speakers are
likely to make judgements that do not match native speaker
intuitions.
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Chapter Four 
1 Raskin has actually gone further than this, committing himself
to the view that the purpose of a Joke is to create an effect
and not to convey information:
"The purpose of .... joke telling is not to convey any
information ... but rather to create a special effect, with
the help of the text, namely to make the hearer laugh."
(Raskin, op.cit: 101)
Zhao (1988) has shown, however, that Jokes are capable of
creating an effect and conveying information. An example
from Nash (op.cit) will illustrate.
Consider the following:
- Living in Coventry is like watching a plank warp.
Someone who is unfamiliar with the Midlands, and who has no
preconceived ideas about life in Coventry, will be able to
infer from this humorously intended piece of graffiti that
Coventry is an unexciting place to live. Of course, living
in Coventry cannot be quite so boring as watching a plank
warp, but nonetheless, the hearer gets the gist of the
message, along with its humorous import, which will give him a
flavour, perhaps, of life in a fairly nondescript Midlands
city.
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2 In his paper on the nature of punchlines, Oring (1989) also
identifies cognitive reorganisation as a feature of humour
appreciation. Tannen (1987) talks about a "frame shift",
while Morreall (1983) argues that laughter results from a
"pleasant psychological shift".
3 Hockett argues that these do it car stickers are actually
double entendres, not puns. He explains the difference as
follows:
"In the exact pun, two distinct words or phrases happen to
be phonemdcally identical, whereas in the double entendre a
single word or phrase has two relevant ranges of meaning,
both brought to the hearer's attention by context. This
distinction may not always be easy to make, and may be
spurious." (Hockett, 1977: 250)
4 Raskin (op.cit: 150) also discusses these do it car stickers,
since they fit neatly into his view that humour stems from the
overlapping of two opposing scripts. It is important to
appreciate the difference between Raskin's position and that
of the relevance-theoretic position outlined here. For Raskin
It is merely the Juxtaposition of the two opposing ideas that
creates the humour. According to relevance theory, the humour
stems from the sudden insight we get into two contrasting
mental worlds.
5 In contrast, Freud (1976) believed that obscene jokes (his
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term) are found in abundance because they give us a much-
needed release from our inhibitions. He further believed that
to indulge in sexual humour represented a saving in psychic
energy since it takes effort to suppress 'forbidden' - that
Is, sexual - thoughts.
6 An analogy can be drawn here between these examples and the
work of artists such as Karcel Duchanp. By isolating the
urinal from its usual context, Duchamp caused the spectator
to see it in a different light: he transformed it into an
art object. These gratuitous utterances can likewise be
transformed into Jokes.
7 Other humour researchers - for example, Freud (1976), Koestler
(1964), Dolitsky (1983), Eetzron (1991) - have mentioned the
contribution of implicitly conveyed information to the
creation of verbal humour. However, none of these give a
precise enough description of the kind of information that is
typically left implicit, nor do they attempt to explain
exactly why this mode of communication might be comic.
8 Oring is an incongruity theorist who has noted the importance
of effort and discovery to humour appreciation (Oring, 1989):
"... 'getting a Joke' involves more than being presented
with an appropriate incongruity. It requires effort. An
appropriate incongruity must, to some extent, be
discovered." (Oring, 1989: 358, author's emphasis)
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9 Many writers on humour - for example, McGhee (1972), Xorreall
(1983), Mayon (1988), Goldstein (1990), Hetzron (1991) - have
considered whether there is a common thread to humour -
something that could be called its 'essence'. The consensus
nowadays is that it is too diverse a phenomenon to be reduced
to a single, unifying formula.
10 Giora (1991), who has also considered the difference between
jokes and advertising slogans, disagrees with this analysis.
She believes that the ambiguity in jokes is resolved (i.e.
cancelled and replaced), while in commercial texts the two
interpretations are retained. One of her own examples will
illustrate. Consider the following:
"Don't leave without a good buy" (sign on an airport
store, cited by Giora (ibid: 477))
According to Giora, the above slogan is a witty text (but not
a joke) because the ambiguity remains unresolved: both
interpretations ("don't leave without saying good-bye"/"don't
leave without buying something") are seen as relevant and are
thus retained. While this may be true, to some extent, of
her example, it does not hold good for the slogans discussed
above - the Habitat slogan, for instance - in which it is
vital that the initial interpretation is abandoned.
Moreover, we have looked at many examples of humorous texts
which depend for their effect on the ambiguity flat_ being
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resolved. There is clearly a danger in drawing conclusions
from a highly restrictive sample of data.
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